Kravchuk and the coup (09/01/91)

Kravchuk and the coup

by Dr. Roman Solchanyk
RFE/RL Research Institute

The attempted coup d'état of August 18-19, which appears to have been primarily if not exclusively aimed at preventing the territorial disintegration of the Soviet Union, has achieved the exact opposite. On August 24, the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, in direct consequence of the failed coup, adopted a declaration on the independence of Ukraine. Earlier, Latvia and Estonia declared themselves independent; Ukraine, Byelorussia and Moldova followed suit.

Ukrainian independence and the temporary suspension of the activities of the Communist Party of Ukraine, which has been the main force in the republic acting to preserve the Soviet Union as a "renewed federation," have dramatically and quite suddenly transformed the political situation in Ukraine. The balance of power has shifted in favor of the democratic opposition which, although differing in its tactics, has been united on the fundamental question of state independence.

The Communist Party has been disgraced as an institution and some of its leaders are likely to face criminal charges for promoting the failed coup in the republic.

Among the many questions that have yet to be answered is the eventual fate of Leonid Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, who has cautiously steered a middle course between the opposition and the Communist-backed majority in Parliament, and who, at least prior to the failed coup, was the leading candidate in the republican presidential elections scheduled for December 1.

Questions about Mr. Kravchuk's political future have been raised in connection with his initial reaction to the developments in Moscow. His first public statement, at 4 p.m. on August 19 on republican television and radio, neither supported nor condemned the coup. The Ukrainian leader called on citizens to remain "calm and patient," saying that the Supreme Soviet had thus far not received any official documents from Moscow and that in due course an evaluation of the situation would be made by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Supreme Soviet itself. In such extraordinarily serious political matters, he maintained, one should not be "in a hurry with appraisals," which in any case should be undertaken by "the collective organ elected by the people."

At the same time, he added, there could be no doubt that in a law-based state everything, including the introduction of a state of emergency, must be done on the basis of the law. Mr. Kravchuk noted that a state of emergency had not been introduced in Ukraine and emphasized that all legally elected state organs were functioning throughout the republic.

It was only towards the end of his address that Mr. Kravchuk hinted at the illegality of the coup. Appealing for unity "in the name of democracy," Kravchuk said: "It is precisely our unity that will guarantee the failure of attempts of whatever kind by whomever to act outside of the Constitution, to return society to the kinds of ruling or other structures, both in the center and locally, which could stand above the law."

Much more compromising was Mr. Kravchuk's appearance that evening on central television's main news program "Vremya," where he said that "that which has happened should have happened," adding that perhaps it could have taken other forms. The main problem, he argued, was that the center was incapable of governing.

Later, at a press conference for foreign journalists on August 22, Mr. Kravchuk explained that the broadcast was heavily censored to remove any criticism of the coup leaders. He also revealed that Boris Yeltsin had called him on the morning of August 19 and that he had told the Russian president, "I will never recognize this committee [State Committee on the State of Emergency in the USSR] and Yeltsin thanked me for this." Western journalists later reported that Mr. Yeltsin had indeed stated that Mr. Kravchuk and Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev had backed the Russian leader's, strike call, although a joint statement by the leaders of the three largest republics, which had been expected, never materialized.

Mr. Kravchuk was afforded another opportunity to publicly air his views on developments in an interview with correspondents for republican television and radio on the evening of August 20, directly after the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet adopted a declaration on the situation. In the course of the interview, he repeated his argument from the previous evening - i.e., that the center could not manage the situation, but that nonetheless it did not want to hand over power to the republics. At the same time, he suggested that the announcement by the coup leaders of Mikhail Gorbachev's illness was unconvincing and that he would demand full information on the status of the Soviet president's health.

Then Mr. Kravchuk, in what could be interpreted as a statement recognizing the State Committee on the State of Emergency in the USSR, said: "I feel that this committee that has just been formed has already made quite a few mistakes. Well, that's normal because it is a new formation, it has not found itself yet. But can this be corrected? I think that it can and that this should be done by the extraordinary session of the [USSR] Supreme Soviet, which, as has been announced, will convene on August 26."

In the next breath, Mr. Kravchuk told the correspondents that, to the extent that it was possible, he would press that Mr. Gorbachev be invited to the Supreme Soviet session in Moscow. If health reasons would not permit him to attend, then a statement from the Soviet president should be read at the session. Further, he expressed doubt as to why the State Committee had been formed if, as the coup leaders had said at their press conference, Mr. Gorbachev would eventually resume his post. Mr. Kravchuk emphasized that these were his personal views. Once again, the Ukrainian leader did not take a clear-cut stand. Moreover, conspicuous by its absence was any indication of support for the position taken by Mr. Yeltsin.

Shortly before Mr. Kravchuk's interview, the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, which was called into session at 6 p.m. the previous day, adopted a declaration on the situation containing the following main points:

(1) a full analysis and appraisal of the situation in the aftermath of the formation of the State Committee would be made by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet following decisions taken by the extraordinary session of the USSR Supreme Soviet scheduled for August 26;
(2) prior to a decision taken by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet the resolutions of the State Committee have no juridical foundation on the territory of Ukraine;
(3) a state of emergency has not been introduced in the republic and the Presidium sees no justification for its introduction;
(4) the Constitutions of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR and the appropriate laws and resolutions remain in force and the legally elected organs of state rule and administration are exercising their duties; and
(5) the Presidium intends to consistently defend the state sovereignty of Ukraine, human rights and the democratic achievements initiated in 1985.

Further, the declaration called on local councils of people's deputies, leaders of state organs, enterprises and organizations, leaders of political parties, public groups and mass movements, and citizens of the republic to do everything in their power to prevent a destabilization of the situation and refrain from strikes, meetings and demonstrations.

The declaration, which was supported by 15 of the 25 members of the Presidium who were present, including Mr. Kravchuk, was later criticized by the democratic opposition both for its tardiness and its indecisiveness. The main problem, according to Izvestia, was the difficulty in overcoming the wait-and-see attitude of a part of the Presidium membership.

The leader of the parliamentary opposition National Council, Ihor Yukhnovsky, addressing the August 24 extraordinary session of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, accused Mr. Kravchuk of failing to express his stand during the Presidium session. According to Mr. Yukhnovsky, Mr. Kravchuk banned the discussion and even the reading of a telegram in support of the RSFSR leadership at the Presidium session, suggesting that the Ukrainian leader had struck a deal with Army Gen. Valentin Varennikov, commander-in-chief of Soviet ground forces, with whom he had met on the morning of August 19 in Kiev.

Mr. Kravchuk, who addressed the Ukrainian Parliament before Mr. Yukhnovsky, claimed that he emphasized from the very start of the Presidium session that he would never recognize the legality of the State Committee. At the same time, he agreed that the declaration was late in coming and that, from the present vantage point, it was indeed "soft." As for his meeting with Gen. Varennikov, Mr. Kravchuk informed the Ukrainian deputies that the former "unceremoniously" warned him that any attempts to ignore decisions of the State Committee or acts of civil disobedience would result in the introduction of a state of emergency. "So, we had to act responsibility," said Mr. Kravchuk, "manifesting concern for the fate of the people, who at any moment could have been drawn into a catastrophe by the ill will of the insurrectionists." He also said that he told Gen. Varennikov that the State Committee was an unconstitutional body which could not be recognized until the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet and that this could be verified by First Vice-Premier Kostiantyn Masyk, who was present during the discussion.

Earlier, at the August 22 press conference, Mr. Kravchuk told foreign journalists: "I understood from him (Varennikov) that I was on the blacklist after Yeltsin - the Baltics, Yeltsin and then me."

Both at the press conference and during the extraordinary session of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, Mr. Kravchuk defended himself against accusations of wavering with the argument that, unlike the Russian president, as chairman of the Supreme Soviet he was not empowered to issue decrees, only to sign decisions of the Presidium. Consequently, at the Supreme Soviet session he asked for special powers until the election of a president, which were granted.

For Mr. Kravchuk, the turnaround came on August 21 in still another evening interview for republican radio and television, which witnessed the first express public criticism of, in Mr. Kravchuk's words, "the so-called Emergency Committee." "I consider that it no longer exists," he said, "and actually it never existed. This was a deviation from the democratic process, from the constitutional and legal process." In the course of the interview, Mr. Kravchuk noted that he was the first of the republican leaders to get in touch with Mr. Gorbachev in Crimea. He also revealed that earlier in the day he had telephoned Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Anatoly Lukyanov and delivered what amounted to an ultimatum.

The Ukrainian leader is reported to have sold Mr. Lukyanov that:

(1) he personally does not and never will recognize the State Committee;
(2) the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet would shortly convene an extraordinary session which, he was confident, would also not recognize the State Committee's legitimacy;
(3) the USSR Supreme Soviet could not be convened in the absence of Mr. Gorbachev; and
(4) an appeal to the citizens of Ukraine not to heed any orders from the State Committee would be issued immediately. In a separate message to Mr. Lukyanov, also issued on August 21, Mr. Kravchuk again demanded President Gorbachev's presence at the USSR Supreme Soviet.

After August 21, the steps taken by the would-be Ukrainian president were fairly predictable. On August 24, Mr. Kravchuk told the extraordinary session of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet that he had decided to resign from the CPSU Central Committee and the Politburo and Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. Several days later, there was an as yet unconfirmed Western report that Mr. Kravchuk left the party altogether and that, in his words, he had made his decision already on August 19, the first day of the attempted coup.

Clearly, Mr. Kravchuk's behavior during the dramatic days of August 1921 reveals a number of contradictions and leaves many questions unanswered. Yet, there is little doubt that, over all, the Ukrainian leader hesitated to take a decisive stand against the plotters in Moscow. Further, there are indications suggesting that even when he acted more resolutely it was a result of pressure from the democratic forces. Thus, according to one report, the "threatening" telephone call to Mr. Lukyanov on August 21 followed a 3 a.m. call to Mr. Kravchuk from representatives of the National Council demanding that he contact Moscow and unequivocally denounce the State Committee.

Similarly, the convening of the extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet on August 24 appears to have been the work of the National Council which gathered the necessary 150 signatures required for an extraordinary cession of the Parliament. Mr. Kravchuk, it will be recalled, favored holding the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet session after the USSR Supreme Soviet convened on August 26, a position that was reflected in the declaration of the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet on August 20.

The impact of all of this on Mr. Kravchuk's political life is equally unclear. Opposition deputies called for an inquiry into Mr. Kravchuk's behavior during the attempted coup at the extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet. Earlier, a Rukh spokesman demanded that the post-coup "cleanup" in Ukraine begin with Mr. Kravchuk himself. Similar demands could be heard in the streets of Kiev.

Volodymyr Hryniov, deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, who was one of the first Ukrainian leaders to denounce the attempted coup in an interview in Komsomolskoye Znamia published on August 20, has said that Mr. Kravchuk has lost "authority and popularity." But whether this will seriously affect the outcome of the December 1 presidential vote remains questionable. Moreover, in the weeks and months to come, it can be expected that Mr. Kravchuk will take an even harder line on Ukrainian independence, which is sure to be greeted favorably by the electorate. That process has already begun.

At a press conference on August 28, the Ukrainian leader said that "today there can be no talk about a union treaty." Ukraine's position, he maintained, will be clarified after the December l referendum on Ukraine's independence. The determining factor, however, may prove to be neither his behavior on August 19-21 nor his position on Ukrainian independence, but rather the outcome of the newly emerging relationship between Ukraine and Russia.