FOR THE RECORD: CIUS reacts to Russian ambassador's essay
Following is the full text of a letter to the editor sent to Foreign Affairs by Dr. Bohdan Klid, assistant to the director of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies based in Edmonton at the University of Alberta. The letter is a response to a fall 1992 article by Vladimir Lukin, Russia's ambassador to the United States.
In his essay "Our Security Predicament" (Foreign Affairs, fall 1992), Russia's ambassador to the U.S., Vladimir Lukin, begins by describing Russia as "a country of paradoxes;" paradoxical is also a good word to describe his vision of Russia's future foreign policy. While claiming that Russia has discarded its imperial past, Mr. Lukin argues, throughout his entire essay, for its continuation in the form of a Russian protectorate over the other, now nominally independent, former Soviet republics.
Although one could challenge many of the concepts proposed by Ambassador Lukin, it is worthwhile to focus on his argument that Russia should protect "the interests and rights of Russians and other minorities" who live outside the Russian Federation's frontiers. It is already clear that Russia's support of its ethnic kin in Moldova, who have formed a quasi-state called the Dniester Republic on the borders of Ukraine and Moldova, has caused much bloodshed and instability, thereby undermining Moldova's sovereignty. This problem is still explosive and not yet resolved. One should draw the proper lessons from this tragedy as well as from the recent break-up of Yugoslavia to see that Ambassador Lukin's proposals will lead to greater instability throughout Eurasia, increased inter-ethnic conflicts and warfare.
It is also useful to draw a parallel between those policies advocated by Mr. Lukin, and already followed by Russia to a degree, and the policies of post-imperial interwar Germany towards Czecho-Slovakia and Poland, especially those regarding borders and the large German minorities in both states. Germany's policies regarding Poland and Czecho-Slovakia were revisionist, while the presence of substantial German minorities in both countries was used to put pressure on the two young and fragile states. Hitler pursued the policies of Weimar Germany to their logical conclusion, thereby causing the collapse of Czecho-Slovakia and precipitating the second world war through the invasion of Poland.
Nowhere are the dangers of Ambassador Lukin's proposals more evident than in the policies he has advocated in the past and those he is currently advocating towards Ukraine. Contrary to Mr. Lukin's claims, Ukraine is not building its state on the "anti-Russia" foundation - though there certainly are differences in the foreign policies of the two states and in their approaches to solving problems affecting both states, whether of a bilateral or multilateral nature.
Lukin and many leading Russian politicians view the CIS as not only a device for saving what was left of the old empire, but also as the cornerstone for rebuilding it, that is, in Mr. Lukin's words "fill[ing] the Commonwealth with substance." Within the framework of the Commonwealth, Russia has attempted to preserve some of the inherited Soviet common institutions, especially its huge military machine, and has promoted the creation of new common institutions that would guarantee its dominance over the other republics. This was achieved, in part by the Treaty of Tashkent, initiated by Russia to bind the republics in a mutual security pact, which Ambassador Lukin views positively.
Arbitrarily, and outside of the framework of the Commonwealth, Russia has seized all of the old Soviet Union's foreign assets, including its banks, and has stalled on dividing these among Commonwealth members, even though all of the republics contributed toward their purchase, creation or upkeep. Through this gesture of "good-neighborliness," the non-Russian republics have been effectively robbed of whatever has remained of former Soviet hard currency assets, including real estate, that could have been used to establish diplomatic and trade missions abroad._1_
In contrast, Ukraine has viewed the CIS as a forum for settling differences and as a device for the peaceful dismantling of imperial structures. To Russia's dismay, Ukraine has been engaged in building its own state structures, thereby consolidating its independence. It is taking steps to introduce its own currency, has urged the division of the former Soviet Union's assets, including military hardware, and moving to establish its own, defense-oriented, nuclear-free armed forces, thereby dealing a staggering blow to the old Soviet military behemoth. This last step has infuriated Russia, which has been consistently blocking Ukraine's attempts to form its own armed forces, most vividly in its refusal to quickly divide the Black Sea Fleet stationed on Ukraine's territory.
It is not surprising, then, that Russia's wrath has been directed primarily against Ukraine. Most importantly, it has been threatening Ukraine's territorial integrity and encouraging inter-ethnic tensions and conflicts between Russians and Ukrainians. Russian government spokesmen began to make claims to parts of Ukraine's territories immediately following its independence declaration last August. Now, their tactics have shifted to advocating the secession of ethnic Russian minorities in southern Ukraine, especially in the Crimea.
Ambassador Lukin has espoused these policies in the past and continues to do so when he writes that Ukraine must come to an agreement with Russia "defining the status of the Crimea." This position is a territorial claim, which violates not only principles of international law and established norms of international behavior, but also directly violates a bilateral Russo-Ukrainian treaty of November 1990, in which both sides recognized existing borders._2_
In January 1992, Mr. Lukin, then chairman of the Committee on International Affairs and International Relations of the Russian Parliament, was directly involved in formulating Russian policy towards Ukraine regarding the status of the Crimea and the Black Sea fleet. The January 22 issue of the newspaper Komsomolskaia Pravda published parts of an internal memo from Mr. Lukin to Ruslan Khasbulatov, chairman of the Russian Parliament, in which the former suggested options for President Yeltsin to pursue regarding the two issues.
Published excerpts show that Mr. Lukin was prepared to support the option of using military force against Ukraine. His preferred course of action was less forceful, but nevertheless dangerous. Mr. Lukin proposed that Yeltsin issue a decree, placing the entire Black Sea Fleet under Russian command, including all naval bases in the southern Ukrainian cities of Sevastopil, Balaklava and Mykolayiv. These actions were to be followed by discussions with Ukraine regarding the status of these bases, which could be tied to an offer of splitting the fleet. The memo further suggested that steps be taken to cripple Ukraine's industry, which would eventually lead to social strife and the removal of the most valuable airforce units from Ukraine.
Regarding the Crimea, Mr. Lukin suggested that the parliament examine the legality of the transfer of the Crimea to Ukraine in 1954 "with the objective of declaring this act illegal."_3_ He also stressed that the separatist movement of Crimean Russians be used as a bargaining chip in negotiations with Ukraine over the fleet and the status of the Crimea. The Ukrainian government, Mr. Lukin concluded, "will be placed before a dilemma: either it will agree to the transfer of the fleet and bases to Russia, or Ukraine's authority over the Crimea will be questioned."
Despite the absence of inter-ethnic conflicts in Ukraine and the guarantee of minority rights, including those of ethnic Russians, by the Ukrainian government, interventions, such as advocated by Mr. Lukin, are aimed at destabilization, which may lead to the "Yugoslavization" of parts of Ukraine or to its collapse, similar to that of prewar Czecho-Slovakia.
Seen in this light, it is not difficult to understand what Ambassador Lukin really means when he proclaims Russia's leading role as "a stabilizer of the Eurasian geopolitical environment," or of "Russia's new role as defender of its smaller neighbors and guarantor of stability and security of their borders..." It should be clear then, that attempts to re-establish Russian hegemony outside the borders of the Russian Federation are dangerous and utopian.
One can agree with Ambassador Lukin that Russia should not be treated like a pariah or outcast, but rather with sympathy, and helped to integrate into Europe. Common sense and self-interest, however, suggest an even-handed approach to the former Soviet republics, aimed at achieving a balance of power, not condoning Russian domination of the region, which would lead to increased tensions, further inter-ethnic conflicts, warfare, and the re-emergence of a militarized and aggressive Russia.
This policy can be pursued by attaching political, in addition to economic, conditions to aid programs. In particular, Western aid should be tied to responsible international behavior by Russia, including the treatment by Russia of Ukraine and other republics as full-fledged members of the international community of nations, and not as its backyard. In return for such behavior, the West should be even more generous in its aid than it has been until now. Such a policy would support a more peaceful Russia, compensate it for loss of empire, and encourage its politicians and people to turn their energies inward, toward reconstruction.
Copyright © The Ukrainian Weekly, January 17, 1993, No. 3, Vol. LXI
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