ANALYSIS: Strategic nuclear weapons and Ukrainian national security

by Markian Bilynsky

CONCLUSION

Despite - some analysts would argue because of - the rationality paradigm traditionally used to assess political behavior, it is impossible to establish the effect of a deterrent on a potential aggressor in a non-confrontational situation, if then. States do not exist in a condition of permanent tension. Peace generally reigns simply because a state has no intention of attacking its neighbor. A state perceives, either through choice or necessity, that its interests are best served by non-military means. Such is the norm of international relations.

And such is the current state of Russo-Ukrainian relations. The political and economic tensions straining their relationship as both try to establish their own post-Soviet credibility and identity are being resolved through negotiation without the backing of any credible military power. There is no military coercion. Indeed, given the woeful state of the former Soviet military establishment in both Russia and Ukraine, as well as the continuing decline of the industrial infrastructure needed to support a viable, modern military, this is likely to be the pattern of Russo-Ukrainian relations for the foreseeable future - rhetoric from either side notwithstanding.

It would make the concept of deterrence meaningless to argue that Russia and Ukraine are currently in anything like a deterrent posture, even a general one that characterized the superpower relationship for most of the Cold War. "Non-deterrent" posture would be the best description. Every effort should be made to consolidate this situation.

Clearly, Russia does not need deterring at present. But what about in the future? On the declaratory level at least, the future of Russo-Ukrainian relations is generally - usually implicitly - cast by many Ukrainians in terms of their historical experience. There is an understandable tendency for Ukrainians to look back to the future when searching the horizon for external security threats. A critical downturn in Russo-Ukrainian relations has to be prudently planned for, even by those who do not believe that history inexorably repeats itself. But a Ukrainian ICBM arsenal cannot contribute anything in this respect.

Strategic nuclear weapons are not credible policy instruments. Their immense destructive power cannot be made to serve any rational war fighting purpose. They cannot, therefore, bring about victory in a meaningful sense of the word or actually defend a territorial unit from aggression. The absolute weapon is absolutely unusable, except as a deterrent to a potential opponent's use of his own strategic arsenal.

However, such a strategic equilibrium is only attainable if each side has what is referred to as an invulnerable second strike capability. This balance is a function of weapon type not quantity. Put simply, if a strategic force is sufficiently invulnerable, an opponent will perceive that it would be impossible to destroy that force even with a surprise attack without inviting a devastating retaliation. Both sides are mutually held hostage in a deadly yet essentially stable embrace of "mutually assured destruction" (MAD). Russia has this invulnerable second strike capability in the form of its SLBMs. Ukraine does not. Ukraine has a strategic bomber fleet capable of delivering as yet non-operational nuclear gravity bombs and nuclear tipped cruise missiles. But being land-based and relatively small, this force is itself highly vulnerable to a surprise attack.

A Russo-Ukrainian strategic balance would, therefore, be inherently unstable - something of no consequence in times of peace but potentially disastrous in times of crisis and confrontation. How Ukraine could restore such a balance short of building the necessary forces or negotiating away Russia's SLBMs is unclear.

However, even a stable strategic balance, while ensuring that Ukraine could effectively deter a Russian strategic threat, would do little to address the situation on the conventional force level. The two force levels would remain operationally detached and remote from each other. The location of those assets most critical to Ukrainian statehood is geo-strategically highly vulnerable. The capital, Kyyiv, as well as the principal industrial regions of Kharkiv and the Donbas all lie uncomfortably close to the border with Russia.

Barring an act of nuclear madness by Moscow, the most probable initial Russian military threat to Ukraine would stem from its conventional, and not nuclear forces. In such a scenario Ukraine's ICBM force would be largely irrelevant, despite its supposedly complimentary role to the conventional forces, because the Ukrainian leadership would be presented with an "all-or-nothing" nuclear response option should its conventional forces be facing defeat. (The question of exactly when during a conventional force conflict a strategic response should or could be ordered is itself a topic worthy of a lengthy examination.)

A Russian conventional threat to Ukraine's political and economic centers cannot be reciprocated in kind. Nor can punishment with strategic nuclear forces be credibly threatened as a deterrent. Any Ukrainian threat to strike Moscow would be incredible because Kyyiv would itself then face obliteration from a retaliatory strike from Russia's SLBMs. Destroying Ukraine in order to "save" it might appeal to the advocates of "better-dead-than-Russian" position but it is a negation of anything resembling a national security policy. Thus, an "all-or-nothing" option for Ukraine in response to an impending conventional defeat is in fact no option at all because of the potentially disastrous consequences. The Ukrainian strategic arsenal would be deterred, a victim of its paradoxically immense, though militarily inapplicable, power.

Confronted with just such an all-or-nothing (non-) option of "massive retaliation" in the early 1960s, U.S. strategists sought to link the disparate force levels by deploying a whole arsenal of tactical, short- and medium-range nuclear weapons which provided them with a operationally viable - in theory at least - strategy of "flexible response." This integrated escalatory ladder created a conceptually credible nuclear "trip-wire" organically linking the front line NATO infantry with the U.S. strategic forces.

Barring a conceptual breakthrough Ukrainian policy makers would have to pursue a similar beefing-up policy to integrate their strategic and conventional forces. The possibility that Ukraine could now or in the near future realistically pursue such an option is remote.

Most dangerously for Ukraine, however, the Russian political leadership might perceive in a time of crisis that Ukraine would actually execute an act of pre-emptive madness leading it to launch a pre-emptive strike of its own against the Ukrainian ICBMs and command structures. Such a strike is theoretically plausible and would be militarily decisive, because Ukraine would be left with no surviving retaliatory capability. Thus, because of its structural weaknesses, a Ukrainian strategic force in times of crisis could quite conceivably become the reason for Ukraine's devastation rather than the guarantor of its security as its advocates contend.

Theory, not empirical evidence

Discussions on this topic must inevitably proceed in a somewhat rarified atmosphere devoid of empirical evidence. There is, fortunately, no record of how nuclear confrontations actually develop beyond the point where the weapons are merely threatened to be used. Theory predominates and speculation informs strategy. Therefore, the issue is one on which reasonable people can disagree.

Reviewing what has been written, proponents might choose to argue that there is always a chance a pre-emptive Ukrainian strike would be so psychologically devastating that the victim would be paralyzed into not responding. But since even one Russian submarine is capable of wreaking unimaginable destruction, to act on the less than favorable odds that there will be no response whatsoever would be the ultimate act of folly.

It might also be argued that the existence of an independent Ukrainian strategic arsenal appears to create so much uncertainty concerning who will do what to whom and under what circumstances, that this in itself will serve to enhance deterrence. In other words, Russia might refrain from intimidating Ukraine militarily even if there was only a relatively small chance that it might itself be devastated.

Studies of crises, however, suggest that states often find themselves in critical situations in spite of rather than because of rational choice. Confrontations spin out of control despite the protagonists' belief that force can be utilized in a carefully calibrated manner for the pursuit of achievable strategic goals. No Russian scheme for coercing Ukraine into submission can reasonably have as its goal the destruction of Ukraine through the use of nuclear weapons.

However, a point during the confrontation could be reached where the destruction of, say, Kyyiv would be far more palatable to the Russians than the levelling of Moscow by Ukrainian missiles. Since any Ukrainian nuclear force would be an integral part of Ukrainian defense policy, conceptual inadequacies could eventually translate into real and dangerous liabilities.

Given their lack of military application, and hence credibility, Ukraine should proceed to dismantle all of the remaining former Soviet ICBMs on its territory. This could be done regardless of whether or not Russia chooses to reciprocate - an unlikely prospect as long as the U.S. and China show no willingness to abandon their strategic arsenals - since Ukraine will be no more vulnerable to a Russian nuclear strike in times of crisis than before. Indeed, the danger of a Russian preemptive strike - the most credible and rational nuclear threat Russia can pose - will vanish along with the Ukrainian ICBMs. As for an irrational Russian use of these weapons, a Ukrainian ICBM force could neither credibly deter nor punish such an act, let alone defend against it, for the reasons cited above.

Unilateral abolition naturally raises the specter of "nuclear blackmail": since Ukraine would have no nuclear weapons would it not then become vulnerable to Russian nuclear intimidation? Intimidation, like deterrence, is largely a function of credibility stemming from psychological manipulation and perception. Russian nuclear intimidation would succeed only if Ukrainian policy makers believed that Russia would actually use its strategic weapons to achieve its goals, a highly unlikely occurrence, since its aftermath would certainly negate any benefits Russia could possibly hope to gain.

In addition, world opinion appears to be a significant factor here. Historically, there seems to be a genuine reluctance by states of all political persuasions to cross the nuclear threshold (as opposed to merely threatening to cross it). This attitude, in addition to the military inapplicability of even relatively "low" yield tactical nuclear weapons, is one reason why historically the use of nuclear weapons has never been considered a credible military option. Thus, nuclear weapons were of no assistance to the democratic United States in its bloody encounters in Korea and Vietnam, nor to the totalitarian Soviet regime in Afghanistan.

Furthermore, there is no evidence that the North Koreans, Chinese, Vietnamese, or Mujahedeen allowed the thought that their superpower adversaries might resort to nuclear weapons to seriously affect their strategies or will to resist. They appeared to have correctly concluded that such a threat was essentially irrelevant. Stalin was rarely right, but he was probably close to the mark when he observed that nuclear weapons tend to intimidate only the weak of nerve.

(Chemical and biological weapons, on the other hand, in correct usage have actually been used despite international conventions to ban them. Ukraine should therefore be much more concerned with Russian stockpiles of these categories of weapons, as well as Russian compliance with agreements signed by the Soviets for their elimination.)

The crucial question

The crucial question is not whether Ukrainian ICBMs should be eliminated but under what conditions. Ukraine has quite rightly demanded there should be reasonable guarantees that the ICBMs scheduled for destruction will actually be dismantled and the warheads destroyed; that it receive financial compensation for the nuclear components it correctly defines as a Ukrainian commercial asset; and, finally, that it be provided with adequate security guarantees once it enters the ranks of the nuclear-free.

The first two issues can be approached in a relatively straightforward manner. Since there are very real doubts concerning the ability (and commitment) of the Russians to dispose of the Ukrainian ICBM warheads to Kyyiv's satisfaction in Russian facilities, and the U.S. is balking at paying the cost of doing so on Ukrainian territory, one possible solution would be to transport the warheads to the U.S. for reprocessing, with the downgraded uranium being shipped back for use in Ukraine's nuclear power plants. The highly toxic propellants would go to Russia for storage and reprocessing, while the missiles themselves would be destroyed in Ukraine. Such transactions could be carried out on a commercial basis.

This is not to say that the negotiations will not be awkward. The American side, for example, might raise political and environmental concerns. However, discussions over the fate of the all important fissile materials would be easier to conduct in a bilateral setting between Kyyiv and Washington than in a trilateral one complicated by a residual suspicion between Moscow and Kyyiv.

The issue of security guarantees, however, is much more problematic. While the value of a nuclear warhead and the process of its destruction can be calculated in concrete, economic terms, it is virtually impossible to define as accurately a state's security requirements.

Moreover, Ukraine's bargaining leverage in this respect has been weakened by Kyyiv's a priori unilateral declaration to comply with START I within the stipulated time frame - something that has inadvertently made the Ukrainian government's credibility and trustworthiness an issue and rendered the ICBMs a steadily depreciating currency for Ukrainian negotiators. Strictly speaking, the U.S. government does not have to concede anything as the deadline approaches - regardless of any Ukrainian references to fairness and so forth.

Nevertheless, there are uni-, bi- and multilateral military and diplomatic steps that can and should be taken by Ukraine to counter the most probable contingencies arising in its dealings with Russia. These would help allay any reasonable concerns that ridding Ukraine of nuclear weapons would be to expose it to a Russian conventional threat.

Militarily, the most important point in this regard is to address the problem of the size and mission of the Ukrainian armed forces and the development of the necessary technologies for their fulfillment of this role. Also important is the nurturing of a Ukrainian strategic culture. The Ukrainian armed forces must shed their debilitating Soviet heritage and develop a truly Ukrainian institutional identity on the organizational and operational levels.

On the bilateral level, the question of conventional force postures and balances between Russia and Ukraine must be addressed to the satisfaction of both parties. The fact that both militaries have adopted in principle a non-provocative strategy of "defensive defense" is encouraging. Limiting the numbers of traditionally offensive equipment, such as tanks, artillery and bridging equipment, and revising training maneuvers so they emphasize defensive and not offensive tactics, blunts the ability of a force to conduct large scale offensive operations.

Troop concentrations and maneuvers can be monitored by the intrusive verification procedures established under multilateral conventions such as, for example, the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) regimes. These can be further modified to satisfy any doubts Ukraine and Russia might harbor over each others' commitment to putting theory into practice by, for example, allowing the inspection of weapons-producing facilities.

Such measures do not depend on trust. Rather, they are adhered to because there is a mutually perceived interest in preventing conflict of all kinds: modern conventional warfare, after all, can be an extremely destructive business. But since they are confidence-building such measures can eventually breed trust. Russia's policy towards Ukraine will be determined by the Russians themselves. Ultimately, this is a factor that lies beyond the powers of any other state to influence.

But while all contingencies cannot be planned for, commitments entered into and structures established today can shape and define the context, content, and hence the future course of Russo-Ukrainian relations. With this in mind, diplomacy - whose role it is to identify international problems and deal with their causes before they escalate to the level of military confrontation - on the bilateral, regional, and international levels will have a crucial role to play in Ukrainian national security policy towards Russia.

U.S. interests

Much has been made of the American reluctance to militarily underwrite Ukraine's national security once the ICBMs are gone. However, specific demands for U.S. military guarantees are highly unrealistic. Ukraine is not perceived by U.S. policy makers to be critical to U.S. national security. A very persuasive case can and must be made that pursuing a Russocentric post-Cold War policy towards the former Soviet Union might eventually prove counterproductive to U.S. national security.

Barring a conceptual epiphany, however, it is extremely unlikely that U.S. armed forces will ever be committed to defend Ukraine. Nor is this perception of Ukraine's position in the geopolitical equation likely to be substantially challenged by the Clinton administration. A country that had been viewed almost as a geopolitical afterthought by the most conceptually arid administration in memory will almost certainly not be significantly upgraded by an incoming administration heavily committed to subordinating the conduct of American foreign policy to domestic imperatives.

Nevertheless, the U.S. still has a potentially vital non-military role to perform both during this crucial period for Ukrainian national security and beyond as an impartial broker, consistent with its declared intention of treating Ukraine as a member of the international community of equalstanding with legitimate security concerns vis-a-vis Russia. The U.S. is uniquely suited for such a role.

While international organizations such as the CSCE and United Nations are slowly growing in stature and respectability, Washington's voice is still the most singularly powerful and persuasive in the international arena. Yet for a whole complex of reasons, the U.S. has thus far been reluctant to elevate its declaratory policy onto the operational level. With U.S. policy towards Ukraine revealing signs of frustration and impatience - not to mention sterility - Ukrainian diplomacy has an increasingly crucial role to play in presenting the Ukrainian case before American public opinion.

There has been talk of admitting both Russia and Ukraine into NATO. Such a move could at least partially satisfy Ukraine's security requirements. There is, after all, some evidence that membership has had a mollifying effect on Greek-Turkish relations. But with the U.S. unwilling to acquiesce to such a move, with Ukrainian policymakers themselves unsure of its desirability given Ukraine's commitment to remaining neutral, and NATO's own deep crisis of identity brought on by the collapse of its Warsaw Pact adversary, this is a prospect that will not likely be realized any time soon.

However, there are some immediate steps that Ukraine could request from the U.S. Ukraine could request special access to U.S. intelligence. The unrivalled American intelligence-gathering capabilities could provide Ukraine with vital reassurances or timely warnings regarding the Russian military. Such an agreement would not compromise U.S. interests because it would only involve Ukrainian access to appropriate intelligence products, and not the technical means for gathering the raw data.

Furthermore, during the Bush administration some commentators argued the need for the appointment of an official whose task it would be to coordinate all aspects of U.S. foreign policy toward the former Soviet Union. The Clinton administration should refine this proposal by appointing a high level official charged with monitoring security developments in the former Soviet Union. This official would report directly and regularly to the president himself. The counsel of a respected and influential individual such as, for example, Zbigniew Brzezinski, would help restore a balanced perspective to a region where U.S. foreign policy has become mired in misperception.

Ultimately, however, Ukraine's national security and relations with Russia will depend on Ukraine's ability to formulate a coherent national security concept that seeks to balance both the ends of policy with the diplomatic and military means for its execution. This is a task as significant as any of the other numerous aspects of state-building currently confronting Ukrainian policymakers - perhaps even more so since it touches upon the very essence of Ukraine's existence. It is also one that is complex and delicate enough without the additional burden of a militarily insignificant and perhaps even devastatingly counter-effective strategic nuclear arsenal.

PART I

Copyright © The Ukrainian Weekly, February 7, 1993, No. 6, Vol. LXI

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