NEWS AND VIEWS

Shades of gray: perspectives on U.S.-Ukrainian relations


by Orest Deychakiwsky

CONCLUSION

The U.S. Congress

While the executive branch takes the lead in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy, it is especially necessary to take into account the critical role that the legislative branch (the Senate and House of Representatives) plays in creating and shaping foreign policy, including towards Ukraine.

In the "old days" for instance, it was Congress and the Helsinki Commission that ensured Ukraine was not forgotten. This is not widely known in Ukraine, but throughout the 1970s and 1980s, especially following the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, there were numerous efforts in the U.S. Congress to call attention to the plight of Ukraine.

In addition to Captive Nations proclamations, these included: various hearings featuring Ukrainian dissidents or on topics such as the 1932-1933 famine, Chornobyl, human rights in Ukraine; numerous resolutions, statements and letters by congressmen on behalf of individual Ukrainian political prisoners, especially the Helsinki monitors, concerning the plight of the Ukrainian Churches and various other human rights issues; the establishment of the Ukraine Famine Commission; statements commemorating the 1917-1921 Ukrainian independence or criticizing Russification or other actions of the Soviet government. All of these kinds of activities were not at all uncommon.

 And in 1991, it was Congress, through a resolution introduced by Helsinki Commission Chairman Sen. Dennis DeConcini and Rep. Don Ritter, that called upon the administration to recognize Ukraine's independence. This legislation passed Congress prior to the December 1 referendum - despite the State Department's considerable lack of enthusiasm for it.

Congress and assistance to Ukraine

Since Ukraine's independence, Congress has also played a role in pressing the administration to take a more active approach with respect to Ukraine as well as to warn about the dangers of Russian attempts to resume its status as an imperial power.

Allow me to focus on one recent development to illustrate this point while at the same time pointing out some of the complications and nuances that exist in U.S. policy regarding assistance towards Ukraine.

A growing recognition of Ukraine's importance by the United States Congress, to cite one important example, is found in a recent bill appropriating money for foreign aid. On the last day of September 1993, Congress passed and President Bill Clinton signed into law the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act to the United States fiscal year 1994. Included in that appropriation is a $2.5 billion aid package for the NIS (newly independent states). Within the legislation, Ukraine was specifically and uniquely identified by the Congress for special mention.

The appropriations bill states that "of the funds appropriated by this or any other act, not less than $300 million should be made available to Ukraine." This language is significant even if the amount is not adequate. It is important within the context of the evolving U.S.-Ukrainian relationship and evidences a growing recognition by Congress of Ukraine and growing commitment to an independent, democratic Ukraine.

But even this favorable Congressional decision should be viewed in light of the following: First, there have been rather large reductions in over-all levels of funding for foreign aid by the Congress this year, given America's increased focus on its own, domestic concerns. Second, over recent years there has been a growing resistance in the Congress against earmarking specific monies (designating specific amounts) for individual countries. Third, and perhaps most notably, Ukraine's lack of progress in reforms was used by the administration and by some within Congress as an argument against singling out Ukraine for special consideration.

Yet, despite these factors arguing against special recognition for Ukraine, the efforts of sympathetic members of Congress and lobbying by the Ukrainian American community succeeded in having this language included in the appropriations bill.

Clearly, major challenges remain with respect to this assistance. One challenge will be to ensure that the administration upholds the intent of Congress in actually providing the funds for Ukraine. This is not a foregone conclusion, as there are concerns that the administration may be reluctant to spend all of this money, arguing that in the absence of a sound economic policy in Ukraine it may be difficult to deliver and absorb assistance.

While there are some indications that Ukraine may again be undertaking reform efforts, without genuine reform, Congress could refuse to appropriate additional aid to Ukraine in the future, fearing that American taxpayer dollars are not going for a useful purpose.

Thus, whereas Congress may be more favorably disposed than the administration, there are a variety of dynamics that affect its actions with respect to Ukraine.

The non-governmental sector

One also must not ignore the role of the Ukrainian American community and other Americans concerned about Ukraine's fate in influencing policy. The Ukrainian American community, while far from being the most influential lobby in Washington, has over the years contributed significantly toward promoting Ukrainian interests.

Many of the actions prior to independence noted earlier came about because committed Ukrainian Americans brought to Congress's or the executive's attention issues concerning Ukraine (whether through direct contacts with individual congressmen or congressional staff, or statements, letters or telephone calls to congressional offices, or the White House or State Department).

And one most certainly cannot underestimate the role of prominent and respected private individuals of non-Ukrainian extraction - including former high governmental officials such as Zbigniew Brzezinski or Dick Cheney - in articulating support for Ukrainian statehood and pointing out the dangers of any restoration of the Russian empire.

An especially significant role is played by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), a growing number of which are present in Ukraine. More and more American NGOs assisting Ukraine in a wide range of endeavors - democratic institution building, privatization, humanitarian relief, health care, the environment, media, culture and education.

Ukrainian Americans are playing important roles in many of the private, voluntary organizations active in Ukraine. Still other NGOs are primarily, or exclusively, Ukrainian American.

With their active presence in Ukraine, NGOs are working with both the Ukrainian government and, as importantly, with Ukraine's own emerging independent, non-governmental institutions.

Many of the non-governmental initiatives in Ukraine complement expanding U.S. governmental efforts as well. There is a wide assortment of ongoing U.S.-funded technical and humanitarian assistance projects by governmental departments and agencies including U.S. Agency for International Development, the State, Defense, Commerce, Treasury, Agriculture and Energy departments, United States Information Agency, Peace Corps, Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), among others.

To enumerate all of the current and planned forms of both U.S. governmental and non-governmental assistance - not to speak of the entire subject of U.S. business investment or interest in Ukraine - would go well beyond the scope of this article.

Conclusion

The key ingredient that will shape U.S.-Ukrainian relations is what happens in Ukraine itself. As mentioned earlier, even those who sympathize with Ukraine and wish it well (or concretely help it in Congress etc.) are disillusioned with lack of progress in the economic and political arena. As long as Ukraine is perceived as being in the hands of the "post-Communist nomenklatura" and does not move on genuine economic reforms as well as further political reforms, the U.S.-Ukrainian relationship will not flourish.

This is not to diminish the very real progress that has been made in Ukraine, especially in 1991 and 1992 in the realm, for instance, of human rights. Indeed, published reports by the U.S. government (State Department and Helsinki Commission), the CSCE, and the media have noted these positive changes, especially Ukraine's treatment of its minorities. However, even these and other initial moves towards genuine democracy appear to have stalled over the last year as political and economic paralysis seized Ukraine.

Those Americans who follow Ukraine are not blind to the fact that there are still far too many negative vestiges of the old system. This also does nothing to improve American perceptions of Ukraine and, hence, to enhance relations.

In short, Ukraine is not helping its own case, because the fact of the matter is despite what cynics may think, Americans do pay attention to democracy and economic reforms. In any event, at a minimum, lack of economic and political progress in Ukraine plays into the hands of those not favorably disposed to assisting it in the first place. While money for dismantling nuclear weapons, assuming the trilateral nuclear agreement begins to be implemented, will be made available to Ukraine relatively quickly, further bilateral U.S. as well as multilateral economic assistance are conditional on significant economic change.

There is reason to believe that Ukraine's leaders are prepared to demonstrate the political will needed to undertake serious reform measures. If this is indeed the case, the prospects for improvements in Ukrainian-American relations - and much more importantly, for Ukraine itself - will undoubtedly brighten.


Orest Deychakiwsky is a staff member of the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission), an independent U.S. governmental agency. The views expressed in the article are his own and do not necessarily represent the views of the Helsinki Commission. This article is scheduled to appear in the February issue of the Ukrainian foreign policy journal "Polityka i Chas."


Copyright © The Ukrainian Weekly, February 20, 1994, No. 8, Vol. LXII


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