ANALYSIS
Political extremism in Ukraine
by Bohdan Nahaylo
CONCLUSION
Other ultra-right groups
Apart from the UNA-UNSO and the DSU, the existence in Ukraine of a number of other smaller fascist or neo fascist groups has been reported during the last two years.
In October 1992 two obscure groups in Kyyiv, the Brotherhood of the Eastern Cross (headed by Oleh Riznyk and Vitaliy Petruk) and the Legion of the New Order (led by Roman Haivas), helped by a third organization, Conscious Ukrainian Youth, staged a public burning of "undesirable" literature, which included a Jewish newspaper and a representation of the Star of David._20_ A National-Socialist Party of Ukraine, led by Oleh Shpirko, was founded in Poltava in 1992._21_
The most attention, however, has been paid to the Social-National Party of Ukraine (SNPU), which was founded in Lviv at the end of 1991. It is headed by Yuriy Kryvoruchko; Iryna Kalynets's daughter, Zvenyslava, is another of its leaders. Members of this organization sport black-shirt uniforms and use a swastika-like modification of the Ukrainian national emblem, the trident, as their symbol._22_ The SNPU conducted a vociferous and aggressive election campaign in the Lviv region, and its candidates reportedly ran in all of the region's electoral districts._23_ None, however, was elected; Mr. Kryvoruchko, who had the best result, received only 5 percent of the votes._24_
Although Lviv appears to have become the center of Ukraine's ultra-nationalist organizations, the extent of local support for them should not be exaggerated. Bension Kotlik, a local Jewish leader and a member of the city council, told an American correspondent in March that the national radicals had generated "a wave of political anti-Semitism" on the eve of the elections, but that extremist views "have received little support" from the western Ukrainian population._25_
In fact, in the two rounds of elections in Lviv the candidates representing Rukh and other national democratic groups won at least 11 seats, and the KUN five. The UNA's local leader, Mr. Shkil, was defeated by the reformist economist Viktor Pynzenyk,_26_ although Mr. Vitovych made it in the second round, scoring a significant victory by defeating the head of the Lviv Oblast Council, Mykola Horyn - a democrat. On the eve of his victory, Mr. Vitovych told a foreign correspondent that the main difference between the UNSO and the democrats "is in our way of thinking. It is like comparing people who wallow in the mud like pigs and others who stand up like Kozaks."_27_
The approximate number of votes won in the Lviv region by the various parties was as follows: over 230,000 voted for candidates from Rukh; over 150,000 for the reformist New Wave bloc; over 150,000 for the KUN; over 120,000 for the URP; under 35,000 voted for either the Communist Party of Ukraine or its ally, the Socialist Party of Ukraine; about 100,000 voted for the UNA-UNSO; and 50,000 for the SNPU._28_
Local elections are due though on June 26 in Ukraine; and the ultra-rightists in Lviv - who, it should be noted, appear to be mainly young people - are already preparing to make a better showing in them. Mr. Kryvoruchko told Reuters that the parliamentary elections had been the SNPU's "first campaign and the idea is to publicize our name. We shall be winners in the local elections."_29_
To complete the picture of Ukraine's radical right-wing forces, several other nationalist political parties need to be mentioned. One of them is the Ukrainian National Conservative Party, led by Viktor Rodionov, which was formed in June 1992 as a result of the merger of the UNP and the Ukrainian People's Democratic Party. The other is the Ukrainian Peasant-Democratic Party, led by the writer and publicist Serhiy Plachynda, who has argued that Ukrainian nationalism should be made the "state ideology."_30_
Extreme-left and pro-Russian groups
In the eyes of many, the Communist Party of Ukraine was an "extremist" organization that had gone along with the leaders of the attempted coup in Moscow, and the lifting of the ban on this party in October 1993 caused outrage in democratic circles. In fact, that year saw a regrouping and resurgence of communist and neo-communist forces that are opposed to Western-style reforms and favor re-establishing, if not the old Soviet Union, then at least very close ties with Russia; though some of them are indeed explicitly for the restoration of the USSR in some form.
During the fighting in Moscow last October, about 30 members of ultra-left youth groups from Ukraine actually fought on the side of Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoi and Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov. They were from the Kyyiv regional branch of the neo-Stalinist All-Union Young Bolshevik Guard (VMGB) and the Kharkiv-based Leninist Komsomol of Ukraine, and they included teenagers from Kyyiv, Kharkiv, Donetske, Luhanske and the Crimea._31_
The VMGB, according to the deputy secretary of its Kyyiv city organization Hryhoriy Rudenko, is "the youth faction of the All-Union Communist Party Bolsheviks of Nina Andreyeva" (the notorious neo-Stalinist). Its enemies are all "national fascists," which for the VMGB includes just about all the parties supporting Ukrainian independence, ranging from Rukh and the URP to the UNA-UNSO. According to Mr. Rudenko, the VMGB seeks the restoration of the USSR, which he and his colleagues believe will take place after a civil war in which "socialist" Russia defeats "pro-American and pro-Zionist peacekeeping forces" and "worker masses" launch revolts in "Ukraine, Belarus, [and] Moldova."_32_
Communist and neo-communist groups and parties that are essentially, and sometimes explicitly, anti-Ukrainian and pro-Russian, have proliferated in the Crimea and Ukraine's Russified eastern oblasts. In the Crimea groups such as the Communist Party of the Crimea, led by Leonid Hrach, have sought the "voluntary" restoration of the old union; and in the Donbas and other parts of eastern Ukraine, too, organizations such as the Intermovement of Donbas, led by Dmitriy Kornilov, and the Civic Congress of Ukraine, headed by Aleksandr Bazeliuk, are nostalgic for the USSR and would welcome the creation of a new Slavic union.
These and more moderate forces are advocating regional autonomy, the federalization of Ukraine, dual citizenship, that Russian be made a second state language alongside Ukrainian, and that closer links be established with Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States._33_
In the Crimea and eastern Ukraine there are also numerous non-Communist, though often leftist, groups that are either Russian chauvinist or staunchly pro-Russian. They include the Russian Party of the Crimea, led by Sergei Shuviainikov, and Yuriy Meshkov's Republican Party of the Crimea, the Donetske-based Party of Slavic Unity and the pro-Russian Cossacks in the Luhanske region. It should also be added that extremist and chauvinistic Russian papers such as Den, Russky Vestnik, Zemshchina and Puls Tushina have been readily available in the major cities of these regions and in Kyyiv.
Other manifestations of intolerance
To complete the picture, several other developments should be mentioned that, while not explicitly connected to politically extreme movements, do reflect broader aspects of intolerance in Ukrainian society.
They include the bitter religious conflict in the country that since about the end of 1989 has seen a struggle, mainly in western Ukraine, for influence, parishes, churches and other property.
This has been taking place between Ukrainian Catholics and initially the Russian Orthodox Church (the Ukrainian Exarchate of which was renamed the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in 1990), and subsequently also the independent Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC); and also, after the split in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in 1992, between the pro-Moscow Ukrainian Orthodox Church, the newly formed independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyyiv Patriachate and the UAOC.
There were also instances in the latter part of 1993 and early 1994 in the Crimea of what some believe many have been politically inspired assassinations, such as the gunning down on January 16 of the Crimean Tatar leader Iskander Memetov. The security services have apparently still not solved these killings.
Finally, cases of the harassment of members of democratic groups and parties, including the use of political violence, by "unknown persons" on the eve of the parliamentary elections caused concern not only in Ukraine's democratic circles but also among international human rights observers._34_
Conclusion
Considering its complex make-up and geopolitical location, Ukraine has been very fortunate that political extremism has so far not been a major problem in the newly independent state. Ultra-right and ultra-left groups and movements do exist; but the amount of anti-Russian, anti-Ukrainian or anti-Jewish feeling that has been generated by them has so far not reached alarming proportions, relatively speaking.
However, the deepening political and economic crisis in the country has created social tensions that could fuel political extremism, and the strained relationship with Russia has made it harder to maintain ethnic harmony - after all, over 11 million Russians live in the country.
The most dangerous fault lines that are opening up correspond to the country's ethnic and regional divisions; although, unless the country's perilous economic decline is halted and the situation stabilized, there could also eventually be serious social unrest. Furthermore, should Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity be seen to be seriously threatened from inside or outside the country, the ultra-nationalist forces in western Ukraine are likely to react forcefully and attempt to mobilize the public behind them.
On the other hand, should the Kyyiv leadership use heavy-handed methods to curb separatist and pro-Russian tendencies in the Crimea and eastern Ukraine, the results could also be very dangerous. Until now, therefore, political extremism has been kept on the fringes of society; but in the context of Ukraine's complex internal and external politics, it appears to be becoming an increasingly serious danger.
The election of a number of ultra-nationalists, such as Mr. Vitovych, to the new Parliament - in which the Communist Party of Ukraine and its allies will be strongly represented and which is likely to be polarized along ideological and regional lines - could have inflammatory results. With parliamentary proceedings being extensively covered by the Ukrainian media, the new radical deputies will not only have constant access to an audience of millions, but will also enjoy parliamentary immunity.
It remains to be seen whether the general public dismisses them as the "lunatic fringe" or whether, if social and economic conditions continue to decline and the friction with Russia continues, it begins to have more sympathy with them.
Copyright © The Ukrainian Weekly, May 15, 1994, No. 20, Vol. LXII
| Home Page |