FOR THE RECORD: Central and East European Coalition position on NATO expansion (02/11/96)

FOR THE RECORD:

Central and East European Coalition position on NATO expansion

Published below are the Central and East European Coalition's January 26 letter to President Bill Clinton and its position paper on the expansion of NATO.

CEEC's letter to the president

Dear Mr. President:

We approach you on behalf of our non-partisan coalition of 18 national organizations, representing more than 20 million Americans with roots in Central and East Europe. Our ethnic communities are dedicated to the common goals and values of the American people and the nations of our heritage.

We appreciate the accomplishments of your administration in the areas of prime interest to us. We particularly welcome recent indications of greater attention of American policy to the concerns of the many states in Central and Eastern Europe which regained their independence following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

We offer our support for your efforts to restore peace to Bosnia, and are gratified that NATO has accepted the offers by our ancestral homelands to take part in the Implementation Force. We feel the Bosnia mission will reinvigorate NATO as an effective force for peace, while restoring America's leadership and involvement in Europe.

At the same time, we are duty-bound to express formally to you our alarm over certain other developments which, we feel, adversely affect the longer-term prospects for peace in Europe. The enclosed position paper outlines these concerns, and offers some remedies based on our own experience and understanding of this critical region and its peoples.

We sincerely hope, Mr. President, that this position paper may help your administration in the identification of potential sources of future conflict in Europe, and encourage thoughtful consideration of actions that may be taken by the United States to reduce or eliminate such threats. We look forward to an opportunity to meet with you to discuss the concerns and remedies offered in this position paper.

Inte Rupners, president, American Latvian Association Inc; Carl Bazarian, chairman, board of directors, Armenian Assembly of America; Russell R. Zavistovich, president, Belarusian Congress Committee of America; Armand A. Scals, president, Congress of Romanian Americans Inc.; Juhan Simonson, president, Estonian American National Council Inc.; the Rt. Rev. Imre Bertalan, D.D., chairman, Hungarian American Coalition; Regina F. Narusis, J.D., president, Lithuanian-American Community Inc.; Laszlo Pasztor, national president, National Federation of American Hungarians Inc.; John J. Karch, Ph.D., executive vice-president, Slovak World Congress; Ulana M. Diachuk, president, Ukrainian National Association Inc.; Radi Slavoff, vice-president, Bulgarian Institute for Research and Analysis; Otakar A. Horna, chairman, Czecho-Slovak Council of America; Ylo Anson, president, Estonian World Council Inc.; John B. Genys, Ph.D. chairman, Joint Baltic American National Committee Inc.; Grozvydas Lazauskos, president, Lithuanian American Council Inc.; Edward J. Moskal, president, Polish American Congress Inc.; Askold S. Lozynskyj, president, Ukrainian Congress Committee of America Inc.

On behalf of the Central and East European Coalition.

CEEC position paper

The Central and East European Coalition (CEEC) is an umbrella organization of 18 national organizations, representing more than 20 million Americans with roots in Central and Eastern Europe. Our ethnic communities are dedicated to the common goals and values of the American people and the peoples of the nations of our heritage.

The CEEC appreciates the accomplishment of the Clinton administration in the areas of our prime interest, including the Partnership for Peace, which has created the potential for developing bilateral military cooperation with, and assistance to, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It particularly welcomes recent indications of greater attention in American policy to the concerns of Ukraine, the Baltic nations and other states which regained their independence following the collapse of the Soviet Union. It also extends its total and unanimous support for the president's courageous efforts to restore peace in Bosnia, which will reinvigorate NATO as an effective force for peace, while reinforcing America's leadership and involvement in Europe.

At the same time, the CEEC feels compelled to formally express its alarm over certain other developments which it feels adversely affect the long-term prospects for peace. The purpose of this position paper is to outline the principal sources of the CEEC's concern and to suggest some remedies based on its members' own experience and understanding of this critical region and its peoples.

I. No progress on NATO enlargement.

In January 1994, the Clinton administration committed itself to the integration of the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe into the defensive structure of the Atlantic community. Two years later, the questions the president posed - when the process of NATO expansion will begin, and who will join - remain unanswered.

The president's stated doctrine that designation of prospective new members of NATO would draw a new line of division in Europe would seem to contradict and undermine the very concept of NATO enlargement, since it implies that the old division between East and West should remain.

The CEEC sees no forceful advocacy by the administration to obtain consensus among the NATO allies for NATO expansion beyond vague and non-committal statements that sometime in an unspecified future some unnamed countries may join the Atlantic community. Legislation authorizing assistance to countries most qualified for NATO membership has been vigorously opposed by the U.S. Department of State.

II. Escalation of Russian Threats

Further, the president's assurances that Russia would not be permitted to veto NATO decisions have been repeatedly contradicted by events. President Boris Yeltsin did in fact veto the enlargement of NATO in his letter of September 15, 1993, addressed to the major NATO powers. There are good reasons to believe that had the United States acted firmly at that time, making clear its decision to enlarge the alliance, but coupling this with the offer of a strategic partnership and economic assistance to Russia, the Russian leadership would have reconciled itself to the concept.

We believe that this was a unique historical opportunity to gain Russia's reluctant recognition and acceptance of its loss of empire, and to guide it away from its traditional path of expansionism and towards much-needed internal reforms. Instead, the United States yielded to the Russian veto. After three more months of painful hesitation, the Clinton administration deferred indefinitely any decision on enlargement.

This deferral is the cause of our deep concern. For the first time, Russia was given a clear signal that it would successfully prevent the enlargement of NATO and keep open the option of regaining in the future its control over the independent states of the former Soviet bloc.

Russian hopes of rebuilding its empire were regrettably fueled by the United States policy of placating aggressive Russian nationalism. Growing indications of resurgent expansionist ambitions were passed over in silence, minimized, or even presented as "good news."

So far, the only outcome of this policy have been increasing expressions of anti-Western and anti-American feelings and a dramatic escalation of threats and demands. As recently as January 4, 1996, the Russian minister of defense repeated threats that any expansion of NATO would be met by the relocation of Russian troops, a new role for tactical nuclear weapons, and unilateral abrogation of the existing arms reduction treaties. These threats were made in Kyiv in the presence of the United States secretary of defense.

We do not believe there is any imminent danger of Russian military aggression. But we cannot remain indifferent when leading Russian military experts are publicly predicting that the reoccupation of the Baltic states would not be resisted by NATO, that the dependence of Western Europe on supplies of natural gas from Russia will effectively prevent the Europeans from resorting to economic sanctions, and that Russia's nuclear arsenal should be used to deter any effort to contain Russia's strategic goals.

Regrettably, the escalation of Russia's military threats has prompted a backlash of opposition to NATO enlargement among our allies and in the United States. Opponents of expansion are not willing to accept the growing risks projected by Russian statements. The anti-expansion arguments have not been contested by administration spokesmen.

In December, the NATO ministerial conference awarded Russian nationalists another major success by again suspending any meaningful progress towards NATO enlargement. We do not consider endless abstract studies and non-committal consultations as progress.

At the same time, the Russians were offered a charter of strategic partnership and membership in a consultative committee based on the model established in Bosnia for the specific purpose of integrating Russian troops into NATO peacekeeping operations. This Bosnian consultative committee specifically excluded other countries participating in the NATO mission.

In the likely event that in June the Russians will elect a nationalist or communist as president, the risks of confrontation over NATO expansion will inevitably rise to an unacceptable level, and the whole issue may well be dropped from the international agenda. Should this happen, the strong pro-Western and pro-American orientation of the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe will be undermined, and the United States will again lose a unique opportunity to consolidate democracy and to stabilize this critical region, which in the past has been the source of so much ethnic conflict.

III. Conclusions

In view of these disheartening developments, there is a growing perception among the communities represented by this coalition that the countries or our heritage will not be permitted to join the Atlantic community of free and democratic nations during the present administration. Instead, we see the United States on the road to strategic cooperation with Russia, to the exclusion of the interests and equal participation of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

We do not believe that one can find any American with roots in these countries who does not dread the specter of the big powers once again deciding, as at Yalta, the fate of these smaller nations. We all remember the suffering imposed on our kin as a result of Yalta, as well as the high price the United States had to pay through the years of the Cold War. The president's determined effort to put an end to the ethnic conflict in Bosnia affirms once again that appeasement leads to aggression, while the projection of power is the only way to avoid the necessity of using it.

IV. Recommendations

Time is not on our side, but it is our hope that the fruits of victory in the Cold War may yet not be lost. We have given much thought to steps that the United States still might take to avoid such a tragedy. We offer the following recommendations for the administration's consideration, in the belief that delay in their implementation will only increase the threats to peace and security in the region:

1) A declaration that before the end of 1996, the United States will propose to NATO the designation of countries that will be invited to join the alliance through a gradual enlargement, and establish a clear time-frame for this process.

2) Before the security guarantees of Article V of the Washington Treaty are formally extended to countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the United States should introduce a NATO resolution declaring that any attempt to restrict sovereignty of any democratic country in Central and Eastern Europe by force, threat of force, or economic extortion will be opposed collectively by the NATO countries by means considered adequate to ensure stability and peace.

3) A statement by the president of the United States establishing the limits to Western tolerance of threatening behavior by Russia. Surveys show that the overwhelming majority of the Russian people do not want conflict with the West. They should be warned of the risks involved in placing their fate in the hands of adventurers and chauvinists.

4) In the transition period proceeding admission to NATO, the allies should enhance the defense potential of Central and Eastern Europe. Bilateral military cooperation should be expanded under the Partnership for Peace. The United States should assist these countries in developing appropriate self-defense strategies and in restructuring their armed forces accordingly.

It is the CEEC's most sincere hope that this position paper may help the Clinton administration in the identification of potential sources of future conflict in Europe, and permit thoughtful consideration of measures that may be taken by the United States to reduce or eliminate such threats.

| Home Page |