ANALYSIS: Russian-Ukrainian treaty on friendship - can it be achieved? (02/18/96)

ANALYSIS: Russian-Ukrainian treaty on friendship - can it be achieved?

by Markian Bilynskyj

Two visits in rapid succession by President Leonid Kuchma to Moscow have raised Ukrainian hopes that the long-awaited and often postponed visit by Russian President Boris Yeltsin to Kyiv for the signing of the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation is imminent. President Kuchma's first visit to Moscow occurred on January 16. This was a hastily arranged affair that the Ukrainian president had suggested during talks with his Russian counterpart at the January 11 funeral of Francois Mitterand. Three days later, the Ukrainian president again traveled to Moscow for the summit of CIS heads of state.

In reviewing the outcome of the two visits, the official government daily, Uryadovyi Kurier, commented: "It is probably not worth looking for logical links between these two visits because each one had its own goals and agenda.'' This might be true on the purely procedural level, but viewed from a broader perspective, President Kuchma's recent commuting to Moscow suggests a more coherent purpose.

Ukraine's efforts to develop relations with Russia have often fallen foul of the volatility of Russian domestic politics. The barometer of relations between Kyiv and Moscow continues to be the on-again-off-again division of the Black Sea Fleet (BSF), which is increasingly a dispute over the status of Sevastopil and, by extension, a litmus test of Russian attitudes towards Ukrainian sovereignty. This is the reason the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation remains unsigned.

Relative progress has been made in economic relations over the past year but these potentially remain hostage to unresolved political differences. (Despite the existence of a free trade agreement almost 200 Ukrainian products are effectively excluded from the Russian market because of high import duties. It is interesting to speculate whether these duties would stay in place if Ukraine became a full member of the CIS.)

During this period President Kuchma has tried to introduce some degree of stability and predictability into the relationship with Russia - in his word, Ukraine's "principal strategic partner" - by increasingly dealing directly with his Russian counterpart. Following a meeting early last year, President Kuchma revealed that he and Mr. Yeltsin had agreed that relations between their two countries were important enough to merit monthly presidential summits. Nothing came of this. But the fact that President Kuchma proposed such an idea testifies to Ukrainian concerns over the vagaries of Russian politics and Ukraine's potential economic vulnerability.

The agenda for the January 19 CIS summit reflected Moscow's growing desire that the CIS should develop into a viable supranational entity with Russia firmly at the helm. That the agenda was set by Russia was implied by the fact that while the conflicts in Tajikistan and Georgia were discussed, the war in Chechnya - and in Pervomaiskoye - was not. The slanted agenda also can be explained by the fact that the summit was intended to provide the Russian president with a unanimous show of support for the forthcoming Russian presidential elections.

This was also the first CIS summit to be held since last December's elections to the Russian Duma. Those elections produced a legislature even more inclined than its predecessor to view the territory of the former Soviet Union as a historically ordained sphere of Russian supremacy. Despite the Duma's marginal foreign policy role, its composition is generally representative of current Russian public opinion.

The presidential elections were therefore probably not far from President Yeltsin's mind when on January 9, he appointed Yevgeni Primakov as foreign minister. An unabashed advocate of more rapid CIS integration and Russia's right to steer the process in its own interests, Mr. Primakov's appointment should help shield President Yeltsin's foreign policy flank from a legislature not lacking in populist demagogues. In short, integrationist enthusiasm appears to have infected Russia's ruling circles as never before.

None of this spells good news for Ukraine. With its emphasis on bilateral rather than multilateral contacts, Ukraine remains the black sheep of the former Soviet family. Much to Russia's frustration - which surfaced at President Yeltsin's post-summit press conference - President Kuchma continues to view CIS summits more as an opportunity to pursue bilateral consultations than to indulge Moscow's hegemonistic fancies.

Viewed in this context, President Kuchma's urgent need to meet with Mr. Yeltsin so soon before the CIS summit (even as the latter was unleashing the brutal incompetence of the Russian security forces against Pervomaiskoye) makes sense. The Ukrainian president clearly felt it necessary to clarify, reiterate and remind his Russian counterpart, himself hardly the most predictable of characters, of some mutually vital bilateral interests that should not be forgotten during and after what proved to be an almost obsequiously pro-integration and pro-Yeltsin summit.

The Ukrainian side left Moscow on January 16 in good spirits. The bilateral talks between the two presidents had ranged across the full spectrum of issues. The president's spokesmen were quick to point out that this meeting had been different from previous ones because it had produced substantial results. Essentially, the two sides decided to set up a consultative committee chaired by their prime ministers that would meet at least twice a year; President Yeltsin agreed that the remaining BSF issues should be dealt with separately from the friendship treaty and, significantly, the two presidents jointly removed Rear Adm. Eduard Baltin, an arch opponent of the BSF's division, as the fleet's commander. (Less than a week later the Russian Duma condemned this move by a vote of 276 to 2.)

In contrast, President Kuchma's CIS summit agenda was very limited. Its substance appeared to consist of little more than trying, unsuccessfully as it turned out, to get his colleagues to agree not to draw distinctions between so-called "internal'' and "external" borders. Ukraine agreed to participate in some common cultural and scientific actions and joint police measures to combat organized crime. However, Ukraine did not join discussions on, for example, the customs union, CIS peacekeeping functions or the CIS flag and emblem: in other words the measures intended to strengthen the CIS institutionally. Nor by all accounts did President Kuchma spend as much time in bilateral conversations with other heads of state. Clearly, the real business had been dealt with three days earlier.

Ukraine's presence at the summit, however, was not simply pro forma. President Kuchma was the principal advocate for nominating President Yeltsin for an unprecedented second term as chairman of the CIS heads of state council.

Like the dog in the Sherlock Holmes story that provided a clue to solving a crime because it did not bark, Ukraine's reticence at the CIS summit hints at a refusal to compromise its perceived national interests. In fact, recent Ukrainian policy toward Russia has been characterized by what might best be described as a tentative assertiveness. Much to Russia's surprise and displeasure, Ukraine not long ago announced its intention to increase transit prices for Russian gas (negotiations are currently being held over the final price). Moreover, at his Moscow press conference President Kuchma directly accused Russia of delaying the division of the BSF. Ukraine also appears to be in no mood to compromise over the status of Sevastopil, the definition of its borders and the issue of dual citizenship.

Current circumstances favor a concerted Ukrainian effort to resolve some important issues with Russia. President Yeltsin is again politically vulnerable and perhaps ripe for some concessions. Ukraine's ever-improving relations with the West may also have enhanced its self-esteem and increased Kyiv's confidence in dealing with Russia. But given the nature of relations between Kyiv and Moscow, even the short- to mid-term consequences of this Ukrainian initiative are difficult to forecast. Similarly, only time will tell whether President Yeltsin's January 16 concessions are substantial or ephemeral.

Short bilateral summits are nothing new in relations between Kyiv and Moscow. Hopes have been raised before, only to be dashed later on. For example, President Yeltsin's statement that the BSF issue should be de-coupled from the matter of the friendship treaty is at least the third such promise made over the past year. Nor should it be forgotten that although meetings between the Russian and Ukrainian prime ministers will from now on be institutionalized there have already been several such meetings.

Adm. Baltin's removal? It might represent a genuine Russian concession, but it simply could be one on the form and not the substance of the debate because the division of the BSF has never been an issue per se. Resolution of the technicalities, for example, is proceeding encouragingly, and there are reports that the two sides have agreed that the transfer to the Ukrainian Navy of its portion of the BSF's ships and facilities will be completed by March 10. (Incidentally, after meeting with his Russian counterpart on January 16, Defense Minister Valeriy Shmarov told reporters that the BSF problem was 80 percent resolved. Even allowing for the high degree of subjectivity in such a guesstimate, last year's commonly cited figure was 90 percent.)

Many Ukrainian officials view the signing of the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation as a key event in their relationship with Russia. The Russian president's signature, as the argument goes, would indicate that Russia finally accepts Ukraine as a sovereign, independent and, most important, equal entity. President Yeltsin might indeed travel to Kyiv and sign the treaty largely on Ukrainian terms. But such a concession is unlikely to come without strings attached - probably in the shape of considerable Ukrainian political concessions on the CIS. This kind of trade-off is unlikely to appeal to the Ukrainians, but anything less would leave Mr. Yeltsin vulnerable to potentially crippling criticism in the run-up to the presidential elections.

This could be the reason that, from today's perspective, President Yeltsin might once again have to postpone his visit to Kyiv or, should he travel, leave the Ukrainian capital without having signed the treaty.

Markian Bilynskyj is director of the Pylyp Orlyk Institute for Democracy.

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