ANALYSIS: Russia's elections and Ukraine (03/10/96)

ANALYSIS: Russia's elections and Ukraine

by Volodymyr Zviglyanich

CONCLUSION

Russia's prospects

The advent of "instinctive" rather than charismatic leaders presents Russia with a choice among the prospects of "corrupt stability" (Yeltsin - Chernomyrdin); "moderate reformism" (Yavlinsky and the remnants of the democrats); and "instinctive demagoguery" (Zyuganov - Zhirinovsky - Lebed).

"Corrupt stability" gave the "party of power" fabulous material wealth. But it lacks the mass support needed to successfully compete for the presidency. The "party of power" could win this support, however, through compensation for savings lost during Gaidar's reforms and increases in pensions, wages, welfare programs, etc. However, it has neither the money nor the desire to do this. Moreover, it lacks an official leader.

Mr. Yeltsin will have to raise his personal rating within three months from 8 percent to at least 30-35 percent - and that looks almost impossible. Mr. Chernomyrdin will need to find an explanation for his decision to run after several public claims to the contrary. Both politicians are associated with those who launched an unprecedented wave of corruption in Russia. Mr. Yeltsin is notorious also as the only active politician who destroyed the USSR and started a war in Chechnya.

Mr. Yavlinsky's "moderate reformism" is not a program of action. So far this is rather a center-right plan for social order with a stress on governmental assistance to the intelligentsia - the major target of economic radicalism. Therefore, Yabloko and its leader could make it to the second round of the presidential races, provided they elaborate a clear version of economic reform with a stress on its ways and means. Mass support for a reform program is crucial both for the proponents of "stability" and "moderate reformism."

"Instinctive demagoguery" needs neither a rational economic program nor an effective bureaucracy for its implementation. The program could be superseded with a modified version of the Bolshevik principle "to take and divide" accompanied by claims of restoration of social justice. The obvious brutality of such a plan could be disguised with recognition of the equality of all forms of property and references to the Chinese model. Bureaucracy could be replaced with the new Communist nomenklatura from Mr. Zyuganov's shadow Cabinet and a special service that will be in charge of battling corruption and export control.

The leaders of this "instinctive demagoguery,'' such as Messrs. Zyuganov, Zhirinovsky and Lebed, have a stable and disciplined electorate. Their messages to the people are primitive, done in the aesthetic technique of traditional Russian "lubok" and are free of Western liberal terminology. The participation of Zhirinovsky and Zyuganov in the second round of the presidential race in Russia, a scenario that appeared unlikely a year ago, now seems rather feasible. This prospect could be undermined either by a fight between these leaders or, as in the case of Zyuganov, a possible split within his party.

Consequences for Ukraine

The results of Russia's elections and the possible advent to the presidency of an "instinctive demagogue" threaten Ukrainian independence. During his visit in May 1994 to the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars in Washington. Mr. Zyuganov told this author that his party has a special department working on Ukraine and that when they come to power, the Ukrainian question will be first on the agenda regarding restoration of the USSR.

The consequences of such a policy for Ukraine could be as follows:

1) establishment of cooperation between the leaders of the Russian and Ukrainian Communist parties to coordinate their efforts to curb market reforms and return to a mostly state-controlled version of economic development;

2) practical implementation of President Yeltsin's Edict No. 1040 of September 14, 1995, titled "On the Strategic Course of Russia With Countries-Members of the CIS," whereby Russia's relations with the CIS countries are treated from the position of economic, cultural and political hegemony;

3) abolition of the Belovezhskaya Pushcha Treaty of December 8, 1991, on the dissolution of the USSR (Ukraine was one of the signatories of this treaty);

4) an increase in nationalist rhetoric in the Duma, accompanied by calls for a referendum on reunification of the three Slav nations;

5) activization of efforts aimed at involving Ukraine in supra-national bodies of the CIS;

6) speculation on the problems of regionalism (especially in the Donbas and the Crimea), on the rights of "Russian speakers" and the policy of energy supply.

However, one should exclude the possibility of military clashes between the two states as the Russian army (shown in Chechnya) has nearly lost its combat readiness. Escalation of the policy of non-military pressure and demagogic hysteria regarding Ukraine could compel it to withdraw from the CIS and raise the question of Ukraine's accelerated membership in NATO. This scenario could challenge regional and global security if there is negative reaction on the part of Russia regarding such a move by Ukraine. It also could force the West to re-evaluate the balance of forces in the region.

Dr. Volodymyr Zviglyanich is adjunct professor of East European area studies at George Washington University.

PART I

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