Russia, the specter of integration and Ukraine: a look at new realities (04/07/96)

Russia, the specter of integration and Ukraine: a look at new realities

by Volodymyr Zviglyanich

CONCLUSION

Confederation or hegemony?

The signing of a "union" between Russia and Belarus on April 2 will lead to the creation of at least three geopolitical configurations on former USSR territory, thus questioning the validity and very essence of the CIS.

The first is the Baltic states, which do not belong to the CIS and will not join any "confederations." Their aim is to join Euro-Atlantic structures, such as NATO and the European Union, as soon as possible.

The second is the CIS, which is destined to be split when some member-countries become "more equal than others" due to their involvement in a "real union" with Russia. This turns the CIS into an "illusory union" (which it was in practice) and makes its further existence meaningless.

The third is the "new union/confederation" that will preserve a contrived sovereignty and governance through supranational bodies under Russia's dominance. The first idea of what form this government would take was given by President Alyaksandr Lukashenka after his talks in Moscow with President Borys Yeltsin and Viktor Chernomydin on March 22-23: a joint Supreme Council made up of presidents, prime ministers and legislative chiefs from each state, and an inter-parliamentary congress drawn from each legislature.

The participation of some CIS countries in this proposed "confederation," or community, would allow them to obtain credits for common programs and relieve such basket cases as Belarus and Tajikistan of responsibility for their political and economic crises.

For Moscow, entering a post-CIS space is a means to assert its role as regional hegemon, to soothe the psycho-emotional pain of its populace caused by the disintegration of the Soviet empire, and to combat plans for NATO's eastward expansion.

However, the co-existence of one top-dog (Russia) and several underdogs within the framework of a "new confederation" has the potential of turning this body into a sort of a hegemony established peacefully and "voluntarily," in which the military and economic capabilities of one member exceed by many times those of the rest of the members combined.

Lessons for the West

For the West the emergence of a post-CIS geopolitical reality contains several lessons.

Having said "no going back to the USSR" as a union based on violence and lawlessness, one cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that a post-CIS amalgamation could turn into a sort of "voluntary" hegemony. The problem is not how a post-CIS union is created, voluntarily or violently (the Communists so far speak only about peaceful means to restore the USSR), but what is its essence - democratic, hegemonistic, or authoritarian. The USSR, according to its constitution, was a voluntary union open to other countries, but essentially it was a totalitarian empire.
Russia should not feel itself isolated from the processes of European integration in which its former satellites are more and more actively involved. However, the West should capitalize on the idea that a post-CIS configuration could in no way be treated by Russia as a barrier to certain countries' membership in Euro-Atlantic structures. It also should be made clear that of the "three Europes" about which Warren Christopher spoke in Prague on March 20, (Western, Central and Eastern), Russia's path to Western European structures lies through the development of free and equal contacts with the countries of Central Europe rather than by establishing "exclusive" relations either with NATO or the EU.
The West should be ready for non-traditional forms of interference in the affairs of sovereign nations by Russia, such as creeping cultural expansionism, including educational and informational expansionism, language policy and "ethnic" foreign policy issues. This could entail a redefinition of the very notion of "interference."
The West should also be ready to deal with the three geopolitical configurations on former Soviet territory with their different aims and visions of the West.
Of these three, the Baltic states and Ukraine are the most important states for the West, and especially for the U.S., in limiting any Russian effort (voluntary or otherwise) to reassert dominance in Eastern Europe. Traveling to Kyiv shortly after the Duma vote on restoration of the USSR, Secretary of State Christopher stressed that "Ukraine is a very important partner of the United States," an independent and sovereign state. He noted that any unilateral attempt to change its status "should be rejected by the international community."

Lessons for Ukraine

During his meeting with Secretary Christopher on March 19, President Leonid Kuchma stressed that "Ukraine needs political stability more than ever." From this stem several important lessons for Ukraine.

The future of Ukraine's political stability is connected with countries that respect written laws and change them only in a legal way, rather than by the dictum of political whim.
Ukrainian political stability also depends on its relations with those countries that would not consider Ukraine's reinforcement a challenge.
From this follows that Russia cannot be the major strategic political partner for Ukraine. So far Russia - as the recent decision by the Duma and the intention to create a new union inside the CIS have shown - is not at ease with the idea of observing written laws and changes them as political considerations dictate. Any potential reinforcement of the political, economic or cultural standing of Ukraine will be considered a challenge to Russia's own national self-image. The political future of Ukraine is in Europe, with those states and structures that could facilitate the emergence of a market democracy there, rather than with Russia or some vague "Eurasian" space. At the same time, Russia could be regarded as a major economic partner for Ukraine until it develops its own internationally competitive hi-tech industry.
The strategic loss of Belarus, both by the West and Ukraine, to Russia must draw the attention of countries that together with Ukraine could withstand any Russian effort to re-establish dominance in Eastern Europe. Therefore, Ukraine's contacts with the Baltic states and the Scandinavian countries, as well as the countries of the Visegrad group, are now a top strategic priority in the region.

Dr. Volodymyr Zviglyanich is adjunct professor of East European area studies at George Washington University.

PART I

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