The socio-political basis and consequences of the nuclear accident (05/19/96)

The socio-political basis and consequences of the nuclear accident

by Oleksandr Burakovsky

In 1986, during the early morning hours of April 26, the No. 4 reactor at the Chornobyl atomic energy station exploded approximately 100 kilometers north of Kyiv.

The initial consequences of this catastrophe are now generally known. This year marks a decade since the tragedy, one that is being commemorated throughout the world. Dedicated to this event are conferences, symposiums, meetings, a special session of the United Nations. A variety of organizations are aiding victims of Chornobyl, especially the children, who with the sacrifice of their health are paying the price for the "games" of adults. Studies have been and are being conducted on the medical consequences of the explosion.

Socio-political assessments of the tragedy and its consequences have been made less frequently. It is not generally recognized that a disaster of this magnitude was inevitable given the socio-political system of the USSR, that sooner or later a catastrophe such as Chornobyl would happen. As a socio-political event, Chornobyl was not an accident. It was inevitable.

The nature of civic interaction, born of the socio-political atmosphere that had been developed in the country, made most citizens non-participants in the political process and, therefore, unaware and "dense." The Communist idea was dominant throughout society and created an environment in which nobody was interested in the feelings or thoughts of an individual.

Ultimately, the most important criteria for the success of any kind of society are the inner peace and comfort of its citizens. The model of society that had been developed in the USSR prior to 1986 did not put the attainment of each citizen's individual comfort in first place; this approach was considered to be erroneous. Instead, the ideology required reliance on a faceless and hollow concept of "the collective." In reality, the definition of this collective and its interests were determined by a self-selected elite, an elite that developed an all-knowing arrogance.

Since the "country of councils" differentiated itself from others on the basis of a socio-political system of organization, and not on characteristics unique to individuals such as race, ethnicity, religion, historical circumstances, this priority and emphasis on social and political organization on the basis of the "collective" led to a most profound tragedy for millions of people: the destruction of their life foundations, the fundamentals of their existence - traditions, faith, rituals, personal histories. As odd as it seems, the first to understand the folly of this destruction were the Communists, who then began a policy of restructuring, or "perestroika," in order to save this "country of councils."

The explosion at Chornobyl suddenly uncovered the "underlying currents" of the seemingly concrete-solid socio-political system of the country. It is the explosion at Chornobyl that awoke the sleeping and jolted them into awareness. In the first place it awakened the intelligentsia, particularly the intelligentsia that was living in the republic's capital, Kyiv, mere kilometers from Chornobyl.

This was not yet a movement for independence. In this movement into awareness, there was not yet any hint of political motives. Nonetheless, this was the first budding of parties that later would evolve into an opposition to the Communist Party and its policies. It is Chornobyl that led people to form various "movements," "fronts," "groups of Greens." This massive discontent gave energy to such organizations as Sajudis in Lithuania and the Popular Movement of Ukraine (Rukh).

Whereas, throughout the history of the Soviet Union, there were always individuals, or entire groups that stood in opposition to the party, the party deflected blame onto the opposition. With Chornobyl, there was no opposition - no one to blame but the Communist Party itself. And yet, the elite remained silent about its responsibility. This act of political betrayal by the party is one of the key socio-political consequences of Chornobyl.

It is the Chornobyl betrayal that gave impetus to the deputies of the first Parliament of an independent Ukraine to adopt as one of its first resolutions the declaration of Ukraine as a non-nuclear state. This particular act needs some clarification.

Today one frequently hears that Ukraine declared itself to be non-nuclear only to exact a higher price - more money for its nuclear weapons - and that such a declaration was the only way to get millions of dollars from the West, as well as "purchase" acceptance by Western countries of its independence. In my opinion, this point of view does not completely reflect the reality at the time.

Chornobyl opened the eyes of even those Communists who until this tragedy in one way or another had served the Communist behemoth, sincerely believed in "perestroika," and chose as their goal the rebuilding of the country on the basis of communism. "Glasnost," which began after 1985, took under its wing much of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, which occupied a prominent place in society.

The first general, republic-wide "informals" were given life in the offices of the Ukrainian Writers' Union. In the founding documents of these organizations, facilitation of "perestroika" was stated as one of the main goals. However, when Chornobyl exploded, everyone suddenly realized there was no denying that the managing elite of the country was completely cynical. They hid from the people the truth about the explosion, they took care to protect only their children, and ignored the very people they had provoked to tread the path of restructuring.

As it turned out, the "glasnost" that was a result of "perestroika" was openness to talk about and uncover only the past. In no way was this openness about the secrets of the present, or of the future. Chornobyl, in fact, showed "perestroika" to be a fiction, and for all intents and purposes, nothing in the country had really been changed. Not even a catastrophic explosion in the center of the European region of the Soviet Union, next to one of the largest and most beautiful cities in Europe, in one of the most populous areas of the Soviet Union, could force the leaders of the country to be forthcoming with their people.

This was a heavy blow to those who had any hope for mutual decency between officials and citizens and found it impossible to imagine that such cynical behavior was possible. It was the awareness of vulnerability in the face of danger that convinced the vast majority of the Ukrainian intelligentsia - I emphasize, without regard for political, social or ethno-national orientation - to raise its voice in support of a non-nuclear Ukraine.

The resolution proclaiming Ukraine's non-nuclear status to a large degree was a heartfelt rejection of the Communist Party's vision of Ukraine as a nuclear workhorse, willing to incur the risk of irreversible contamination of its land and forever threaten the health and well-being of its people. No one considered monetary "compensation" as the reason to take a non-nuclear position.

However, let us return to the events at Chornobyl. Chornobyl was presented as a one-time "accident." First, let us consider another earlier moment. On May 14, 1985, one year before the explosion, at 2:45 p.m. the Kyiv radio station interrupted its broadcast and throughout the city the tragic announcement was heard that the dam at the "Kyiv Sea" (north of the city) had broken. And even though in exactly eight minutes that same radio station broadcast the information that the announcement was a mistake, most people were not around to hear it. Most immediately believed the initial announcement - I emphasize, believed, there had been a break in the dam, which had been hanging like the sword of Damocles 10 kilometers north of Kyiv, ready at any moment to drop and wipe out half of the city.

Within minutes after the announcement, all the subway stations that led in the direction of the Dnipro River (on which the dam is found), were packed with people rushing to save their children and elderly parents at home. And the continuous announcements on the subway intercoms that the announcement was a mistake were to no avail. People were psychologically pre-disposed to believe this turn of events - the realization of their worst fear, the break in the dam.

If, in fact, the dam had broken, this would have been a small Chornobyl. Hundreds of thousands of people would have drowned. The building of the dam, one that changed the ecology in a huge, densely populated region of Ukraine and Belarus, flooded vast fertile tracts of land, forcing the relocation of thousands of people from dozens of villages. It threatened and continues to threaten the lives of the residents of a city of 3 million. The dam was built because the Communist Party leaders in Ukraine did not wish to reject general Soviet norms, for building a hydroelectric plant was prestigious. However, most were built in sparsely populated areas.

That did not matter. Ukraine needed a prestigious dam, and the safety of the citizens was discounted. Soviet engineers and builders could do no wrong. The socio-political system did not allow for other considerations. It is this political hubris that made such an event as Chornobyl inevitable.

To underscore the depth of the cynical attitude to those in power towards the people, I offer a few citations from the major political press of the country at the time of the Chornobyl explosion:

For example, Pravda wrote on May 7, 1986, "...not the North and South Poles, not cosmic orbits, nor the energy of the atom, nor the depths of the ocean can be tamed without tragic mistakes. This truth is made evident by the accident at the Chornobyl AES" [atomic energy station].

The Minister of Health of Ukraine, speaking on television in those days, calmed the people with the following statement: "...background radiation in Kyiv is even lower than it was prior to the accident."

The Ministry of Health of the USSR noted on March 20, 1989, in Pravda that "among the population there is no apparent radiation illness in any form."

The Ministry of Energy and Electrification of the USSR in June 1986 published instructions that forbade its employees to disclose the true information about Chornobyl to the print and broadcast media.

Pravda Ukrainy wrote on April 30, 1986, "...At the Chornobyl AES there was an accident that led to the ruin of a portion of the building that housed the reactor, and led to some release of radioactive materials. As a result of the accident, two people died. The radiation situation at the CAES, as well as surrounding areas, is stabilized."

May 1, 1986: "...during the past day, the level of radiation in the area of the CAES was lowered."

May 2, 1986: "...the level of radiation at the CAES has been reduced by one and one-half times."

May 6, 1986: "...the radiation situation on the territories of Belarus and Ukraine is stabilized with a tendency toward improvement...today, in the main square of Kyiv a celebratory opening of the 39th World Championship Bicycle Race will take place..."

May 13, 1986: "...radiation situation in Belarus and Ukraine, including Kyiv, is improving...agricultural activities have been undertaken...all daily tourist activities continue."

Such citations of the arrogance and cynicism of the leadership towards the people are countless.

These citations highlight the absence of genuine contact and mutual concern between those who had power and those who were dependent. Precisely this situation gave birth to the Chornobyl catastrophe, as well as the next step, the finale: the dissolution of the USSR. The heart of the matter was not "perestroika," its failure or success, or the August coup. These were just steps - some more, some less radical. However, the first step towards the dissolution of the USSR was the Chornobyl catastrophe. The consequences of this event will continue to affect the lives of millions of people for decades to come.

The world has recognized a medical explosion in the consequences of Chornobyl. However, no less important is the explosion of psychological, moral and demographic consequences, including relocation. The growth in mistrust and alienation among the people, as well as the sharp crest in the wave of immigration, which is not motivated simply by ethno-national, religious, political or economic situations, but by a genuine mistrust of the future, also is a result of this catastrophe.

In the first months after the explosion, one could hear "Chornobyl" riddles and anecdotes across the USSR. People wanted to remain as normal people, especially in tragic circumstances. One of the anecdotes was such: "Communism - this is Soviet power plus the deactivation of all countries." In the countries of the former Soviet Union, communism is no longer being built. "Deactivation," however, continues, in both the literal and metaphorical sense.

In my opinion, a complete study and analysis of the socio-political aspects and consequences of the catastrophe remains to be done.

Oleksandr Burakovsky is a human rights activist and a contributing writer to Novoye Russkoye Slovo. The text below is an abridged version and translation from the original Ukrainian of a presentation at the conference "Chornobyl: Ten Years After" held at Columbia University on April 9.

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