ANALYSIS: Russia discusses plans to revive (Soviet) union (05/26/96)

ANALYSIS: Russia discusses plans to revive (Soviet) union

by Volodymyr Zviglyanich

The Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy recently released a draft document titled "Will the (Soviet) Union Revive by 2005?" This council works under the direct supervision of President Boris Yeltsin and is headed by Sergei Karaganov, deputy director of the Europe Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Its recommendations constituted the basis of President Yeltsin's Edict No. 940 of September 14, 1995, titled "The Strategic Course of Russia with the States of the CIS," which was analyzed on several occasions by The Weekly.

Earlier, Mr. Karaganov and his council had published the document "The Strategy for Russia" in the Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta (May 27, 1994), which laid the groundwork for the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service's document released on September 20, 1994, under the title "Russia-ClS: Does the Position of the West Need to be Corrected?" In that document the tendency of CIS countries toward "reintegration" was proclaimed as inevitable and objective.

The main practical results of these theoretical exercises have been the recent signing of a treaty between Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Kyrgyzstan, and the Treaty on Creating a Union of Sovereign Republics, signed on April 2 by Belarus and Russia. Having taken into consideration the close contacts of the Council of Foreign and Defense Policy with Yevgeny Primakov, former head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service and now Russia's foreign minister, one cannot help but regard any document prepared by this council as most serious - particularly as it directly concerns Ukraine.

Main focus of the "2005" document

The document stresses that the word "Soviet" used in conjunction with the word "union" is used in a non-political sense only for designation of the future state, which is a historical successor to the Soviet Union, and which could emerge in the form of a confederation, union or federation on the territory of the former Soviet Union (FSU). The possibility of such a state's creation is the major focus of the document.

Why 2005? According to the authors, it is intuitively clear that this period will be key in the development of integration processes in the post-Soviet space. After this date the processes of either integration or disintegration will take final shape. The struggle between those two tendencies will last for the next 10 years.

The document stresses that, despite the openly manifested claim of some participants of the recent CIS summit in Moscow about the impossibility of recreating the USSR and objections to the very intentions of such a recreation, these declarations were of a "purely political" nature caused by the results of elections to the Russian State Duma and forthcoming presidential elections in Russia.

Moreover, these claims came from the states "that are only in the stage of creating independent sovereign states from the remnants of the FSU." According to this logic, those states of the CIS (excluding probably, Russia) which capitalized on the impossibility of creating the USSR (first of all, Ukraine) have practically no attributes of their own statehood. Therefore, they should seek reintegration with that political body that does possess statehood, i.e., Russia

The context of the discussion

The question of restoring the USSR in the near future is among the most acute global problems of the contemporary epoch, stresses the document. The context of its discussion is worldwide. It touches Russia and the whole post-Soviet space, Asia, the U.S. and partially Canada, some African countries (Arab countries, first and foremost) and Latin America. Only Australia has escaped this honor.

Factors impeding the revival of the USSR are as follows:

The liquidation of the USSR was judicially sound and confirmed by national referenda; the former states of the USSR have become members of the U.N. and other international organizations.
The West has reached "near consensus" concerning the undesirability of restoration of the USSR as a "strong" neighbor. The Western countries are much more stable now than they were when the USSR emerged.
The current situation practically excludes the use of coercive methods to restore the USSR.
The economic and political development of countries of the FSU is uneven and different. Russia proper lacks both the political will to resolve this problem and the foreign policy mechanism to pursue this goal.
In the future, Russia will deal with its own problems of survival and internal restructuring and will be incapable of paying for the restoration, which for most of the population is associated with the return to power of the old Communist nomenklatura and the abolition of private property.
New national political elites will resist any encroachments on their state sovereignty.
One of the major obstacles is that the countries of the FSU have acquired all formal and informal attributes of independent statehood, as well as the economic bases for their relatively independent existence.

The "2005" document purports that factors accelerating the revival of the USSR are not as numerous as those impeding the restoration. However, they are more fundamental by nature, and each centrifugal factor has its opposite, centripetal, aspect.

The act of denunciation of the USSR is illegal, as it was kept secret from the parliaments of the Soviet republics and the acting president.
The stability of Western states is volatile and the Atlantic model of democracy is withering away. The 21st century could see political instability in these countries.
The population of the FSU is suffering as a result of the rapid break-up of the USSR. The success of economic reforms in Russia could once again make it the center. The imperial consciousness of certain Russian political elites will gradually decrease and the traditional Russian desire (though arrogant) to make its weaker neighbors happier could increase.
The Russian diaspora is more technologically advanced and can more rapidly acquire market behavior. The fact that the Russian language is formerly the all-union language could also facilitate restoration of the USSR.
The U.S. is getting weaker as it is the only existing superpower.
The Slavic (or historical) unity of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine is a strong centripetal factor.
The threat of disintegration of the new independent states, as well as the problem of "unnatural borders" and "disputed territories" could also push for the restoration.
New local conflicts are almost unavoidable in Central Asia; the fall of the political regime in Tajikistan will inevitably push Kazakhstan toward Moscow.
The expansion of NATO via Poland to the borders of the FSU almost instantly puts Belarus under Russia's protectorate. This heralds the restoration of the USSR. The pressure on Ukraine will inevitably increase.
Many of the problems currently unresolved (e.g., the Crimea, Transdnistria, eastern Ukraine, the Black Sea Fleet, Kaliningrad) could be resolved upon restoration of the union.
One has a feeling that some of the new independent states are not very interested in becoming truly sovereign (or, objectively, cannot do this). Thus, they could either voluntarily unite with Russia or be absorbed by other states.

Therefore, according to the document, the coming decade will be decisive in answering the question "Will the (Soviet) Union revive in the near future?" If the answer is not found by the year 2005, it will never be found at all. Within this decade, the next five years are crucial in addressing two main points: Will there be an economic upturn in Russia? Will the West commit some major mistake causing the revival of the USSR?

The document purports that by the year 2000 a new federation will emerge. It rates the chances of newly independent states joining that body as follows: Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia - very likely; Ukraine - wholly or in part; Georgia, Kirgizia - with great, but not decisive likelihood; Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan - even smaller likelihood; Moldova and Azerbaijan, and the fate of the destiny of these states, respectively, will depend on Ukraine and the situation in the Caucasus; Latvia - less likely, but possible; Estonia and Lithvania - practically unlikely.

Having recognized that a single answer to the question of restoration does not exist, the authors nonetheless propose a long-term strategy aimed at revival of the USSR which is beneficial to Russia. They propose a series of steps:

to reform the Russian foreign policy mechanism, namely, to create inside the Foreign Ministry a special "ministry" in charge of the CIS and the FSU (i.e., of the Baltic states);
to elaborate a set of directives on Russia's policy toward each country of the CIS as well as the FSU;
to shift the focus of activities within the CIS from signing treaties to elaborating projects in the economic, social and economic spheres. A special role in this regard is given to the Russian language and its usage on the territory of the FSU.

The document capitalizes on further reinforcement of Russia relative to the rest of the CIS, and stresses the necessity of creating a wide network of both formal and informal contacts with political, economic and cultural elites of the CIS. To this end, the establishment of the semi-governmental CIS Fund as well as a CIS Institute is foreseen.

The results of the forthcoming presidential elections in Russia could be crucial in determining whether the idea of recreating the USSR is revived or is allowed to wither away.

The strategy for Ukraine

The "2005" document continues the move toward reintegration of the CIS countries, which since October 1993 (at the time of the forcible dissolution of the Russian Parliament) has become a dominant theme of both the Kremlin and the opposition. Previous documents, however, did not raise the possibility of restoring the USSR, instead they spoke more about integrating different forms of governmental institutions.

The new document, having paid lip service to the possibility of preserving the independent status of CIS countries, openly proclaims the task of restoration by the year 2005. It stresses that economic and cultural means will play the crucial role in Moscow's forthcoming efforts of "gathering lands."

Ukraine is seen in the second tier of countries constituting the new confederation (a prologue to a union) by the year 2000. The likelihood of its joining the confederation is evaluated by the authors as very high. Nor do they exclude the scenario of Ukraine's disintegration, as a result of which one part (probably eastern Ukraine) would join the confederation.

Russia is very interested in this scenario, as it would provide an opportunity (as stated in the document) to resolve the problem of the Black Sea Fleet (i.e., to put Sevastopil under its jurisdiction) and the Crimea, regarding it as a testing ground for eventual secession based on language and cultural factors. Eastern Ukraine, where the major part of the Ukrainian economic potential is concentrated, is a juicy morsel for rapidly expanding Russian companies and financial-industrial groups. As a preliminary step to this expansion and the eventual annexation of eastern Ukraine, the document foresees the development of debt-property agreements (the Russian monopoly Gazprom acquired parts of Belarusian gas processing facilities to cover debts), establishment of a customs union and the opening of Ukrainian markets to penetration by Russian goods unable to compete internationally.

The loss of Ukraine's economic sovereignty is considered by the Russian strategists as a key prerequisite of the "Belarus" scenario. Since Ukraine stands as a major factor in any attempts by Russia to restore the union, all efforts will be concentrated to further increase Ukraine's economic dependence on Russia, with corresponding language and cultural expansion.

Ukraine now faces the choice of either following the path of Eastern European countries, which managed to reduce their dependence on Russia, reorient their trade to the West and are looking now for integration with the EU and NATO, or following the path of Belarus this quasicomic/quasitragic example of colonization at the end of the 20th century.

To counter the latter tendency, so fraught with the loss of political independence, Ukraine would be compelled to study and implement the experience on decolonization acquired by such countries as Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and even Albania. All these countries have a level of direct foreign investment per capita that exceeds Ukraine's by dozens of times (e.g. while it is $30~$350 in Hungary; it is $12-$15 in Ukraine).

This means that the place of Western economic advisers in Ukraine, who do not understand the post-Soviet mentality, should be taken by experts on decolonization from Eastern European countries or from the Baltic states who know perfectly well the psychological peculiarities of market forms in post-totalitarian countries. They could elaborate a successful strategy for gradual transition of Ukraine, first to the level of the most advanced Eastern European countries and then within 10 to 15 years - to the level of Greece and Spain. Any attempt to replicate the model of Russian economic reform would inevitably lead Ukrainian Communists to power with all consequences to follow.

The intensity of efforts by Russian strategic planners regarding restoration of the (Soviet) union by the year 2005 or confederation by 2000 present Ukraine with the necessity of re-evaluating its major strategic priorities in economic and foreign policy.

Dr. Volodymyr Zviglyanich is adjunct professor of East European area studies at George Washington University.

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