Ukrainian reforms: a sociological analysis
by Volodymyr Zviglyanich
CONCLUSION
Parties and statehood
So far political parties have limited appeal in Ukraine. Popular support is distributed among 30 or more parties, with the Communist Party getting the most backing. Support for national-democratic and centrist parties has declined somewhat since 1992. However, this fact does necessarily mean that the Communists would succeed in parliamentary and presidential elections. Trust in the Parliament (where the Ukrainian left parties occupy near half of the seats) is the lowest of all governmental institutions (70 percent say they lack confidence in Parliament).
At the same time the public prefers pro-reform (47 percent) over anti-reform (4 percent) parties. Support for pro-reform groups is greatest among the younger generation (age 18-29) and the better educated, reaching a majority among the latter. This means that national-democratic pro-reform parties, which somehow lost popular standing, should adjust their programs and practical activities according to popular expectations, which are definitely connected with economic issues, social security and the fight against crime. It seems likely that the party with the strongest appeal on these issues would have the best chances to increase its popular support.
So far, political parties have failed to attract public attention and support, which is reflected in the limited attachment to specific parties. When asked which one party is closest to their political views, more than 60 percent either said "none" (30 percent) or "don't know" (32 percent). Only 30 percent named some 30 specific parties, most of which drew less than 1 percent of popular support. When asked who they would vote for if an election were held tomorrow, 28 percent said they would be likely to vote for a candidate representing a political party, whereas 23 percent would rather chose a non-affiliated candidate.
The figure of politically indifferent people was remarkably high - 21 percent answered "nobody" and 28 expressed no opinion. In general the public prefers a multi-party to a single-party state. However, only 17 percent opined for two strong political parties to contest in election; and 30 percent each favored "many" political parties or a "one-party" state.
People's national identity is important to their sense of statehood. When asked to describe themselves to foreigners, 60 percent would say "I am a citizen of Ukraine." Forty-three percent would identify themselves as residents of Ukraine or as members of a national group (45 percent). However, 67 percent would describe themselves as Slavs, far more than would say they were Europeans (7 percent), although nearly 11 percent would use both terms.
Ethnic Ukrainians (65 percent) and Russians (75 percent) are similar in Slavic self-identification. This could lead to a trend negative for the very existence of a Ukrainian independent state, as 59 percent think Ukraine's interests would be best served if the government "sought confederation with Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and other former Soviet republics." Only 31 percent think "remaining sovereign and independent" would better serve national interests. Support for confederation with Russia and other former Soviet republics is highest among ethnic Russians (80 percent), the over-50 generation (62 percent), in the Crimea (88 percent), and in the eastern (87 percent), northeastern (67 percent) and southern (66 percent) regions of Ukraine.
The lack of popular confidence in the national government and political parties, which are supposed to represent people's interests, reinforced with the vision of themselves as "Slavs" rather than "Europeans," brings about positive sentiments toward a possible "Slavs plus Kazakhstan" confederation and a decrease of support for an independent state.
Taking into account the rise of the tendency toward "real" integration in Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan as well as the almost complete energy dependence of Ukraine on Russia, one should consider these two factors combined as the biggest possible threat to Ukrainian independence.
In assessing Russian policy toward the Ukrainian state, 53 percent believe Russia "is seeking to have Ukraine unify again with Russia in a single state," 21 percent think Russia respects Ukraine's independence, while 14 percent believe Russia is neutral to Ukrainian independence.
The belief that Russia seeks Ukraine's integration is greatest in the western regions of Ukraine and Kyiv (68 percent).
To withstand this negative trend, the government should elaborate a special program aimed at reinforcing the independent Ukrainian state. This should include a series of educational, political and economic measures, especially among Russian-speaking and elderly people, as well as among the youth, where a market-oriented culture has strongest backing.
The "integrationist" trend indicated above is balanced somehow by a positive vision of the U.S. and Germany as possible guarantors of Ukrainian statehood and promoters of financial aid for reforms.
Quick adoption of a constitution for Ukraine was considered vital for the further development of Ukrainian statehood. However, knowledge of constitutional processes was limited: only 18 percent had heard much about it. Among 60 percent who had heard something, 33 percent had heard enough to pick a model for drafting the constitution, while the rest preferred the European model of democracy (32 percent), followed by the U.S. Constitution (12 percent) and the Russian Constitution (6 percent). This shows that the majority of those polled choose a Western European model as most appropriate for Ukraine.
The public also disclosed a strong understanding of the necessity of civil rights guarantees in a new constitution. Almost 90 percent agreed on five issues they felt must be included in Ukraine's constitution: guaranteeing personal liberties and freedoms to all citizens, guaranteeing political freedoms to all citizens, protecting the rights of national minorities, creating an independent judiciary and guaranteeing the right of private property.
Conclusion
The results of the nationwide polls showed that public trust in the government is crucial for conducting reformist processes. The success of any reforms is directly related to the level of popular trust in the government. The greater the gap between the deeds of the authorities and the public's popular understanding, the smaller the chance for social change. Thus, relations between the people and the government in Ukraine should improve at all levels.
The government now faces the crucial task of persuading the people that the results of economic modernization could benefit everybody, not only the new elite. Otherwise the old Soviet dichotomy between "us" and "them" will persist, thus undermining any reformist attempts.
Politically, the civil rights and freedoms of individuals should be unconditionally protected by special constitutional provisions. This would help the government reduce "neo-integrationist" expectations stemming mostly from the public's economic impoverishment and frustration with the government.
Socially, a thoroughly elaborated governmental program aimed at support and development of the Ukrainian national identity and statehood is needed. This program would include the development of values of a civil society as a mediator between the state and the individual, respect for written laws and constitutional principles, and promotion of the value of the social contract between the citizen and the state.
Dr. Volodymyr Zviglyanich is adjunct professor of East European area studies at George Washington University.
Copyright © The Ukrainian Weekly, July 14, 1996, No. 28, Vol. LXIV
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