THE STATE OF UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE: An overview from Harvard: The political scene (08/25/96)

THE STATE OF UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE: An overview from Harvard

The political scene

A special roundtable on Ukrainian politics in the post-independence era was held at Harvard University's Ukrainian Research Institute on July 22. Participants included James Clem, professor of politics at the Harvard Ukrainian Summer Institute; Zenovia Sochor, professor of political science at Clark University; Roman Szporluk, Mykhailo Hrushevsky Professor of Ukrainian History and Director of HURI; and Lubomyr Hajda, associate director of HURI, who also acted as moderator.

Q: Lubomyr Hajda: Can the last five years since Ukraine gained independence already be viewed as a historical period in its own right, and how can this period be considered as part of a long-term historical process?

A: Roman Szporluk: It is possible to view the last five years as a historical period because they are rich in great events - turning points. I mean, for example, the declaration of independence and the adoption of the Constitution on June 28 of this year. One such turning point earlier in this century was in 1953-1954, when what I call the "Forty Years' War" (from 1914 to about 1954) that was waged against the Ukrainian people by Russia and the USSR (and also other powers, such as Germany) ended.

For an immediate antecedent to 1991-1996, I would take 1944-1945, because it is then that the most important event in modern Ukrainian history occurred, namely, the unification of Ukrainian territories in a single state. Very importantly, this ended the 300 years of conflict with Poland. The only previous time when all Ukrainian lands were under one sovereignty was from 1569 to 1648, and as we know it caused some problems for Poland. By 1945 everything was under Russia and this fact put Ukrainian-Russian relations on a new footing that then made 1991 possible.

Zenovia Sochor: This is to see today's Ukraine as a culminating point, but of course 1991 or the processes before are also initiation points. I think of them as beginning processes within the context of the globalization of democracy which you have in Eastern Europe and in quite a number of Third World countries. Democratization always begins with some kind of a splitting of the old elite, the development of genuine political parties, the establishment of a framework of rule of law and some consensus-building.

From that point of view, I think that we are witnesses to some of those first steps of democratization, and that 1991-1996 makes for a convenient period for consideration because it ends with a Constitution that establishes the rule of law and with the left ceasing to act as a bloc.

Q: Hajda: Looking back over the five years since Ukrainian independence, would you hazard an opinion on what is the most significant success or achievement, on the one hand, and the most dramatic failure or loss of opportunity, on the other in this period?

A: James Clem: Besides the Constitution, which truly is a tremendous success for democracy in Ukraine, I would point to the presidential elections of 1994. This was a process that was conducted relatively freely and fairly, and it resulted in a turnover of elites for the top position in Ukraine.

The biggest failure, I would say, was the lack of initiative on economic reform at an early point when the political capital was there. This represented a tremendous missed opportunity, and it has made things much more difficult.

Sochor: Another success is that there is very little to report on the ethnic front. This runs contrary to the views that were prominent in the Western press that the break-up of Ukraine was imminent. It implied a basic question about modern Ukraine: is there a modern Ukraine or just its regions, with the eastern regions not being the least bit interested in being part of something modern called Ukraine?

The fact that the ethnic situation has proven to be much calmer than anyone predicted is a very important part of this success story, as were the political decisions made. The Law on Nationality, for instance, helped pave the way for ethnic harmony. Ukrainianization proceeded at a very gradual pace. And Rukh set the tone by not presenting itself in terms of "Ukraine only for the Ukrainians," so that from the very beginning there was an effort to reach out to all ethnic groups.

Clem: I agree that ethnic differences have not been mobilized in general in the political sphere, but disagree on regional differences. I think the 1994 presidential elections show that there are regional differences: the east-west vote reflected that. But again, the elections were held, the majority was heard, and the decision was accepted. The fact that those regional divisions did not explode is another high point.

Szporluk: This idea of Ukraine as a case in the universal global process of democratization gives us a conceptual framework within which we can establish certain criteria for judging Ukraine's performance. It is encouraging that Ukraine is now participating in world history as an independent player but is also judged by universal criteria. Our colleague here at Harvard, Prof. Timothy Colton, has made the point that the test of new state-building lies not only in one free, democratic election but also in the second. By these standards Ukraine succeeded quite well.

For the negatives, Ukraine has been less than successful in economic reforms. Just as in politics we have a good tradition, in economics and social values we are dealing with a historical legacy that was reinforced by the Soviets, but in fact has a longer tradition: prejudice against capitalism, hostility towards a market economy, and a village outlook on people from towns as manipulators, crooks and speculators. That tradition is still present in contemporary Ukraine among people who are not Communists and yet who feel that people dealing with money are not working as hard as those who work in the field.

Sochor: In a comparative perspective, the countries that have had the easiest time in their transitions to democracy are those that had some kind of tradition of a market economy. In Spain, under Franco, the market was not completely wiped out. After Pinochet in Chile there was a thriving market. In Poland there was some tradition of entrepreneurship, of capitalism.

Szporluk: Private farming, at all times.

Sochor: Exactly. And, as we know, it is one thing to initiate democracy, another to sustain it. For that you need a middle class with a vested interest in some kind of a democratic forum, because it gives them political privileges and allows them to enact those kinds of economic laws that will allow them to be productive. So where are we in terms of Ukraine? We did not have the tradition nor the economic reforms.

A contagion effect, though, seems to be the one thing that works - people looking outside their borders to see what's attractive. Will they see that their East European neighbors who have done the best are the ones that have enacted some kind of market reform? If nothing else, the last election in Russia showed that, when the chips are down, people would rather take their chances on the stumbling market reform, than going back to a command economy. So Ukraine's neighbors, all of whom have elements of market reform, might help sustain the beginnings of entrepreneurship.

Hajda: What I would view as a major success is the trend toward national integration in a country that has only very recently known territorial unification, and even that within a multi-national empire that sought to eliminate the national element. It is a remarkable fact that two territories as dissimilar as the Crimea and Transcarpathia are being integrated without any major upheavals - though with occasional ripples - and the whole is gradually melding into a single polity. By conscious policy, or by simply muddling through and not interfering too much administratively, Ukraine has seen much more integration than could have been expected in 1991.

Clem: I would agree and point to the 1994 elections as a turning point in national integration, given Leonid Kuchma's careful self-stylization as the symbol of national integration.

Szporluk: I don't think we should congratulate Ukraine too much on that issue. Ukraine is successful because horrible things have not happened, not because it has been doing things positively in the area of integration. For example, I am not so sure that the view that Transcarpathia is so successfully integrated is very much shared in Transcarpathia. Can some native of Transcarpathia become president of Ukraine? Can he or she hope to become a leading political figure in Kyiv? Similarly, in the Crimea do the Tatars feel that their voice is heard in Kyiv and that they participate in decision-making in Kyiv?

I think the Ukrainian state, society, organizations, political parties and economic structures still need to work out some process of a flow of people from regions to the center, from the center to regions, up and down, horizontally and vertically.

Q: Hajda: How successful do you think democratization has been? Is Ukraine indeed developing a multi-party system? What are the trends?

A: Clem: The general trend is encouraging. During the elections of 1990 there were a number of restrictions on the ability of the democratic opposition to present candidates; the elections of 1994 represented an extraordinary improvement. Party candidates still represented only around 10 percent of all the candidates who ran, but those candidates did disproportionately well.

There is a range of parties representing a variety of choices, from a more radical nationalist perspective to moderate democratic parties, national democratic parties, centrist parties and leftist parties. Where I think there can definitely be improvement is within the centrist bloc: parties that can join up with national democratic parties, such as the Ukrainian Republican Party, and form a solid center.

Sochor: In the elections that you were talking about, there was an east-west split that was more regional than genuinely ethnic. Much of that split has to do with the fact that the Communist stronghold is in the east. The Communist Party is the one party that continues to have a strong organizational base, but no one party has enough of a party base to appeal across regions. Neither Kravchuk nor Kuchma felt the need to base themselves on a political party. It still is clan-like. One of the elements that you need in terms of competition and the electoral processes and democratization is a political party.

Szporluk: Open to ambitious people from all sorts of places.

Sochor: And one of the functions of a party is integration. Not just to seek power, but in the process of seeking power, to integrate.

Clem: Parties also serve as recruitment agents for the political system. Something that needs to take place is the development of a strong non-leftist party alternative in eastern Ukraine - it is slowly developing in Parliament now.

Szporluk: Since parties are also talent scouts for political leadership, they are integrators; they are in fact a precondition for the democratic functioning of the state - it is clear that Ukraine needs a democratic electoral law that promotes the channeling of political activity.

Q: Hajda: We've been talking mostly about national politics. My impression is that politics regionally and even on the municipal level can be quite different. What do you think about the local political situation?

A: Clem: The control of the local level is extremely important, particularly when a lot of the registration of candidates takes place by electoral commissions that are formed at the local level. The effect of more progressive politicians at the local level in the east was not felt in the 1994 elections but will be felt in future elections. This process of reclaiming municipal and oblast-level resources from the Communist Party started much earlier in the west with the victories of national democrats in the 1990 elections. That contributed to a large degree to victories at the national level in 1994 and the development of political parties in that intervening four-year period.

Q: Hajda: Is it still too early to notice a trend in the changing of the guard among the elites? What kind of people are beginning to move in?

A: Clem: I think it's a little too early. While there was a physical turnover of people in the 1994 Parliament, the proportion of forces that first came in did not radically change. In the 1994 elections there was talk of nomenklatura elites with an interest in privatization, with Kuchma and interregional blanket reforms being an example, and the Liberal Party sending deputies to Parliament, but this group has yet to make itself known officially under a party banner.

Sochor: There is an ongoing power struggle everywhere. In the rural areas, collective farm chairmen still dominate. There's been a minimum of privatization - and until you have separate political and economic elites, it is going to be very difficult to resolve the issue of transfer of power at the local level. There is now, however, a provision in the Constitution that forbids one from being a member of Parliament and also a collective farm chairman or a government minister. That certainly will affect a good proportion of the Communist faction in terms of having power both in Kyiv and at the local level.

Szporluk: I think Ukraine also still has a long way to go in integrating cultural elites with political and economic elites. The traditional Ukrainian intelligentsia need to find a form of contact with politics and with the economic sphere. One precondition is regional integration and a flow of elites. The other one is allowing politically talented people from the world of academia, literature, art and culture both entry into political positions and the capacity to influence people in those positions.

At the same time the rising class of Ukrainian business-people and professional politicians needs to have some sentiment for an understanding of cultural and intellectual trends. There is a need for journals and newspapers that all of those people voluntarily read in common.

Q: Hajda: I would like to conclude by discussing national symbols and their role, and how the conflict over the symbols was resolved in the Constitution.

A: Sochor: The left argued in the constitutional debates against the national symbols because they wanted to get something in exchange, and they were successful. The Crimea was given not only autonomous republic status but also a separate constitution, provided that it is in accordance with the Ukrainian Constitution as a whole. More generally, however, what is important about the national symbols goes back to the national integration question.

One of the legacies left over from the previous period is a kind of Soviet political culture. Those of us who used to talk about the Soviet system all said that one of its failures was the inability to create "homo sovieticus." But we're finding in retrospect that there was far more impact in terms of Soviet thinking, Soviet habits, of Sovietization in general, than we ever suspected. One of the repercussions of this kind of Sovietization of peoples of the USSR was to erase for a lot of people any sense of national identity, and this complicates the path of national integration. The opinion polls show that a third of the population simply identify with a region or with a vague Soviet identity. Their attitude towards national symbols is relative indifference. For others, especially in western Ukraine, national symbols have a very important emotional connotation.

What the Constitution does is to establish a framework for all: this is who we are, this is how we are represented. It begins to take on a meaning, and hopefully with time, a widespread and shared meaning. But having national symbols adopted in the Constitution is a very important step in fixing them in the national consciousness.

Szporluk: As a final note, I wish to say that I think it is very encouraging that the Constitution, adopting the traditional Ukrainian national symbols, did so in a very sophisticated way. For example, it adopted the trident, but it does not refer to the word "tryzub." It says it uses the symbol of the state of Grand Prince Volodymyr.

It stresses the statist basis of Ukrainian identity. The symbol of Ukrainian nationhood is a state, and it is a state that enjoys unquestionable legitimacy in the eyes of all east Slavic citizens. Before we go on to talk about prospects, we can agree that this gesture gives a form of closure to the first 1,000 years.