Harvard conference participants note Ukraine is at center of NATO debate (02/16/97)

Harvard conference participants note Ukraine is at center of NATO debate

by Margarita Balmaceda

CAMBRIDGE, Mass. - The recent visits to Kyiv of British Defense Minister Michael Portillo and NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana have put Ukraine at the center of discussions and negotiations about NATO enlargement. From Ukraine's perspective, the question is complex: how to avoid international isolation - and a possible Russian pressure for closer military relations - after the expansion of NATO in 1999.

This expansion, which is most likely to include Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, is not likely to include Ukraine in the short or medium term. If not negotiated and implemented carefully, such an expansion could indirectly lead to a situation where two reformulated military blocs could take shape in Europe: an expanded NATO up to Ukraine's western borders, and a newly assertive, Russian-led military alliance based on CIS collective security agreements (dubbed by some the Miensk Treaty Organization).

Although Ukraine has repeatedly refused to join CIS collective security agreements, its ability to withstand Russian pressure may become limited if a newly expanded NATO leaves the country in an isolated and vulnerable position. Thus Ukraine is working toward a special relationship with NATO that would offer some guarantees of Ukraine's territorial integrity.

These questions provided the background for a public debate on NATO expansion to the East that took place at Harvard University on February 10 under the auspices of the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute and the Davis Center for Russian Studies. The debate was moderated by Theresa Rakowska-Harmstrone (professor emeritus, Carleton University) and counted as panelists Celeste Wallander (assistant professor of government, Harvard University), Hannes Adomeit (chairman of the Program in Russian and East European Studies at Tufts University), Andrei Kortunov (president, Russian Science Foundation) and Zenovia Sochor (associate professor of government, Clark University). Presentations were followed by an open debate that included the large audience, at which faculty members from more than 10 universities were represented.

As the debate brought together specialists on a variety of disciplines - international security, German politics, Russian foreign policy and Ukrainian politics - each panelist was able to approach the issue of NATO expansion from a different angle, bringing new freshness and depth to discussions that often, especially as portrayed in the mass media, have remained at the superficial level.

Prof. Adomeit focused his remarks on the idea that this is not the first time NATO has had to deal with the question of expansion to Eastern Europe. In fact, many of the questions on the table today were faced by Soviet and Western negotiators already in 1989-1990 during the diplomatic negotiations that preceded Germany's reunification in 1990.

Going back to the original agreements on NATO expansion to former East German territories reached by Russia and the West at the time of Germany's reunification (the so-called 4-plus-2 agreements), Prof. Adomeit emphasized that the Russian leadership may have a point in objecting to NATO expansion on the grounds that the spirit, if not the letter, of the 4-plus-2 agreements prescribed no further NATO expansion after the incorporation of former East German territories. In Prof. Adomeit's words: "I am not against enlargement per se, but I'm against an enlargement against Russian opposition."

Mr. Kortunov, president of the Russian Science Foundation, discussed the peculiar coalition that has taken shape in Russia against NATO expansion. What makes this coalition special, in Mr. Kortunov's words, is that it brings together a widely diverse group of politicians with vastly divergent views about Russia's domestic politics and Russia's place in Europe: the conservative-nationalists and the liberals.

The first group, the conservative-nationalists, see NATO mainly as a potentially hostile military alliance, whose extension up to Russia's borders could create new security uncertainties for Russia. (Therefore, in view of this author, this group is especially opposed to a potential inclusion of Ukraine in the alliance).

For the liberals, on the other hand, their dislike for a NATO expansion that excludes Russia is based on issues of national identity: as NATO membership is taken to be a symbol of belonging to the new Europe, a Russian exclusion from NATO is both isolating and humiliating; it would imply Russia was to be treated as semi-European.

The two groups also differ in terms of their policy prescriptions.

The conservatives see the prospect of NATO expansion as so threatening that no measures should be spared in the effort to block it. If this fails, however, Russia should balance this enlargement by seeking to erode NATO, and building a new set of alliances both within the former USSR (building up a competing military alliance and increasing pressure on Ukraine to join it) and in the Third World.

For the liberals, on the other hand, the only acceptable solution would be to join NATO. Were this to be impossible, they would strive for a substantial consolation prize (limitations on NATO activities in the new states, new conventional weapons agreements, etc.), which could be sold to Russian public opinion, thus avoiding total discreditation of the liberals in the eyes of the Russian public.

Prof. Sochor's presentation emphasized how, for a long time, U.S. and NATO officials seemed more concerned with Russian reactions and attitudes towards NATO than with the concerns of the countries seeking to join NATO, or more directly affected by its expansion, such as Ukraine.

Prof. Sochor's presentation also focused specifically on the case of Ukraine's changing relationship with NATO. If initially Ukraine seemed to be opposed to NATO expansion, by now most policy-makers favor a separate charter agreement with the alliance. (In an interesting contrast with earlier declarations, the new National Security Doctrine recently approved by the Verkhovna Rada allows for the country to join international security systems, thus opening the door to a special agreement with, or even membership in, NATO.)

Prof. Sochor finished her presentation with two remarks about the role of Ukraine and Russia in a future European security system: NATO expansion should not be interpreted narrowly as being against Russia; on the contrary, once expanded, NATO could also contribute to Russia's rethinking of its security policies in a constructive way. Moreover, for all the difficulties involved in incorporating Ukraine into the new Europe envisaged by the West, these difficulties are relative, as there could never be real security in this new Europe without Ukraine.

Some of the most provocative elements of the discussion where provided by Prof. Wallander, who focused on Russia's uneasiness about NATO expansion, and on the question of whether NATO expansion - at least as currently formulated - could indeed solve Europe's real security problems. According to Prof. Wallander, the West is making a great mistake by attributing anti-NATO expansion sentiments to extremist or fringe elements in the Russian political spectrum. Confirming Mr. Kortunov's assessment, Prof. Wallander sees the Russian political elite as basically united in its opposition to NATO expansion.

According to Prof. Wallander, whether one agrees with Russian objections or not, it is imperative to come to terms with the fact that these concerns are long-standing and genuine, and that ignoring them as simply the product of an extremist and populist political discourse cannot but harm Europe's future security. Moreover, as noted by Prof. Wallander, current NATO members are not likely to ratify the inclusion of new members if they feel that this will destabilize their relationship with Russia: current NATO members want to increase their security, not decrease it.

Prof. Wallander also emphasized the fallacy of believing NATO can, as if by magic, solve all of Europe's security problems: in her view, the real threats facing the European states are not so much external threats, but the question of mistrust and lack of cooperation between states. Moreover, having the false expectation that NATO can solve all of the continent's security problems would overburden the institution and be counterproductive in the longterm. In her view, thus, the West should seriously consider Russia's concerns (by measures such as granting Russia political membership in the alliance, and modifying the alliance's charter to ensure Russia is not seen as a single threat), and transform NATO in such a way (enhancing NATO's capabilities in areas other than conventional external defense, and focusing on broader, all-European institutions such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe ) as to change its focus away from andue concentration on an outdated emphasis on external security.

Where does this leave Ukraine? This debate emphasized the importance of institutions - either as security shields or providers of a certain collective identity - and the fact that a neutral Ukraine could cut loose from this increasingly important web of international institutional links.

Yet some further questions for debate remain. If, as emphasized by Prof. Wallander and Mr. Kortunov, the Russian political elites are so vehemently opposed to NATO expansion, what does this mean for Ukraine? Does this imply that Ukraine does have good reason to feel anxious about an external threat from Russia, in fact providing an argument for including it in NATO's security umbrella?

The debate at Harvard also proved that many discussions about European security continue to be dominated by concern for Russia's perceptions of security, and that Ukraine still occupies a rather awkward place, not only geographically, but also in various theories of geopolitics and international relations. Thus, the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute and the Davis Center have agreed to host a second debate focusing specifically on Ukraine, Central Europe and NATO expansion, to take place on Thursday, March 13.

These discussions are part of a larger HURI series on Ukraine and European security. As part of this series of events, HURI will be visited in mid-March by Dr. Eugueni Kaminski, senior fellow of the National Institute for Strategic Studies, who will lecture at the institute on issues related to Ukraine's new role in Europe. (For more information, please call HURI at 617-495-4053.)

Margarita Balmaceda is assistant professor of political science at The University of Toledo and visiting fellow at the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute.

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