ANALYSIS: A tale of two letters and a bilateral relationship

by Markian Bilynskyj

New year preoccupations with domestic politics in Ukraine - in the shape of arguments over the still unratified 1997 budget and the at times almost frenetic coalition-building efforts of several political parties - unexpectedly gave way recently to foreign policy concerns. These centered on two letters; one real, the other supposedly concocted.

On January 13, Russian President Boris Yeltsin wrote to his Belarusian counterpart, Aleksandr Lukashenka, proposing that they begin substantiating the agreements on integration signed last April. He also suggested holding a referendum on the desirability of a union "of one kind or another" between their two countries. The following day, the Ukrainian daily, Vseukrainski Viedemosti, published the text of a letter - as well as a reduced reproduction of what it claimed to be the original document - allegedly sent last October by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Krylov to President Yeltsin's principal foreign policy adviser, Dmitrii Rurikov.

While the letters and the immediate interest they generated might soon be forgotten, the heavily intertwined bilateral and regional issues and trends they address will remain very relevant. Indeed, they might become even more acute given the prospective geopolitical changes engineered by NATO expansion.

A reply to an assignment?

The Krylov letter was apparently a reply to an assignment from Mr. Rurikov to consider measures "for countering the destructive anti-Russian policy of the president of Ukraine, L[eonid] D[anilovych] Kuchma ..." Mr. Kuchma's cardinal transgressions are identified as a "principled refusal" to allow Ukraine to participate actively in deepening CIS integration under Russia's leadership and an "unwillingness" both to discuss the possibility of preserving a unified Black Sea Fleet (BSF) and to compromise over the status of Sevastopol.

The author points out that the Russian Embassy in Kyiv predicts, on the basis of information confirmed by "confidential sources within the Ukrainian government," that Mr. Kuchma's policies will continue unchanged until the 1999 presidential elections. The only way out is to "neutralize [his] negative personal influence." The "optimal" means would be Mr. Kuchma's "political discreditation leading to possible impeachment by the Verkhovna Rada."

According to the Russian ambassador to Kyiv, Yurii Dubinin, the letter notes, some deputies from "influential" factions within the Rada reported "confidentially" that the above scenario could transpire if a propaganda campaign were to be launched "blaming him for strategic concessions to the Russian side." The "catalytic role" would be played by the Russian Federal Assembly where both chambers would adopt legislation stopping the further division of the Black Sea Fleet and declare Sevastopol a Russian city.

The author predicts that, given Ukraine's dependence on Russian energy sources and its gas debt, President Kuchma would "refrain from extreme retaliatory moves," thereby giving his opponents the opportunity to launch a widespread propaganda campaign "accusing him of betraying national interests."

"Developments," the letter concludes, "could lead, if not to impeachment, then certainly at least to a significant weakening of the Ukrainian president's position, something that would correspond to Russia's national security interests."

All of the Russian officials involved with or mentioned in the letter (plus Foreign Minister Yevgenii Primakov) have either denied its existence or declared it a blatant forgery and have urged the Ukrainians to investigate.

Horbulin reacts to documents

Speaking at a January 15 press briefing, however, Volodymyr Horbulin, who, significantly, had just returned from a trip to Brussels - where the principal item on the agenda had been the systematization of relations between NATO and Ukraine in the form of an as yet unspecified special agreement - stated (obviously without elaborating the point) that although he valued highly the competence of the Ukrainian special services, he did not believe they were capable of producing such a document "on their own." Moreover, he added, given the current state of Ukrainian-Russian relations, the existence of such documents was quite possible.

Certainly, there was heightened Black Sea Fleet-related activity in both the Russian and Ukrainian parliaments last autumn. But whether this constitutes circumstantial evidence for the letter's existence or is just coincidence is unclear. Last October, for example, the Duma passed a law halting the division of the BSF and declared that Sevastopol was a Russian city - something the Federation Council did in December. Moreover, in November the Verkhovna Rada did come within a dozen or so votes of passing a resolution to consider Mr. Kuchma's impeachment. Although the move was initiated by the left and related to his domestic policies while prime minister, rumors that President Kuchma was about to concede to Russian demands on the BSF and Sevastopol may have led some members of the pro-presidential "Constitutional Center" faction to vote in a way that signaled to the president that their support on every issue should not be taken for granted.

Whatever the correlation of forces within the Rada might have been back then, and whatever the source and veracity of the Krylov letter, the fact is that its appearance might now work in President Kuchma's favor. Given the unabating legislative struggle with the Verkhovna Rada (and, increasingly, the government), some members of the Kuchma administration could be tempted to use it as a pretext for suggesting that any opposition might just be the Kremlin's anonymous collaborators.

There can be no doubt, however, that the Krylov letter has appeared at a very awkward time in relations between Kyiv and Moscow. The twin problems of the Black Sea Fleet and Sevastopol appear intractable - this at a time when President Yeltsin's continuing indisposition deprives Russian policy of at least a rudimentary focal point. As a result, sensitive issues are becoming hostage to narrow and distortive political posturing in anticipation of pre-term presidential elections.

Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov has been peerless in this respect. His most recent public blusterings on Sevastopol's status were delivered in the "City of Russian Glory" on January 18 at the opening of apartment blocks built for Russian Black Sea Fleet personnel at Moscow's expense. (Last year, President Yeltsin publicly rebuked the governor of the Primorskoye region, Yevgenii Nazdratenko, for his anti-Chinese outbursts, claiming that they were damaging to Sino-Russian relations. That Moscow's mayor is allowed to continue to negatively affect ties between Russia and its principal foreign policy concern, Ukraine, is curious to say the least.)

Increasingly, therefore, the diplomatic efforts of both sides might be diverted from a search for a genuine solution to the modest but paradoxically more taxing (not to mention vexing) task of preventing the emotive BSF/Sevastopol issue - as well as mutually important economic matters - from being irretrievably drawn into the pre-election vortex both in Russia and Ukraine.

It is very tempting to attribute the appearance of President Yeltsin's January 13 letter to President Lukashenka as the latest gambit in Russia's continuing opposition to NATO expansion. Clearly, this consideration must have played a key role (particularly since relations between NATO and Russia were to be discussed by NATO Secretary General Javier Solano and Foreign Minister Primakov in Moscow on January 20). But there is another, equally interesting possibility.

On January 17, Presidents Kuchma and Lukashenka held a working meeting in Homiel. Belarusian sources said the meeting had been planned for some time, but the appearance of President Yeltsin's letter made the need for a meeting more urgent from a Ukrainian point of view: the Ukrainian president wanted to gauge Mr. Lukashenka's reaction to the letter prior to his January 23 visit to Poland.

By all accounts, the meeting, which apparently had something of a spontaneous agenda, went quite well. President Lukashenka steered clear of any integrationist language and stressed the importance of constructive ties with Ukraine. Indeed, after the meeting he reportedly stated that the two countries "had never before been as unanimous regarding their national and economic interests."

The Russian reaction was interesting: Russian State TV, as well as several political analysts and officials, reacted negatively. Reportedly, some Russian officials also were angry that President Lukashenka did not consult them prior to his meeting with Mr. Kuchma.

Last October, the Russian government had placed a value-added tax on some Ukrainian imports and quotas on others in an attempt to increase budget revenues, protect domestic manufacturers, and, probably, for good measure, to remind Ukraine of its still substantial dependence on the Russian market. However, some of these goods continued to find their way into the Russian market via Belarus. Thus, Belarus benefited, while the Russian treasury (ironically as a result of measures taken by the Russian government) lost a substantial amount of income.

Therefore, apart from the NATO dimension, the January 13 letter could also have been a hint to Belarus to close this conduit. But President Lukashenka is unlikely to accede to Moscow's requests: the relatively free flow of Ukrainian goods, among other things, helps him subsidize prices - a key element of any populist policy. Also, by pursuing closer Belarusian-Ukrainian ties, Mr. Lukashenka might be trying to develop a Ukrainian "card" to be played when necessary while negotiating the terms of integration with Russia.

That Mr. Lukashenka might also see cooperation with Kyiv as a snare for eventually drawing Ukraine into that process cannot be discounted. (Ukraine, on the other hand, appears to view a growing agenda with Belarus as possible leverage for preventing its assimilation by Russia - on whatever terms. Thus, speaking at a February 21 press briefing, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennadii Udovenko stated quite clearly that Ukraine is against Belarus' isolation.)

Because of the implications of this matter for relations with Ukraine and, more generally, with the West (in the context of NATO expansion), Moscow appears keen to disperse any impressions that the declarations on integration between Russia and Belarus are not perceived to be hollow or stalling. Indeed, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement saying that those members of the Russian media who had concluded that the Homiel meeting contravened last April's agreements were wrong. (Of course, it is quite possible to accept this statement as signaling a kind of indifference, or even assent to discussions between two sovereign states. But the fact that Russian Finance Minister Oleksandr Livshyts was recently rebuked for publicly drawing attention to the economic burdens of integration tends to support the above interpretation.)

Nevertheless, the Yeltsin administration is probably not too displeased by the majority view of the media because, by presenting the meeting between the Ukrainian and Belarusian presidents as the latter's negative response to Mr. Yeltsin's letter, the media has placed the Yeltsin administration in a position to claim that President Yeltsin is, as the saying goes, more-Catholic-than-the-pope on the issue of integration.

The populist appeal of this factor should not be underestimated - particularly at a time when President Yeltsin is coming under increasing pressure as doubts grow over his suitability to govern.

Markian Bilynskyj is director of the Pylyp Orlyk Institute for Democracy, established in 1991 by the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation, a non-profit organization that supports the development of democracy and civil society in Ukraine through a variety of projects.

Copyright © The Ukrainian Weekly, February 16, 1997, No. 7, Vol. LXV

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