ANALYSIS: Nuclear power dilemmas (02/23/97)

ANALYSIS: Nuclear power dilemmas

by David R. Marples

The G-7 countries and Ukraine are locked in a dispute over credits assigned to the Ukrainian energy industry which were tied to the closure of the Chornobyl nuclear power station by the year 2000. Ukrainian Energy and Environment Minister Yurii Kostenko berated the G-7 following the organization's February 11 meeting in Washington, noting that it has not yet agreed (and may well decide not to agree) to provide funds for the construction of new nuclear reactors at the Rivne and Khmelnytskyi nuclear power stations in western Ukraine.

The dispute dates back to April 1994, when an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection declared the Chornobyl nuclear power station to be unsafe and recommended its earliest possible closure. Subsequently, Ukraine and the G-7 had a series of meetings to discuss credits and subsidies to Ukraine in compensation for the station's closure by 2000, the sealing of the destroyed fourth unit, and the start-up of new reactors that had been under construction for a number of years at the Rivne and Khmelnytskyi plants.

In April 1996, at a meeting of the G-7 countries in Moscow - which coincided with the tenth anniversary of the Chornobyl disaster - an aid package to Ukraine totalling some $3.1 billion was drawn up, but was made conditional upon the prompt action of the Ukrainian authorities to begin the process of shutting down Chornobyl.

The Chornobyl nuclear power station is a graphite-moderated (RBMK-1000) plant, which in 1986 had four 1,000-megawatt reactors in operation and two under construction. These latter two reactors were abandoned after the 1986 accident. The first three units, however, were all returned into service by the end of 1987. In 1991 a serious fire led to the removal of unit 2 from the grid. On November 30, 1996, unit 1 was shut down, ostensibly "to conduct technical operations." The Ukrainian Energy Ministry implied that the shutdown was temporary.

On November 28, 1996, the Ukrainian State Nuclear Energy Commission declared plans to restart unit 2 by the fourth quarter of 1997. This move puzzled international experts. Nuclear experts in the U.S., Germany and France concurred that it would not be economically feasible to restart any Chornobyl units if Ukraine is to adhere to its commitment to close down the station completely by 2000. The units require upgrading, and the funds expended on that process could not possibly be recouped in so short a time. Ukraine, then, appears to have changed course dramatically since April 1996.

Ukraine's new position has resulted in part from two major grievances against the G-7 group.

First, it has long been held that the attention paid to the Chornobyl station was one-sided, and that Russia, which has similar RBMK stations (Sosnovyi Bor near St. Petersburg; Kursk; Smolensk) and Lithuania, which has a larger capacity version (an RBMK-1500 at Ignalina) have not received such close scrutiny. Serhii Parashyn, director of the Chornobyl station, maintains that his plant is technically safer than its Russian counterparts, precisely because of the improvements made as a result of international inspections.

Second, Ukraine has maintained that the G-7 countries have been sluggish in providing funds. The two new reactors at Khmelnytskyi and Rivne could in theory compensate for the closure of the first and third units at Chornobyl. However, with no funds available, Ukraine has maintained it has had no freedom to bring into service these new reactors.

In addition, Ukraine is facing particularly severe energy problems and a water shortage. Nuclear power currently accounts for up to 40 percent of its total electricity output. Ukraine's total capacity at its nuclear stations is 14,000 megawatts. The major station is not Chornobyl, but the 6,000-megawatt giant at Enerhodar (the Zaporizhia Atomic Energy Station) on the Dnipro River. The accident rate, particularly at the latter station, has been alarmingly high. Safety standards are generally low, partly because of a dearth of safety regulators and low morale among plant personnel.

Hydroelectric stations are at peak capacity, while thermal power stations, which still produce a plurality of electricity output, are dependent upon imports of oil and gas from Russia. Ukraine is also facing a financial crisis. Without outside funds it has no money to finance nuclear energy expansion. Like other workers, employees in the industry have not received regular wages for several months.

Earlier this year, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) criticized Ukraine for failing to look beyond the nuclear sector within the over-all energy sphere. This criticism is a reiteration of similar comments made by Greenpeace International. Ukraine has retorted by declaring that the G-7 also did not look beyond the nuclear energy industry when agreeing to offer the credit, particularly since Ukraine has new reactors that could be brought on line within a short timespan. In short, both the providers of credit and the recipient have failed to find a common ground. Each side is accusing the other of bad faith.

Perspectives

In the short term, Ukraine will likely continue to operate the Chornobyl station well beyond the year 2000 and in the face of international protest. If the second unit is restarted later this year, once overhaul operations have been completed, then Chornobyl could have two (and possibly all three) of its reactors in operation beyond the assigned time limit. In so doing it would forfeit its aid and credits from the G-7.

President Leonid Kuchma also acknowledged recently that the various projected international designs for a new covering for the fourth reactor have been shelved. The current cover, which has a projected lifespan of 15 years, will continue to suffice. Ukraine is not only operating Chornobyl, internationally acknowledged as an unsafe plant (because of its faulty reactor design), but also lacks the financial means to resolve the problem of the covering of the destroyed fourth reactor, posing a long-term threat of the release of radioactive dust into the vicinity of the station.

Does Ukraine realistically have energy alternatives? Sources such as Greenpeace say it does, and that a rigorous energy efficiency plan could compensate for the loss of Chornobyl (which provided just 6.2 percent of Ukraine's electricity output last year). Ukraine is reportedly using three times as much electricity than is used to produce a similar product in Western Europe. The answer lies in energy conservation, according to this viewpoint.

For the Ukrainians, however, energy and politics are closely tied. The country is seeking energy self-sufficiency, and in the short term nuclear power is the best guarantee to remove energy dependence on Russia (particularly) and Turkmenistan. The official mindset is that Ukraine is being singled out unfairly for attention in the nuclear safety area, while other countries are being equally lax; that the industrialized Western nations have provided credits with something less than the required alacrity; and that whatever the problems in the nuclear energy industry, there is no immediate alternative to completing reactors already under construction.

Ukraine can be criticized for such stubbornness, particularly when its actions on Chornobyl endanger the public and people outside its borders. It is difficult, however, to change the nuclear industry's current powerful position with the energy structure (one can criticize only the former priorities of the Soviet regime). Further, Ukraine's position as the operator of stations that fall below world safety standards is far from unique. Several countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have very similar problems, and Lithuania and Bulgaria, for example, are even more dependent on nuclear power than is Ukraine.

On the other hand, Ukrainian policies have been inconsistent. The original G-7 memorandum of April 1996 specified not only financial and technical assistance to shut down Chornobyl and to help secure unit 4, but also to assist Ukraine to develop energy alternatives. This latter request has been all but ignored in Ukraine, while the nuclear lobby continues to make the case for the extension of Chornobyl's life into the 21st century.

Finally, it should be noted that the State Atomic Energy Commission and the directors of Ukrainian nuclear power stations are currently fighting what one U.S. expert has termed "a titanic turf struggle." The plant managers demand the authority to restrict electricity supply to local consumers who do not pay their bills. Currently they are often paid in kind for the electricity (sometimes in metals) and must then find buyers for such goods in order to cover costs. The root of the problem for the nuclear, like other Ukrainian industries, remains the lack of money.

David R. Marples is professor of history at the University of Alberta in Edmonton and director of the Stasiuk Program for the Study of Contemporary Ukraine at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, which is based at that university.

| Home Page |