EDITORIAL: The Helsinki deal (04/06/97)

EDITORIAL

The Helsinki deal

A little more than three weeks ago, Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin met in Helsinki. The results in a nutshell: Russia did not get a legally binding treaty defining its relations with NATO and it did not get a veto over alliance matters that affect its interests. But, Russia did get U.S. pledges that it would do more to support private investment in Russia, back Moscow's bid to join the World Trade Organization and support enhanced status for Russia in the G-7 (e.g., the meeting in Denver will be called the "Summit of Eight").

At first glance, Russia appeared to have compromised on the issue of NATO expansion. But soon afterwards Mr. Yeltsin made it clear that he continues to view NATO expansion as "a mistake, and a serious one at that," and that Moscow intends to "minimize" its impact via an agreement with the alliance.

At about the same time the U.S. and Russian leaders were meeting in Helsinki, Ukraine's Foreign Affairs Minister Hennadii Udovenko was in Brussels outlining what Ukraine expects should be included in its own partnership pact with NATO. The key provisions: "confirmation of the openness of the alliance to new European democracies, including Ukraine; non-acceptance of any claims for a new division of Europe into spheres of influence or domination; guarantees of freedom of choice to join any existing security organization; and confirmation of the NATO requirement that any candidate should fully resolve its territorial disputes and problems with its neighbors, including Ukraine."

Ukraine's reaction to the U.S.-Russian summit was cautious. An official statement noted: "It is unfortunate that ... the differences in U.S. and Russian views regarding NATO expansion were not resolved. ... Ukraine welcomes the efforts of NATO and Russia to prepare an appropriate document outlining the main parameters of their partnership. ... Such an agreement ... should promote the strengthening of European security and should not violate the fundamental security interests of other interested states."

There was stronger reaction from former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. In a cogent article carried by the Los Angeles Times Syndicate, Dr. Kissinger argues that NATO's ability to function as the alliance and guarantor of peace it was designed to be is jeopardized by the deal in Helsinki. The heart of the problem is that Russia will be given a powerful voice via "consultation, coordination and ... joint decision-making and action on security issues of common concern."

"From now on," writes Dr. Kissinger, "all discussions within NATO .... will be influenced by Russian participants whose objectives cannot possibly be the defense of NATO territory - historically the principal objective of the alliance." He goes on to point out that "Even post-Communist Russia is conducting some policies redolent of traditional Russian imperialism."

It is ironic, the former secretary of state writes, that "Russia seems to be achieving NATO participation before the new applicants." That is why he suggests the new NATO-Russian Council should be delayed until new members are admitted, or these applicants should at least be allowed to participate in deliberations of this NATO-Russian forum; that Russia should stop agitating against NATO expansion; and that it should finally accept its borders with all neighboring states.

That, we agree strongly, should be a minumum requirement for any Russian pact with NATO. Clearly Russia - not a NATO member, and not even a prospective member - cannot have more prerogatives than candidate-members. It cannot determine NATO policies as an outsider. And, it cannot be accepted as a NATO "partner" while it refuses to recognize the borders of its own neighbors.

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