BOOK REVIEW: Scholarly study of Ukrainian nationalism in 1990s (04/06/97)

BOOK REVIEW: Scholarly study of Ukrainian nationalism in 1990s

Andrew Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, XVII + 300 pp., ISBN 0521 48285 hardback and ISBN 0521 57457 9 paperback

by Taras Kuzio

Andrew Wilson's book "Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith" is one of the first academic studies to survey the subject of Ukrainian nationalism since John A. Armstrong's seminal "Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939-1945" (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955 and 1963). Mr. Wilson's study is well documented by tables and maps throughout the text, and the author shows a good grasp of Ukrainian-, Russian- and English-language sources on Ukraine. As a study of an important topic, it is therefore a welcome addition to a body of literature that remains sparse.

Nevertheless, for five related reasons the book suffers from an acute identity crisis. First, the book lacks a theoretical discussion of nationalism within which the subject matter should have been placed.

Second, the book lacks a comparative approach to the study of nationalism with other countries within Central-Eastern Europe and Eurasia. By creating a comparative approach Mr. Wilson would have found that Ukraine is not the "unique" country that he argues in the range of difficulties it inherited. All of Ukraine's inherited problems (regionalism, lack of a unified political culture, denationalization, uncompleted nation-building) exist throughout the former USSR.

Third, Ukrainian elections are not always a good indicator of the strength of certain political views. The 1994 parliamentary elections were held on the basis of a majoritarian election law. In addition, although the number of elected radical right and center-right nationalists is relatively small, they have a great degree of influence within the policy-making community in Kyiv. In contrast, the amorphousness of the large number of Russian-speaking Ukrainians Mr. Wilson admits is reflected in the low level of influence they are able to exert.

Fourth, it is never clear in the book what exactly Mr. Wilson understands as the "nationalism" to which the book's title refers, i.e., "Ukrainian nationalism in the 1990s." Until 1991, any study of "Ukrainian nationalism" should refer to all those advocating independence for Ukraine from the former USSR. Since 1992 studies of "Ukrainian nationalism" ought to refer only to the radical authoritarian right in Ukraine. By not defining his concepts of nationalism, Mr. Wilson confuses three distinct and different entities: advocates of Ukrainian independence, the radical right, and those in support of Ukrainian nation-state building after 1992.

Finally, by basing his study primarily on language denomination as the source of the strength of "Ukrainian nationalism," Mr. Wilson oversimplifies very complex and multi-faceted processes. He argues that the large number of Russian-speaking Ukrainians severely limits the appeal of "modern ethno-nationalism and creates the conditions for a sharp polarization of society." This, in turn, leads him to conclude that "Ukrainian nationalism" is a "minority faith."

It is certainly the case that the number of Russian speakers limits the appeal of the radical right, but it does not limit the appeal of nation-state building, in which Russia speakers fully participate.

Mr. Wilson also prefers not to use the term "Russification" as this would denote a prior loyalty to Ukrainian language and culture on the part of Russian-speaking Ukrainians. However, all former Soviet states, with the exception of Belarus, are attempting to provide affirmative action in favor of their titular languages and cultures which were, despite the author's reluctance to use the term, subjected to Russification in the Tsarist and Soviet eras. If Mr. Wilson had surveyed, as did Mr. Armstrong, only the radical right in Ukraine, he could have made the rather unrevealing conclusion that it is indeed a "minority faith." This would not have told us very much, because the radical right is a "minority faith" throughout Europe and Eurasia. If, however, one is referring to either Ukraine's drive to independence or Ukrainian nation-state building, use of the term "minority faith" leads to wrong conclusions and policy prescriptions. Throughout the former USSR, with the exception of Belarus, nation-state builders are the "majority faith."

This identity crisis throughout Mr. Wilson's book leads him to make several general statements and confusing conclusions. For example, Ukrainian nation-state building since 1992 has been largely successful in maintaining stability and progress. However, by confusing "Ukrainian nationalism" with both the radical right and/or Ukrainian speakers, Mr. Wilson fails to see how support for the Ukrainian state is not confined only to western and central Ukraine. Furthermore, Mr. Wilson's neat division of Ukraine presents Ukrainian speakers as standing opposed to the Russian-speaking regions of a supposedly homogenous eastern and southern Ukraine. Mr. Wilson also goes on to mistakenly argue that the Donbas is representative of the entire eastern-southern region of Ukraine and that confrontation between Ukrainian and Russian speakers is likely on a scale of that in Moldova.

However, within the three radical left parties and parliamentary factions only a small minority of members and national deputies still oppose Ukrainian independence. Eighty-five percent of Ukraine's parliamentarians voluntarily took the oath of loyalty to the Ukrainian state after the adoption of the June 1996 Constitution. With his confused understanding of "Ukrainian nationalism," Mr. Wilson fails to understand the dynamics at work within Ukraine's nation-state building project. One would assume from any reading of Mr. Wilson's book that Russian-speaking Ukrainians would be generally disloyal to the Ukrainian state. Yet, we find the opposite: a great degree of continuity between the presidencies of the former "nationalist" Leonid Kravchuk and the "pro-Eurasian" Leonid Kuchma vis-à-vis federalism, the state language, dual citizenship, the CIS and the desire to orient Ukraine towards Europe. In reality, there was little to differentiate their platforms during the 1994 elections; at times, President Kuchma appears to be more of a "derzhavnyk" (or "nationalist" in Mr. Wilson's terminology) than his predecessor, Mr. Kravchuk.

Taras Kuzio is research fellow at the Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham, and senior research fellow, Council of Advisers to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

| Home Page |