ANALYSIS: Military agenda takes hold in Russian politics

by Volodymyr Zviglyanich

The crisis in the Russian army has reached its peak. Russia, the second largest nuclear power in the world, does not have money to pay salaries of officers and soldiers, or for research and development projects. Neither does it have a viable military doctrine. Its best officers have left the army for the business world. The majority of the officers corps does not have decent housing conditions. The very concept of the military's structure - whether it is to be conscript-based or professional - is unclear.

The poor level of military preparedness and the low morale of Russian troops were clearly demonstrated during the ill-fated war in Chechnya. Decision-making processes and responsibilities for them on the highest levels of the military command are split between the Ministry of Defense (Minister Igor Rodionov) and the Defense Council (Chairman Yurii Baturin). These institutions have diverging views on the concept of military doctrine.

On February 7, Minister Rodionov sent a report on this catastrophic situation in the army to Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.

Common issues

There are issues that unite the top brass of the Russian body politic and the military elite.

The first is an adamant opposition to NATO's expansion eastward. Politicians object to this idea in fear of losing control over former Soviet allies in Eastern Europe and former Soviet republics, especially the Baltic countries. The military sees in the forthcoming expansion of NATO a direct challenge to its professional capabilities and ability to cope with the growing crises in the Russian army.

The second is the growing politicization of the Russian army. The evidence of this trend may be seen in the growing number of political declarations coming from the military, such as territorial claims on countries of the "near abroad," especially Ukraine. Their intent is to exert military pressure (especially on the Baltic countries) under the pretext of defending the rights of the "Russian-speaking" population. That argument was used by Hitler's propaganda machine regarding the protection of the rights of the Sudeten Germans in the wake of the invasion of Czecho-Slovakia in 1938.

A new clan in Russian politics

A political-military clan has emerged on the Russian political landscape, alongside the financial and industrial interests. Its characteristic feature is an intrusion - under the pretext of "developing democracy in Russia" - of the military into political affairs and of politicians into the domain of professional military concerns. On February 11, Ivan Rybkin, chairman of the Security Council and former chairman of the Duma, claimed in an interview with Rossiiskaya Gazeta that Russia could use its nuclear weapons first in response to a conventional arms offensive.

Another feature is the availability of a charismatic leader. One could consider Gen. Aleksandr Lebed the leader of the new clan. Mr. Lebed's popularity so far is the highest among politicians active in the Russian political arena. That Mr. Lebed's ascension to power is perceived as a threat by the establishment in the Kremlin is demonstrated by attempts of the state-controlled TV channels such as Russian Public TV (ORT) and Independent TV (NTV), controlled by Mr. Yeltsin's allies Vladimir Gusinski and Boris Berezovskyi, to stage attacks on the maverick general. These attacks ranged from accusations against Mr. Lebed of state treason for the Chechnya deal to his failure to secure the release of two Russian TV journalists kidnapped by the Chechens in late January.

The financial core of the new clan is based on the assets of the retired military officers who joined the ranks of the "new Russians," as well as those who continue their duties in such lucrative businesses as arms exports. For example, a state-owned company, Rosvoonuzheniye, is headed by Mr. Lebed's crony, the former commander of the Soviet aviation forces and former USSR defense minister, Yevgenii Shaposhnikov. Mr. Lebed's trip to Washington last November was sponsored by his friends - retired officers-businessmen. They also financially support his newly created party, Home and Fatherland.

Mr. Lebed supported the former head of Mr. Yeltsin's security service and ex-KGB general, Aleksandr Korzhakov, in his bid for a seat in the Duma from Tula, south of Moscow. This seat had been left vacant when Mr. Lebed moved to the Kremlin last year. Having won a parliamentary seat, Mr. Korzhakov hinted that he would take revenge on his enemies by revealing secrets he had learned during the years he worked for President Yeltsin.

The nuclear card

Trying to cope with the growing crises in the army, the representatives of the political-military clan increased their pressure on Mr. Yeltsin, the government and public opinion in Russia. On February 7, during a closed session of the Duma, Foreign Minister Yevgenii Primakov briefed members on the problems of European security and NATO's eastward expansion. He said that such expansion would lead to "unpredictable" and very serious changes in Russian foreign policy. These changes are connected to the formation of a strategic alliance with China, increasing ties with Iran, clandestine support of Libya and deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus.

There are signs that the Kremlin was increasing its pressure on the West regarding NATO expansion via different channels. Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and First Vice Prime Minister Anatolii Chubais declared in Davos, Switzerland, at the World Economic Forum that nationalists would come to power in Russia should NATO expand.

However, national-chauvinistic sentiments have been part of the official Russian political vernacular since October 1993, soon after the forceful dissolution of the Russian Parliament by Mr. Yeltsin. This time, however, they are supported by frequent references to the nuclear button. Before Mr. Rybkin's aforementioned statement, came Mr. Rodionov's February 7 declaration that Russia may not be able to control its nuclear arsenal in the future. One could surmise that this had more to do with the ongoing campaign to block NATO expansion than with a recent deterioration of the economic situation in Russia and poor subsidy of the army (104.3 trillion rubles were appropriated for Fiscal Year 1997).

Until recently, Russian officials had vehemently denied that there was any problem whatsoever in maintaining nuclear weapons. Why did Mr. Rodionov go public now? One possible explanation is that this is because of his desire to extract additional money. But the timing of his remark - in the middle of a stepped-up Russian campaign against NATO expansion and during Mr. Chernomydrin's visit to Washington - suggests that more than economics was involved.

As Paul Goble, deputy director for broadcasts of Radio Liberty maintains, Mr. Rodionov's comment appears to be part of the broader Russian government campaign against the expansion of the alliance.

The purposes of Mr. Rodionov's remarks could be analyzed as follows.

1) They seem intended to reinforce the message that Russian leaders from Mr. Yeltsin on down have been delivering of late: any expansion of NATO would threaten to undermine the very fragile stability of the post-Soviet region. Expected results: No one in the West would want to take any steps that would lead to the loosening of Moscow's control over its nuclear weapons. Such a loss of control could cause all these nuclear weapons to fall into the wrong hands.

The Kremlin expects that the Western community, having been presented with the frightening prospect of Russian nuclear weapons smuggling, would change its stance on NATO expansion. To this end, the Russians could arrange a sort of a "show trial" connected with nuclear arms smuggling and arrange media hysteria around this. For example, the head of the Federal Security Service (FSB - successor to the KGB) said in Davos that Russia does not exclude the possibility of terrorist attacks on the NATO headquarters in new members' capitals. One could expect that the Russian KGB could arrange a "leakage" of fissile materials closer to the NATO summit. Therefore, Mr. Rodionov's words were timed to get maximum attention in Washington and other NATO capitals.

2) His words appear to have been designed also to extract more cash for the Russian military - but from the West rather than from the Russian Duma. His plea of poverty before this audience has two very different goals: on the one hand, Mr. Rodionov's words will be used by Russian leaders to seek even greater assistance from Western countries, given the West's reasonable fear of nuclear proliferation; on the other, Mr. Rodionov's plea is likely to lead to a greater understanding by some in the West of Russia's recent arms sales to Finland, Columbia, etc.

3) Mr. Rodionov's words also appear intended to split NATO countries on the question of expansion by playing on popular fears of nuclear disaster. In many NATO countries, the populace is far more skeptical about expansion than are the national security elites. By putting the nuclear card into this game, Moscow could count on popular and media criticism of expansion to rise. It may even succeed in splitting off one country from the current consensus on expansion - and Moscow needs to pick off only one NATO member to block any expansion (e.g., Turkey, France).

Trying to coordinate their foreign and internal policies facing NATO expansion, old foes in Russia put off their differences and increased pressure on the Duma. During a joint press conference in Moscow on February 7, Messrs. Rodionov and Baturin tried to deny rumors about their irreconcilable approaches to military reform. It was noted by Sergei Yastrzhembski, Mr. Yeltsin's press secretary, that the president had ordered them to conduct this press conference in order to reduce speculations about disagreements between the two agencies.

The military doctrine

One of the biggest differences between the Defense Ministry and the Security Council is Russia's concept of military doctrine.

The position of generals from the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff is based on the military doctrine of 1993. According to this document, Russia should have enough military forces to combat an offensive from any direction (or several directions simultaneously). However, the danger of foreign invasion no longer exists. This undermines the concept of having a big army and increases the validity of nuclear weapons as a deterrent factor.

A different concept of the military doctrine comes from the Security Council. It maintains that it is difficult to allocate the 160 trillion rubles for military spending demanded by the Defense Ministry and that the army should face budget cuts in the near future. It also purports that nowadays it is impossible to protect Russia from invasions from all possible directions. Rather, it proposes to concentrate on military reform, including personnel cuts, and to preserve research and development, and production of new armaments.

The problem of reduction poses several problems. The first is that the Russian army officially consists of 1.7 million servicemen. Generals from the Defense Ministry propose to reduce it to its actual performance level - 1.5 million - this is, to eliminate the "dead weight." Another problem is that the reduction of the army's size proposed by the Security Council would signify the inevitable loss of jobs for some 500 generals. This creates a real conflict of interest that undermes the army from within. This conflict is only reinforced by the growing corporate solidarity among the generals and senior officers for whom the proposed personnel cuts would hurt any prospect of attaining the rank of general.

Possible solutions

During their joint press conference, Messrs. Rodionov and Baturin argued that military reform cannot be reduced to personnel cuts; this would be only the first stage of a three-point reform plan and it should be conducted by the year 2000. During that period the budget should give money for R & D and production of dual-use technology.

The second stage (2000-2005) presupposes an increase of spending on military training and an increase in the number of contract servicemen.

The third stage (2005-2010) envisages the creation of a "flexible" defense structure to react to emerging threats in different regions. NATO's planned expansion has found its reflection in this military doctrine. Mr. Rodionov even intimated that NATO expansion is designed especially to undermine military reform and democratic developments in Russia.

However, this proposed concept has several weak points. First, it suffers from the Soviet legacy of drawing up huge five-year plans without clear-cut financial and logistical support. Second, it does not resolve the basic difference between the two agencies outlined above: Should Russia have professional or conscript-based armed forces? And third, it does not give an answer to the question of whether Russia should continue (until at least the year 2010) to defend itself from threats coming from all or only some directions; and, if so, the nature of these threats should be delineated.

Additional problem

The constantly growing number of paramilitary troops, i.e., those not subordinated to the Defense Ministry, is yet another problem challenging the reform process in Russian's armed forces. The number of internal troops subordinated to the Russian Internal Affairs Ministry (MVD) rivals that of the land forces of the regular army. More than two dozen different agencies in Russia (MVD, FSB, border troops, etc.) have their own armed forces. Consequently, the number of generals not subordinated to the General Staff is growing, thus creating a conflict between them and army generals. The paramilitary generals have much better financial and social benefits than their colleagues from the Defense Ministry.

The regular army strongly opposes the existence of different paramilitary armed forces, and claims these forces are plagued by low combat readiness and poor coordination (e.g., between the regular army and MVD troops in Chechnya). Generals from the General Staff promote the idea of resubordinating all power structures under their authority. This would be tantamount to the creation of some type of parallel government under the leadership of the military - an idea that is rejected by the non-army generals for obvious reasons.

Conclusions

• The Russian army must resolve the dilemma of how to pull the Russian budget's meager resources into the huge army inherited from the USSR. The Russian economy can hardly afford the 104 trillion rubles allocated for the army. Even this sum will be "eaten" by the third quarter of Fiscal Year 1997.
  
  
• The existence of different parallel armies, which are paid from the budget and aimed at internal problems, prompts one to posit that the political leadership of the country is afraid more of internal rather than external threats.
  
  
• The political leadership of the country has yet to elaborate a constructive view on NATO expansion that avoids threatening rhetoric and the exertion of pressure on former Soviet bloc countries.

Dr. Volodymyr Zviglyanich is adjunct professor of East European area studies at George Washington University.

Copyright © The Ukrainian Weekly, April 13, 1997, No. 15, Vol. LXV

| Home Page |