ANALYSIS: Eight reasons why Ukraine and Russia will not sign an inter-state treaty (05/11/97)

ANALYSIS

Eight reasons why Ukraine and Russia will not sign an inter-state treaty

by Taras Kuzio

During the summer 1994 presidential elections, candidate Leonid Kuchma regularly accused his main rival, incumbent President Leonid Kravchuk, of being a "romantic," in contrast to his own "pragmatism." When Mr. Kuchma came to power in July 1994, he expressed optimism that this "pragmatism" would lead to the normalization of relations with Russia through the signing of an inter-state treaty that would legally recognize current borders and resolve the issue of the Black Sea Fleet.

This normalization of relations would then allow for the establishment of a strategic partnership between Ukraine and Russia through which Ukraine could seek its role in Eurasia. The ideologues of this Kuchma pragmatism (Volodymyr Hryniov, Dmytro Tabachnyk and Dmytro Vydryn propagated this thesis in a pair of books published after the elections.

Nearly three years after Mr. Kuchma's election, his pragmatism seems to have been little different from the romanticism of his predecessor. Russian-Ukrainian relations have improved, but they are far from normalized. In a recent interview in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, President Kuchma argued that Russian-Ukrainian relations have never been at such a low level. The Black Sea Fleet issue still has not been resolved and Russian naval forces have been stationed illegally in Ukraine since January. Ukraine's borders remain recognized by all except one country - Russia.

In fact, there are eight reasons why no inter-state treaty with Russia has been signed - or, indeed, will ever be signed.

First, NATO will hold a summit in Madrid in July at which it will be decided which Central European countries will be asked to join. Opposition to NATO enlargement has cross-party consensus in Russia, as well as support throughout its elites. It seems highly unlikely that Russia will sign an inter-state treaty with Ukraine after the NATO summit. After the enlargement process begins, many believe that Russia will attempt to pressure Ukraine into joining the Belarusian-Russian Community of Sovereign Republics. In addition, Russia will continue to hold out on legally recognizing Ukraine's border, because to do so prevents Ukraine from meeting one of the key criteria (lack of border disputes) required to apply in the future for NATO membership.

Second, we are told by the Russian government that the reason why no treaty has been signed thus far is because President Boris Yeltsin was too ill to travel to Ukraine. This is a blatant excuse based on little truth (unfortunately it is repeated by the Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Ministry like an ancient aboriginal chant). When Mr. Yeltsin was healthy he failed to travel to Kyiv to sign the treaty. He is now expected to travel to Kyiv in June, but such expectations have repeatedly been unrealized in the past.

Third, Moscow shows no interest or urgency in signing the treaty. If it did so, it would agree to Ukrainian demands to separate the Black Sea Fleet/Sevastopol issue from the treaty. After all, according to the December 1993 Russian Constitution, the executive conducts foreign policy. Therefore, there is nothing legally stopping Mr. Yeltsin from traveling to Kyiv to sign the treaty; in fact it is perfectly within the realm of his powers to do so. Ultimately, Russia has not legally recognized Ukraine's borders because it is not interested in doing so, seeing no strategic advantage for itself. With only one side interested in the treaty (Ukraine), there is little wonder that it has not been signed.

Fourth, the support given by the Russian executive to the territorial claims made against Ukraine is reflected in a variety of actions. The political party led by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin - Our Home is Russia - regularly supports imperialist claims against Ukrainian territory in the State Duma and the Federation Council. In the Federation Council, which voted unanimously in November 1996 to assert Russian sovereignty over Sevastopol, the Russian executive has the greatest number of supporters among deputies. Both Messrs. Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin use the resolutions and draft laws prepared by these two houses of the Russian Parliament in attempts to pressure Kyiv into giving up Sevastopol.

Fifth, Russia assumes de facto territorial claims against Ukraine. When Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov travels to Sevastopol to make imperialist claims that this city is the "16th prefecture" of Moscow he is never criticized by the Russian executive. This is unlike the criticism made by Moscow against the governor of the Primorskie Krai over his anti-Chinese statements. We can only conclude that the Russian executive also supports the views advanced by Mr. Luzhkov and the Russian Parliament; but, at this moment in time, chooses to advance them in a more subtle manner. At a talk to the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London in March, Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Yevgenii Primakov said, "Sevastopol as a Russian city is in the heart of every Russian." He is right - 75 percent of Russians believe that Sevastopol and Crimea should be returned to Russian sovereignty.

Sixth, Russians have a psychological problem in recognizing Ukrainian independence as a permanent entity. Three- quarters of those surveyed do not consider Ukrainians to not be a separate ethnic group. Surveys of the Ukrainian question in the Russian press by the Russian historian A. Miller show that Russians simply do not understand what is happening in Ukraine. They remain convinced that if it were not for a former communist, turned corrupt nationalist, elite in Ukraine then the Ukrainian "narod" would agitate for the "re-union" of the three east Slavic branches of the "Russkii narod." Moscow, therefore, sees the actions of President Aleksandr Lukashenka in neighboring Belarus as the example that Ukraine should follow. If Ukrainians are not a separate ethnic group, then how can Moscow psychologically come to terms with erecting a border between two branches of the same "Russkii narod?"

Seventh, Russian policies towards the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) remain consistent over the border question. Their refusal to sign an inter-state treaty with Ukraine reflects their argument that CIS borders should be divided into "transparent internal" and "jointly guarded external" borders. Therefore, Russia has not agreed to demarcate its borders with any CIS state. Why should it do so with Ukraine, a country that it regards as illegitimate, artificial and temporary? Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Primakov argues in his official capacity that the Helsinki Accords signed in 1975 do not apply to these transparent internal CIS borders. In other words, international norms are not applicable to the Ukrainian-Russian border.

Eighth, Russian support for transparent internal borders is due not only to the high costs of demarcating borders. Borders traditionally play two important functions in nation- and state-building, policies that Moscow seeks to thwart. Borders help a country's domestic nation-building through the promotion of greater national unity and increase its external differentiation with its foreign neighbors. Russia would prefer that the non-Russian member states of the CIS remain quasi-states by preventing the nation-building that would allow them to develop into modern nations. As quasi-states they would remain consigned to the Russian sphere of influence as its CIS dominions.

It is plainly in the interests of Ukraine to have its borders legally recognized by Russia. However, these eight factors show how this is now unlikely to occur in the short term. This could occur in the medium to long term if Russia continues along its path of democratic transition. We should remember that it took democratic post-war Germany 25 years to recognize Poland's western borders. President Kuchma has proved himself to be as much a "romantic" in this regard as his predecessor, Mr. Kravchuk. In the absence of any Russian-Ukrainian inter-state treaty, Ukraine has to seek its security elsewhere, through a charter with NATO. By doing so it is now searching for its place in Europe - not the Eurasia of President Kuchma's ideologues in 1994-1995.

The Ukrainian leadership is right to feel a sense of urgency about this issue. After all, with President Yeltsin increasingly resembling Leonid Brezhnev, we should be looking to those who will replace him in the post-Yeltsin era. Of the four likely presidential candidates to do so, only one (Chernomyrdin) will continue current policies. The other three (Luzhkov, Aleksandr Lebed and Gennadii Zyuganov) will all back the territorial claims advanced against Ukraine by the Russian Parliament since 1992. Consequently, Kyiv may be forced to rely on its charter with NATO earlier than expected.

Taras Kuzio is a research fellow at the Center for Russian and East European Studies, The University of Birmingham.

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