Russia, NATO and Ukraine: a united, or disunited Europe?
by Volodymyr Zviglyanich
PART I
For 50 years NATO has been a simple club, with simple rules: mutual Western defense against a threat from the East - the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. But the terms of the security partnership struck between NATO and Russia recently mean that the old club's simple mission and ways of doing business have at least changed or perhaps no longer apply.
Now the old adversary is considered to be an emerging democracy and has a voice - though not a veto - in alliance affairs. Soon NATO meetings will be bigger, as the West will likely offer NATO membership to some Eastern European countries. "All of us are trying to change ... the whole pattern of thought which has dominated the international politics of Europe for 50 years," said President Bill Clinton on May 13 as he hailed the NATO-Russia deal.
However, the "founding act," rather than a binding treaty as Moscow had earlier insisted, reached in Moscow during the meeting between Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Yevgenii Primakov and NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana leaves many questions unanswered.
The group of tactically significant questions includes: Will NATO deploy its troops and infrastructure on the territory of new members if the necessity arises? What will be the logistics of the decision-making process in NATO should it expand?
Strategically important questions include those regarding the fate of the republics of the former USSR vis-à-vis NATO - first and foremost among them the Baltic states and Ukraine. Another question of strategic importance refers to different visions of Europe: the American position - shared by Ukraine - is that NATO enlargement will contribute to the unification of Europe after the end of the Cold War; the Russian stance is that the agreement reached in Moscow happened against Moscow's wishes and will lead to the restoration of old lines of division in Europe.
Evolution of Russian attitude _1_
Russia's efforts to understand the strategic plans of NATO date back to the perestroika period. At that time nobody thought about the necessity of signing documents between Russia (the USSR) and NATO. Mikhail Gorbachev, then general secretary of the Communist Party, intimated that the policy of "new thinking" and verbal assurances of Western leaders were enough to prevent NATO expansion. After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, all Eastern European leaders assured Mr. Gorbachev that they would not seek admission into any "alien" security structures.
In 1993 President Boris Yeltsin, after meeting with Polish President Lech Walesa, admitted that Poland as a sovereign country has a right to chose its own allies. Two weeks later, the Foreign Affairs Ministry of Russia sent a memo to all leading NATO countries explaining that Mr. Yeltsin's words should not be taken for granted.
Nonetheless, Eastern Europe had started knocking on NATO's doors.
In March 1995 Russia Foreign Affairs Minister Andrei Kozyrev sent his deputy, Sergei Mamedov, to the West with a secret mission to probe the parameters of NATO's inevitable expansion eastward. When Mr. Yeltsin learned about that mission, he arrived at a closed session of the Collegium of the Foreign Affairs Ministry and sharply reprimanded Mr. Kozyrev. After that meeting, the Russian president issued a secret memo in which he stated that under no circumstances would Russia recognize NATO expansion.
A new embarrassment for Mr. Yeltsin came when President Bill Clinton declared that according to U.S. national security policy the question is not whether NATO would expand, but when and how NATO would expand. Russia's reaction was rather muted. It delayed its accession to the Partnership for Peace program in an obvious attempt to bargain with the West. Then it proposed different versions of a new European security system via structures of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) where Russia possesses veto power.
After the Berlin summit in June 1996, NATO decided to start negotiations with Russia. However, Russian politicians were not in a hurry to deal with the alliance. In fact, last fall in Vienna, Mr. Primakov declared that Russia will not rely on talks with NATO Secretary-General Solana. The Russian tactic was as follows: play on disputes existing inside the alliance, especially with France. France proposed to decide NATO's fate at a meeting of the four largest members of the alliance with Russia. France's position was rejected, however, by small member-states and the U.S.
Then, in December 1996, France and Russia were informed that all negotiations concerning the future of NATO would be conducted via Secretary-General Solana. Russia entered into negotiations this year on January 20.
During the Helsinki summit, President Clinton has proposed the formula of three "nos" - NATO has "no intention, no reason and no plan" to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new member-states. France and Russia struck back, however, and declared that the signing of the Russian treaty with NATO would take place in Paris on May 27. This initiative was favorable for France, but it imposed strict time limits on Russia.
On May 13 Mr. Solana brought NATO's last concession to Moscow: NATO does not intend to "establish nuclear storage sites" on the territory of new members, "either through the construction of new storage facilities or though the adaptation of old facilities." After numerous consultations by Messrs. Primakov and Solana with Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton, the NATO-Russia deal was concluded.
Anatomy of the deal
The NATO-Russia deal:
The accord isn't legally binding, as Russia has insisted. But officials say it will nonetheless have political clout because President Yeltsin and Clinton, and 15 other NATO leaders, signed it._2_
The document will not require parliamentary ratification. Nevertheless, Mr. Yeltsin insisted in a recent TV appearance: "We clearly see the binding nature of this document. Just as this document says, decisions are to be made only by consensus. If Russia is against any decision, this decision does not got through. I believe this is critically important."
U.S. officials brushed aside that assertion, saying it applies only to decisions by the new NATO-Russia council, which will deal with such matters as joint peacekeeping operations, conflict prevention and combating terrorism. They said the alliance has reserved the right to continue making its own decisions via the North Atlantic Council, its principal political organ, and other bodies on which Russia will have no seat. NATO will not in any way be subordinated to the NATO-Russia council._3_ This body will consist of the NATO secretary- general, the ambassador of Russia and the ambassador of one of NATO's member-states. Thus, Russia has abandoned the idea of having two co-chairmen.
The Russian political elite's position
The Russian political elite still views the NATO-Russia pact as decreasing rather than increasing Russian national security and as a desire of the West to exclude Russia from the European security system.
Viacheslav Nikonov, president of the Politika Foundation in Moscow, asserts that a system of European security has been created from which Russia is excluded de-facto. "This is a very unstable system and, after NATO expansion, Europe will be more a dangerous, rather than less dangerous, place. This is the main problem and major mistake," said Mr. Nikonov.
Another representative of the Russian political elite, a longtime director of the U.S.-Canada Institute, Georgii Arbatov, said that "although this act [the Russia-NATO agreement] is spiritually pleasant, it does not change the essence of the matter. I don't see any breakthrough. Real breakthrough would have been if NATO did not expand. Or if they say: that's it, no more members."_4_
The most recent warning to the West came from President Yeltsin himself, who in a TV interview on May 19 declared that Russia would "reconsider its relations" with NATO, set out in the agreement signed in Paris on May 27, if the alliance gave membership to any former members of the Soviet Union. He continued: "Of course, we cannot forbid them, we cannot go to war against them, but we can try to assure a maximum of security for Russia in one way or another."_5_
Opposition to NATO enlargement even after the signing of the Founding Act resides solely in the Russian foreign policy establishment. The basis of this opposition is found in residual "Soviet" interests in re-establishing influence in Central Europe and preventing a U.S. role in the area. Moscow's "outdated" interests are not surprising, given that the current foreign policy elite is composed mainly of former Soviet leaders.
Recent public opinion polls in Russia suggest that the majority of the Russian people are not nervous about NATO's decision to add new members. In fact, many have yet to form an opinion and others have indicated that NATO enlargement simply is not an issue of concern. The Russian foreign policy elite continues to claim that enlargement will strengthen the positions of those who are the main enemies of the West. They try to cultivate among the Russian people a fear that NATO expansion poses a threat in the form of foreign troops and weapons deployed closer to Russia._6_
Dr. Volodymyr Zviglyanich is a research fellow with The Jamestown Foundation.
Copyright © The Ukrainian Weekly, June 8, 1997, No. 23, Vol. LXV
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