ANALYSIS
Growing authoritarianism in Russia demonstrates lessons for Ukraine
by Volodymyr Zviglyanich
It is in Russia's interest to depict Ukraine before the eyes of outside world as a country where the legacy of communism is the strongest (with the exception of Belarus), where independence is not taken seriously by anybody, and where the bulk of the population craves for reunification with its northern brother.
However, Ukraine's carnival-like transition to a market democracy can in no way be portrayed in red colors as desired by the Kremlin. In the same fashion, the processes under way in Russia can in no way be associated with democratic decision-making and conflict resolution. On the contrary, the recent battle of the Kremlin and the Duma over the budget and the no-confidence vote in the government, the clear anti-American stance of Russian foreign policy, the ill-fated Law on Religious Organizations in Russia, and the dismissal of Boris Berezovskii from his post as vice-chairman of the Security Council, testify to the growing authoritarian and clique-oriented tendencies in the upper levels of the Russian establishment.
Russia's experience contains some important lessons for Ukraine.
Behind-the-scenes deals
The recent Kremlin-Duma standoff on the budget did not have anything in common with democratic conflict resolution and decision-making. The adoption of the state budget for Fiscal Year 1998 was not the focus of discussion among the major parties in conflict, the government, the Duma and the Federation Council. The real issue was the power struggle between the executive and the legislative branches dominated by the Communists. As the Russian Constitution gives Parliament virtually no power to set policy, the only way the Duma can get the government to change course is through the threat of a no-confidence vote.
The Communist opposition in the Duma connected the adoption of the budget with the adoption of the law on the government that would force the entire Cabinet to step down if the prime minister resigned, and with the demand that the Parliament be given more radio and TV air time. As a result, the final budget in Russia was not thoroughly discussed; even the government doubts it could be implemented within fiscal year 1998.
Second, the Kremlin and the Duma demonstrated a growing tendency to withdraw controversial issues from public discussion in the Parliament as the only place of democratic decision-making and conflict resolution. Instead, they used the old Soviet technique of decision-making whereby decisions crucial for domestic and world politics were adopted at closed meetings of several Communist Party bosses - the Politburo. The records of these meetings are still sealed in the presidential archives. The same is now taking place in "democratic" Russia, e.g., the decision to raise federal funds transferred to regional governments to 14 percent of total revenues was made at a closed meeting of a tripartite commission composed of the government, the Duma and the Federation Council. The records of the meeting of this commission, just like the records of the meetings of the Soviet Politburo, are unavailable to the public.
Responding to the major demand of Duma Communists to remove Vice Prime Ministers Anatolii Chubais and Boris Nemtsov from the government, Boris Yeltsin on October 21 convened the "Group of Four'' (himself, the prime minister, and the chairmen of the two houses of the Russian Parliament). What happened behind the closed doors of that meeting, the public and researchers will probably know in some 30 to 35 years. We know only the result: Mr. Yeltsin has said he will not make significant changes to his government's policies. Mr. Chubais, in turn, made it clear that the government will not agree to a two-year freeze on rent and utility payments.
In a further indication of his virtually unlimited control over decision-making, Mr. Chubais made it clear that President Yeltsin will not change his position concerning the law on the government, which he refused to sign this summer even after both houses of the Parliament overrode his veto. Mr. Chubais also ruled out any Cabinet reshuffle demanded by the Communists.
These events signify two striking tendencies. On the one hand, like in old Soviet times, a narrow circle of selected individuals resolves conflicts and makes decisions, referring to anything and everthing, virtually without any public (let alone media) oversight. On the other, the very style of conflict resolution - within the framework of ad hoc created "commissions," "roundtables,'' etc., not specified in the Constitution or the law - introduces an element of perpetual instability into the political process and leaves it beyond legal control. This situation is leading Russia toward the path of authoritarianism rather than toward democratic development. Democratic conflict resolution presupposes an increase rather than decrease of public involvement.
Anti-Americanism in foreign policy
Recent statements by the Russian president at the Council of Europe reflect a reorientation of Russian foreign policy away from the U.S. and toward Europe. During the Council of Europe summit in Strasbourg, President Yeltsin on several occasions called for Russia's inclusion in a "greater Europe." He also demanded an end to Washington's "interference" in European affairs and a reduced U.S. presence on the continent. Implicit in his remarks was the accusation that NATO serves as an unwelcome vehicle for the exercise of U.S. influence in Europe, as well as a restatement of Moscow's long-standing opposition to NATO enlargement on the grounds that it will introduce new "dividing lines" on the continent.
Such remarks seem to reflect an effort by the Kremlin to drive a wedge between the U.S. and its European allies. That effort was obvious in late October 1997 when it was announced that Russia's Gazprom would take part in a $2 billion French-Iranian deal to develop a major Iranian gas field. The announcement allowed Russia to side with the Europeans in a long-standing trade dispute of their own with the U.S., and seems sure to sharpen already considerable tensions between Moscow and Washington over Russia's pursuit of friendly relations with Iran at a time when the U.S. is trying to isolate Tehran diplomatically.
Yevgenii Primakov, Russia's foreign affairs minister, is a well-known sympathizer of Iran and Iraq. It remains unclear, however, whether Moscow's new "anti-Americanism" represents a real shift in Russian policy or just a flash of diplomatic opportunism. Equally unclear is the source of this new initiative. It is possible that the Foreign Affairs Ministry has lost some influence over the making of foreign policy, and Mr. Primakov now wants to restore it.
It may be the case that the impetus for President Yeltsin's recent criticism of the U.S. comes from within his own administration, and that it reflects some tension between foreign policy officials in that apparatus and Mr. Primakov. One guess would be that Mr. Chubais, with the help of Mr. Yeltsin, makes it clear that Moscow is dissatisfied with Washington's continuing failure either to grant Russia most favored nation status or to recognize it as a country with a market economy - policies that have caused Russia economic and "moral" damage. The Kremlin implies that the Clinton administration did little to aid Russia's entry into the Paris and the London Clubs, and complained in particular about Washington's clandestine efforts to block Russia's entry into the World Trade Organization.
Law on religious freedom
In Russia, the history of the Orthodox Church is inseparable from the history of the Russian culture. From the predominant Russian Orthodox perspective, the future of Russia should include the return of the millions taken away from the mother Church by Communist persecution.
That ideology is behind Russia's law on religion - adopted against the protests of the West, but supported by the Duma and signed by Mr. Yeltsin. The law aims to protect the Russian Orthodox Church by limiting its competition. It sets up a two-tiered system of religious organizations. New religious "groups" would be on a 15-year "probation," during which their institutional rights would be limited. After 15 years they could apply for the status of an "organization," which would permit them full rights to own property, publish, provide education and have access to public institutions.
The bill, authored by Viktor Zorkaltsev, a Communist member of the Duma and chairman of its Religious Affairs Committee, restores the traditional Soviet authoritarian practice of requiring all religious organizations and their individual members to register with the state. In addition, it would allow the government to discriminate among religious faiths, such as Catholics, Protestants, Pentecostals, Mormons, Seventh Day Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Christian Scientists, etc.
Ariel Cohen of the Heritage Foundation indicates that "under the bill, the government would be able to re-institute aspects of the persecution and oppression that prevailed under Stalin and Brezhnev." He added that the law hinders Russia's integration into the international community.
The opposite point of view claims that the new law is consistent with the Russian tradition of a strong Orthodox Church and reflects the fact that Russia cannot be another U.S. or Europe. Rather, it will follow its "specific path." This is the path of traditional Russian authoritarianism and autarky. Following this path, Russia refuses to recognize the Ukrainian Orthodox Church - Kyiv Patriarchate and deliberately provokes the split among the Orthodox in Ukraine.
Clans struggle for power
The dismissal of Boris Berezovskii as vice-chairman of Russia's Security Council was portrayed in the press as a "victory" of the "young reformers" (Messrs. Chubais and Nemtsov) over the "tycoon."
Mr. Berezovskii, probably the richest businessman in Russia (his wealth is estimated by Forbes magazine to be about $3 billion), together with seven other bankers, had played the major role in Mr. Yeltsin's re-election in 1996, as dozens of million of dollars were poured into Mr. Yeltsin's election coffers. After his victory, the "magic seven" were given hefty parts of government property in mysterious and secretive shares-for-money deals whereby the cash-strapped Russian government borrowed money from private banks in exchange for shares in governmental property. At that time Mr. Berezovskii was a "reformer" and "democrat."
When Mr. Chubais began the cash stage of privatization, the "great seven" split into rival factions competing for chunks of the most attractive governmental property such as the Norilsknickel and Sviazinvest companies. At least two competing factions emerged: the first one led by Mr. Berezovskii and Vladimir Gusinskii, and the second by the former vice prime minister and head of the biggest private Oneximbank, Vladimir Potanin. Mr. Chubais supported Mr. Potanin and George Soros in their bid for 25 percent stakes in Sviazinvest. As Mr. Chubais is traditionally in favor of the Western media and Harvard-based scholars (Jeffrey Sachs), the routine clash of different financial and political clans for power and property was portrayed in mythical tunes as a battle of good vs. evil, or "democrats" vs. "conservatives."
This simplified picture does not reflect the more complex and potentially dangerous shift of Russia toward authoritarianism and clique-oriented policy-making.
According to Mr. Berezovskii, Mr. Chubais told him when he came on his position to the Security Council, that he could make Mr. Yeltsin sign any decree he wanted. At the time Mr. Berezovskii did not believe him. Now Mr. Berezovskii has said that he sees this true. Mr. Berezovskii added it earlier that was Alexander Korzhakov (formely Mr. Yeltsin's body-guard) who could force Mr. Yeltsin to sign any decree; now that power is hold by Messrs. Chubais and Nemtsov. The duo went to Mr. Yeltsin's dacha and dictated a decree on Mr. Berezovskii's dismissal.
Mr. Berezovskii was in charge of dealings with Chechnya, and he managed to bring Russian money for the transit of Azerbaijani oil via Chechnya to the devastated republic. Mr. Nemtsov wanted to build a pipeline bypassing Chechnya. Mr. Berezovskii's dismissal coincided with the transformation of Mr. Chubais into the de-facto ruler of Russia. It should be noted also that he is a proponent of the strong role of a state in economic reforms. Thus, Mr. Chubais is far removed from his image as a "democrat" and "market reformer" as he is described in the Western media.
Lessons for Ukraine
There are severals lessons for Ukraine in the present-day scenario in Russia.
Dr. Volodymyr Zviglyanich is adjunct professor of East European area studies at George Washington University.
Copyright © The Ukrainian Weekly, February 8, 1998, No. 6, Vol. LXVI
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