COMPARATIVE STUDY: Ukraine and Belarus in the post-Soviet era (03/15/98)

COMPARATIVE STUDY

Ukraine and Belarus in the post-Soviet era

by David R. Marples

The post-Soviet period has been one of dramatic change in the three Slavic republics that were part of the USSR until December 1991. Comparisons between Ukraine and Russia have been frequent, but such analogies are not comparing like with like. Russia was by far the most powerful republic within the Soviet Union, and remains a giant country, well endowed with natural resources.

It seems pertinent to compare instead Ukraine and Belarus, two middle-ranking powers, both involved in the process of nation-building since their independence in 1991. Despite the fact that Ukraine's population is five times larger than that of its northern neighbor, there are many points for comparison, of which this paper will select a handful: nation-building; economic reform; demographic indices (including such factors as population, health, ethnic make-up and the impact of the Chornobyl disaster); and progress toward democracy.

Nation-building

Neither country was prepared for independence in 1991. Independence was in fact thrust on them. Nevertheless, both had made significant progress in the late Gorbachev period toward greater autonomy and state sovereignty. Ukraine's national aspirations have a longer history, and a larger portion of its population can be said to have been nationally conscious throughout most of the Soviet period. Though the territories of both republics were divided, principally between Poland and the Soviet Union, national consciousness in western Ukraine was greater than that in western Belarus. In September 1939, a defining moment in the history of both countries, the reunion of Belarusian territories was marred - at least in the eyes of Belarusian nationalists - by the cession of Vilna (Vilnius) and its adjacent territory to Lithuania. Insofar as Belarus has a spiritual heart of its national development, it lay in the city of Vilna. If one imagines the progress of Ukraine toward national identity without the city of Lviv, one has a comparable situation.

I will divide the contemporary era into two clearly defined periods: that of 1989-1994, which can be termed the period of perestroika (taken out of its Soviet context); and 1994 to the present, defined as the current period.

Ukraine's independence was achieved through its Parliament and a working alliance between the reformist Communists and the National Council (or, according to simplistic current terminology, the political right). In addition, the presidency of Leonid Kravchuk saw nation-building as its top priority - to the detriment of all other issues, and particularly economic reform. The crucial problem proved to be relations with Russia and, related to this question, international isolation as the West, and particularly the United States, regarded relations with Boris Yeltsin's Russia as the first priority. Though the Kravchuk presidency enjoyed mixed success, it provided a breakthrough for Ukrainian self-assertion and the beginnings of the process of nation-building. By 1994, few doubted the future survival of a Ukrainian state; and the United States had amended its foreign policy to assign priority to relations with Ukraine, following Ukraine's signing of the START I Treaty.

For Belarus, the perestroika period was one of dissension and conflict, largely because of a lack of cooperation between the dynamic elements in political life: the Communist and then proto-Communist political leadership symbolized by Prime Minister Vyachaslau Kebich; and the democrats, symbolized by the Belarusian Popular Front and the increasingly isolated Parliament chairman, Stanislau Shushkevich. Simply put: no middle ground could be found in Belarusian political life. The BPF under the leadership of Zyanon Paznyak was widely seen as extremist and Russophobic. Whereas Ukraine neglected economic reform and consolidated independence, Belarus was unable to accomplish either task. By the summer of 1994, the former leaders and Mr. Paznyak were swept aside in the presidential election by Parliament Deputy Alyaksandr Lukashenka, a man in his late 30s, whose mediocre career to that point had been highlighted only by his chairmanship of a parliamentary commission on corruption.

In the present period, Ukraine has made impressive progress in nation-building and in taking its place as a member of the international community. A former member of the eastern Ukrainian management elite, President Leonid Kuchma, defeated his western Ukrainian rival, Mr. Kravchuk narrowly in 1994, largely on the strength of the urban vote in the major eastern Ukrainian cities, and an electoral promise to move Ukraine closer to Russia. Since his election, however, he has carefully occupied the middle ground, and a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Russia was delayed for over two years because of continuing disputes over the division of the Black Sea Fleet. Though the treaty was signed in the summer of 1997, and ratified in January of this year by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, few would have argued at that point that Ukrainian statehood had suffered in the process (President Kuchma's more recent quest for virtual economic union is another matter entirely). Moreover, the president's electoral support, according to opinion polls, now lies in the west and the capital, Kyiv, and he has made it known that he would prefer to work with moderates and centrists in the new Parliament, which is to be elected later this month.

In Belarus, Mr. Lukashenka was initially snubbed by Russian President Yeltsin upon taking office in the summer of 1994, but subsequently made known his wish to form a union with Russia. Whereas President Kuchma has a businesslike and quiet demeanor, the Belarusian president is a populist who constantly uses television to appeal to the public on various issues. The question of nation-building has never been an issue in Belarus. Nationalists have been maligned and the BPF virtually outlawed. The president's rhetoric often evokes a "glorious Soviet past," and his energy in moving toward the union with Russia - signed on April 2, 1997 - was relentless. He has exploited particularly what has been termed the "national nihilism" of Belarusians. Within a year of his inauguration, he had promoted Russian to a state language alongside Belarusian, restored a version of the old Communist flag (erected menacingly on his own residence before the result of the referendum was known), and gained popular approval of his wish to unite with Russia.

Paradoxically, progress toward the destruction of the independent state has been impeded by the actions of Russia itself. A friendly Belarus is surely necessary to the Russian leadership, but Russia has no wish to saddle itself with the sort of economic problems faced by West Germany after German unification, consequently, the union at present is more symbolic than actual. Presidents Yeltsin and Lukashenka are political incompatibles, and the Russians have been appalled at the recent treatment of their journalists in Belarus. Mr. Lukashenka, in turn, is now stressing that Belarus will never relinquish its sovereignty. Thus a form of state-building may be said to be at the initial stages, based mainly on the present territorial boundaries of Belarus and its geostrategic location in central Europe.

Economic reform

When one turns to economic reform, a progress report would give failing grades to both Ukraine and Belarus. The Kuchma presidency inherited a bleak economic situation from its predecessor, but was buoyed by generous credits from the International Monetary Fund and other sources, and a G-7 commitment to assist the costly shutdown of the Chornobyl nuclear power station. Privatization has made slow progress (only 27 percent of the workforce is currently employed in the private sector), and in 1996, Ukraine was one of only four CIS countries to register a decline in production (along with Russia, Moldova and Tajikistan). Unemployment had risen to over 500,000 by this date.

In late April 1997, the G-7 finance ministers in Washington expressed concern that Ukraine was unable to implement economic reforms, and tax collection had become the most acute predicament. Widespread corruption had pervaded even upper levels of government and led directly to the removal of Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko on July 2. President Kuchma made no secret of his views that he considered that his chief minister had made little progress on the announced "Clean Hands" program to reduce corruption in Ukraine.

Belarus continues to operate a budget deficit that is almost 5 percent of GDP; its ruble has continued a free fall against the dollar; and price rises in 1997 exceeded those of any other member of the CIS. The economic picture has been obscured by government figures, however, which indicate a growth rate of more than 17 percent for this year, following reported positive growth rates in 1996 and 1997. The BPF and other sources maintain that the figures are mythical, and based on the inclusion of unsold stocks that have accumulated in warehouses. Government spending is concealed by the existence of a private presidential fund, while new forms of taxation are being constantly devised to bring in more revenue to the state.

There is little visible evidence of an economic turnaround in Belarus; as in Ukraine wages are paid irregularly and for the majority, even when paid on time are woefully inadequate to meet the costs of food and other goods. Privatization of land has barely begun; indeed the president has lauded the collective farm system (he is a former collective and state farm chairman himself) and regards collective farmers as one of his most secure sources of electoral support.

Social demographic indices

In this category, the similarities of the two republics enable a joint treatment. Both Ukraine and Belarus are in a situation where the mortality rate currently exceeds the birth rate, and there is insufficient inflow of people to offset a constant decline of the population. Ukraine's population has thus declined from 52.1 million at the time of independence to 50.5 million today; whereas that of Belarus reached a peak of 10.3 million in 1993, and had fallen less dramatically to 10.28 million by December 1996, a drop of about 20,000 over the course of a single year. A variety of reasons have been offered for what is termed in both countries a demographic crisis: economic decline leading to a reduction of purchasing power of the population, and decreasing its supply of nutritious food; a weak health care sector that has experienced constant shortfalls in government funding; high rates of infant mortality and infectious diseases; and the long-term consequences of the Chornobyl disaster, which has also prompted many women to fear giving birth and to choose not to have children.

One can add also the aging of the population, as almost a quarter of the population in each country will soon be pensioners. The lifespan for males is particularly low - in Ukraine, for example, over the past six years, life expectancy for men has dropped from 64.7 to 61.2 years, and is often attributed to unhealthy lifestyles that include heavy drinking, excessive smoking and working in areas that have high rates of industrial pollution. This situation logically affects Belarus the most because of its already small population - some sources have spoken of the eventual extinction of the nation as a result of natural population decline - and also because it receives considerably less international aid.

The government has recently cut back funding or alleviation of Chornobyl-related problems to less than 8 percent of the annual budget (it was once over 20 percent), and has sent the military into the contaminated zones of the southeast to recultivate land - a sign that the problems of Chornobyl are officially considered to be over (the reality is otherwise).

Corruption has already been cited with respect to the departure of former Prime Minister Lazarenko. Unquestionably, corruption is more entrenched in Ukraine than in Belarus and has penetrated the higher echelons of the government and the economy.

After his removal as Minister of Justice on August 21, 1997, Serhii Holovati scathingly attacked the efforts of President Kuchma to eliminate corruption in the Cabinet of Ministers. On a visit to Dnipropetrovsk last September, the new Ukrainian prime minister, Valerii Pusovoitenko, maintained that a criminal economic elite had formed in that city and was seeking power through companies such as United Energy Systems and acting in collusion with state officials to manipulate prices and control resources. Mr. Lazarenko, as one official from this region, is currently under investigation by the Office of the Procurator General. Economy Minister Viktor Suslov was cited recently as saying that 43 percent of Ukraine's GDP comes from the shadow economy, and the country was able to collect only 76 percent of its anticipated revenues last year as a result.

Belarus has not been immune from similar charges; indeed Mr. Shushkevich was ousted from his position as Parliament chairman in January 1994, following accusations of corruption, though these charges were never verified. However, Belarus does not possess such a powerful elite in one area with links to both the past power structure and the present business leaders. Indeed such an elite does not yet exist in any substantial form. There is also a clear rift between the strongest political parties - the Communists and the Agrarians - and the office of the president. In time, it is likely that the government's power structure will also make significant inroads into the world of private business. That it has only done so on a small scale to date is a reflection, ironically, of the lack of economic reform in Belarus.

Progress toward democracy

Ukraine's progress toward democracy continues, despite some faltering steps and a continuing standoff between President Kuchma and Verkhovna Rada Chairman Oleksander Moroz, who has narrowly survived several votes of no confidence through the support of the leftist factions. Power sharing, encapsulated in the Constitution, appears to be working despite frequent tensions. The president is pursuing a careful and moderate political course, and his tenure has seen the widespread acceptance of the rule of law in Ukraine. However, over the long term, differences with Parliament are likely to continue, particularly after the March elections.

In September 1997, 86 deputies in Parliament, a significantly large group, called for Ukraine to join the Russia-Belarus union. The Treaty of Friendship signed by Ukraine with Russia also prompted a reaction against the president from the right, and the Ukrainian Republican Party and an informal group known as Nation and State launched an unsuccessful campaign to begin impeachment proceedings against President Kuchma.

A more fruitful campaign has seen important changes in the Ukrainian electoral system that were forced through despite the opposition of the president. Under the new system, half the deputies (225) will be elected in single-mandate territorial districts, and half on the basis of slates of parties and blocs, each of which must have a minimum of 4 percent of electoral support. A minimum election turnout of 25 percent is required for the results to be valid. The new law appears to favor the well-organized traditional parties of the left, though the Socialists are currently divided. It is also likely to see Rukh maintain its position as the major party on the right, as various parties scramble to obtain votes from the political center.

Whatever the results of the changes to the electoral law, democracy is at least making some discernible progress in Ukraine. The state might be described as mildly authoritarian, and various power blocs - particularly that of Dnipropetrovsk - wield considerable economic and political authority. Candidates are already emerging to challenge Mr. Kuchma in the 1999 presidential elections, of whom the most prominent are Mr. Lazarenko and Yevhen Marchuk, former chief of the Security Service of Ukraine. Mr. Lazarenko has founded a new political party called Hromada, and maintains that investigations into his financial dealings constitute a presidential ploy to damage his credibility.

In Belarus, democracy has been severely undermined by the actions of the government. In November 1996, a referendum called by the president significantly increased his powers and reduced those of his opponents and the independent state structure. The presidential term was extended to four years from the date of the referendum (or six years in total) and is renewable for a second term. The former Parliament of 260 seats was subsequently reduced to 110 (consisting mainly of Lukashenka supporters), while a new upper chamber of 64 senators was formed, half of whom are appointed directly by the president. The proudly independent Constitutional Court has been completely revamped under a new chief justice, Ryhor Vasilevich, and six of the 11 justices are presidential appointees.

The referendum itself, according to international observers, violated democratic procedures. The head of the Election Commission was removed during its course, and opponents of the president's demands were harassed and given little opportunity to air their views through the media. Following the referendum, a severely amended version of the 1994 Constitution was published.

Over the period of his presidency, Mr. Lukashenka has effectively muzzled the press, and has firm control over the two main daily newspapers: Sovietskaya Belorussiya (which sees fit to retain its old name) and the formerly outspoken parliamentary organ, Narodnaya Hazeta. In late 1997, the BPF newspaper Svaboda was closed down on the orders of the government. Since Russian Television now constitutes the most critical source of information on Belarus, it is hardly surprising that it has been a recent target of presidential wrath. Both ORT and NTV stations have come under attack. In April 1997, six ORT employees were arrested, and one, Pavel Sheremet, was recently put on trial, despite protests from President Yeltsin, though he received only a suspended sentence. Journalists have frequently been detained or beaten by the militia, and public demonstrations around government buildings have been banned following several vicious clashes in the spring of 1997.

Almost all major personalities of the political opposition have suffered some repercussions for their views, from losing travel privileges (Shushkevich) to periods of political detention, which in one case - that of Tamara Vinnikava, former chair of the National Bank of Belarus - lasted for nine months without any trial taking place. Mr. Paznyak, the BPF leader, was granted political asylum in the United States in 1996. Non-governmental organizations were purged in early 1997, and President Lukashenka has responded to the contempt with which he is perceived by many Belarusian students by forming a Belarusian Patriotic Union of Youth (somewhat akin to the Komsomol or Hitlerjugend), headed by 22-year-old Usevalad Yancheuski. Harsh repression has been implemented against young people for actions as minor as brandishing the old white-red-white national flag.

Finally, some mention must be made of the personality of the Belarusian president. His demeanor and inordinately long speeches are angry and violent; he imposes his presence in a room and cuts a menacing figure. At the same time he is genuinely popular among certain sectors of the population, especially the older generation - who believe in the importance of a strong leader - and the military.

After 45 months of President Lukashenka, Belarus is on the path to a dictatorship. It has treated the former Constitution and existing laws with contempt, and violated the most basic human rights of its citizens. One must conclude, therefore, that as far as advancement toward a democratic state is concerned, the Republic of Belarus has regressed.

Conclusions

The period of independence has seen the consolidation of the states of Ukraine and Belarus. Both face severe economic and demographic problems, and neither has embarked seriously on a program of economic reform. Ukraine has acquired international prestige and is a valued member of the Council of Europe, but its commitment to radical changes in the economy and other issues - such as the final shutdown of the Chornobyl plant - has remained uncertain. Much will depend on the realignment of political forces after the March elections, but it seems likely that there will remain serious divisions in the Verkhovna Rada. Though at present few political parties can make the 4 percent cutoff point in electoral support, the central ground of Ukrainian politics remains flooded with parties and political programs. Even the Ukrainian National Assembly wishes to be regarded as a centrist party.

The presidential elections of 1994 showed Ukraine to be divided by regions, but it is simplistic to divide Ukraine into a rightist west and a leftist east. Fluidity is the only certain factor in Ukrainian politics, as President Kuchma's rapid loss of support in the eastern oblasts, combined with a remarkable rise in popularity in western Ukraine indicates. The executive itself can be characterized as moderate and mildly reformist, but the shadow economy remains a powerful impediment to government plans and policies.

One could put the situation in more mundane terms: Ukraine has made good progress in nation building but is mired in an economic and social rut from which it is finding it difficult to extricate itself. In the long term, the government cannot hope to make fundamental changes without a lasting accommodation with the Parliament; and the new electoral system appears unlikely to result in such future cooperation.

On the other hand, Belarus is politically stable while increasingly alienated from its neighbor states through its repressive internal politics. Despite the economic stagnation, the state of the economy does not pose a danger to the political career of President Lukashenka. Initially, Mr. Lukashenka wielded no more power as president than did Messrs. Kuchma or Yeltsin at the time of their taking office. But he has used the office of president to create and develop a formidable power base that at present - barring something unforeseen such as illness or assassination - seems unassailable. Only Mr. Lukashenka, of the three mentioned presidents, is actually in a position to implement his vision of the future. The tragedy, therefore, is that this vision is so blinkered, backward and provincial - reflecting not the visions of a great statesman, but the petty malevolence of a rural official who perceives the dissolution of the Soviet Union as one of the great betrayals of history.

Whether or not Belarus has a future as an independent nation remains to be seen; what is clear is that its immediate destiny is linked irrevocably to the political career of its 43-year-old president, or - as his opponents declare derisively: Alyaksandr Hryhorevich, the president for life.

David R. Marples is professor of history and director of the Stasiuk Program on Contemporary Ukraine, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta.