INTERVIEW: Ambassador to NIS Stephen Sestanovich (04/12/98)

INTERVIEW: Ambassador to NIS Stephen Sestanovich

by Michael Sawkiw Jr.
Ukrainian National Information Service

WASHINGTON - Stephen Sestanovich, ambassador-at-large to the new independent states (NIS), was interviewed on March 13 by the Ukrainian National Information Service (UNIS) and The Ukrainian Weekly. The 20-minute interview, which focused on U.S.-Ukraine relations, was conducted by UNIS Director Michael Sawkiw Jr. in consultation with Roma Hadzewycz, editor-in-chief of The Ukrainian Weekly. Following are excerpts of that interview.

Q: According to a press conference held at the National Press Club on March 12, 1998, Ambassador Yuri Shcherbak acknowledged that a tentative date for the next Gore-Kuchma meeting has been set for the end of June in Kyiv. What can you tell us about the progress of the commission to date? More specially, has there been progress (from the U.S. perspective) on reform in Ukraine and how is the United States helping to resolve those issues?

A: Let me answer that by referring to the experience of all persons within those societies [of the former Soviet Union]. There is hardly a one where corruption is not a problem. Across the NIS we have programs to try to help countries to deal with those difficulties, programs to strengthen the rule of law, judicial reform, law enforcement, and we have the same programs in Ukraine. Those technical assistance programs never by themselves solve that problem, and the most important component to solve the problem is political will.

This issue [corruption] has been under discussion between Vice-President [Al] Gore and President [Leonid] Kuchma with particular urgency because we feel that corruption is blocking the economic road that Ukraine needs to be able to make a break with its past in a lot of different ways. I would like to give you a progress report, but it's certainly true that at their last meeting in November, the two of them [Vice-President Gore and President Kuchma] agreed that it was the initiative they wanted to come back to when they next meet, and that they wanted the reports from the committees that worked under the commission as to the kind of progress that has been made.

Q: Has a specific agenda for the Gore-Kuchma Commission been proposed?

A: What the agenda of these commissions always includes is a review of the work done by the committees under the vice-president and president, plus issues that may not have been addressed by those committees, but require their attention. They'll look at foreign policy questions. They'll look at issues of economic reform, business development, trade and so forth.

Last month [February] we had a meeting on the Foreign Policy Committee, next month [April] there will be a meeting of the Committee on Sustainable Economic Development. One of the issues that will be on the agenda of that committee, as it was during Secretary Albright's visit to Kyiv, will be commercial disputes.

Q: Have there been any resolutions to U.S. investor disputes?

A: Yes, since last April, which is the date that Congress set for measuring progress in investment disputes, some problem cases have been resolved; others have hardly moved at all. There is one case that was resolved and then got worse again. So we monitor the situation closely, and we'll report to the Congress on where things stand.

This is a very tough issue because it extends beyond the problems that individual companies have in Ukraine, and involves a broader question of whether Ukraine is creating a climate that will attract foreign investment. What's at stake here is not just our understandable interest in making sure that our companies get a fair deal. The larger, more fundamental question is whether Ukraine will get the foreign investment that it needs to grow.

Q: The vote for Senate ratification of NATO enlargement is expected to pass with an overwhelming majority of senators in favor of NATO's eastward expansion. What do you foresee for NATO following the admission of the first tier of members?

A: NATO invited the first three new members to join. It said that they would not be the last ones. The alliance's declaration in Madrid last year set the spring of 1999 for another review of new applicants. It said what the criteria would be, and that the alliance would judge new applicants according to their ability to take on responsibilities in membership and would judge their applications in terms of the alliances interest in European security.

There is no mystery as to what will happen next. There will be countries that want to be considered in spring of 1999. As the alliance prepares to consider their applications, it will judge their applications in terms of these criteria. One of the things that's important about this process is that it will be relatively transparent. That creates a kind of confidence among applicants that they will be fairly dealt with, among members of the alliance that the process has certain predictability, and among other states that are not applying that they know the direction and meaning of NATO's policy.

Q: At the NATO summit in Madrid, Ukraine and NATO signed a charter on a "distinctive partnership" that provides for increased dialogues between the alliance and Ukraine. In your opinion, what concrete results could be accomplished via such a partnership with NATO for Ukraine?

A: In creating this special relationship with Ukraine, the alliance was expressing its commitment to enhance some of the cooperative activities that already have been created between Ukraine and NATO, particularly, under the Partnership for Peace. That means Ukrainian participation in exercises, training, various forms of technical assistance, even things like English language study for Ukrainian officers.

A lot of the work that NATO does under the Partnership for Peace is very fine-grained, technical, practical stuff. But the charter indicated beyond that a desire for a political consultative body on both sides, which reflects Ukraine's special situation, its strategic importance. That extra political dimension is one that is hard to quantify but creates an institutional framework for the alliance and for Ukraine. However, whatever the dimensions of NATO's expansion or enlargement eastward are, Ukraine can count on these ties that have been created.

Q: Having been in your new position as ambassador to the NIS for the past five months, what specifically is your agenda for the office, vis-à-vis Ukraine?

A: Our agenda is to advance the policy that the president and the secretary have enunciated, and that is the policy that reflects America's interest in Ukraine's success - its political, economic, social and strategic success. We want a strong, democratic, prosperous Ukraine - Ukraine as a part of Europe. We know that any of our other strategic objectives in the region will be that much harder, perhaps impossible to obtain, if Ukraine does not succeed. That's the overall goal.

Within that framework we obviously have to address particular problems as a means of finding ways to facilitate, accelerate any economic reform, and to help Ukraine deal with the economic crisis that is made more and more acute by the fact that it coincides with the Asian financial crisis. The second issue that's been high on our agenda has been to address a set of non-proliferation questions that are a test of whether, in addition to an agreement in general terms on the goal of our cooperation, we can implement that policy in practical ways.

Q: How can the Ukrainian American community assist in your long-term planning and strategy?

A: From my point of view, the Ukrainian American community represents a strategic asset to the U.S. government because it represents people with a stake in Ukraine's success that coincides with the administration's own stake in foreign policy. [It is] a group that has a unique understanding of the situation in Ukraine that will help us to understand better both what is happening in Ukraine and how we can advance our goals. This is an asset, by the way, that we don't have in every other country of the NIS. It's where there is a large group of Americans with a special interest in the success of the country, our policy is that much more likely to succeed.

I might add that one of the things that I was particularly impressed by my conversations with Ukrainian American leaders is not only the depth of their support for Ukraine but also the depth of their worries about Ukraine. They recognize the dangerous sides, have no interest in papering over difficulties, but have helped us to see what the real problems are.

Q: In your previous writings, you had expressed concern regarding the expansion of NATO to former Warsaw Pact countries, and referred to a Russian sphere of influence on the territory of the former Soviet Union. What, in your view, should be Russia's role vis-à-vis the independent states of the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact?

A: When I wrote that Russia would have a sphere of influence in this region, I think you will find what I said was that it would have influence. It's a large country, a large economy and a large factor in political developments of the region. I also said that it was crucial that Russian influence be exercised in ways that are consistent with international norms, with the independent sovereignty of its neighbors and with their emergence as successful democracies. That's still the right test of whether Russia has found a legitimate new form of relations with other states of the former Soviet Union. It's not yet reached consensus in every case as to what kind of relationship it wants.

It's [Russia's] relations with Ukraine have lately developed in a pretty positive way. President's Kuchma state visit to Moscow was the first state visit by any leader of the NIS. The Russian-Ukrainian treaty represents the normalization of relations between Russia and Ukraine, of a kind that many of us worried would take years to achieve. When Secretary [of State Madeleine] Albright was in Kyiv she spoke of these trends as very positive. She was asked at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy what her view of Russian-Ukrainian relations is. She noted that in the post-Cold War world, relations among states don't have to be conducted in zero-sum terms. She said Ukraine could improve its relations at the same time with Russia and the United States. That's a sign that we can put the Cold War behind us.

Q: Should Russia have a veto regarding NATO expansion?

A: The founding act is explicit about that. The answer is no.

Q: The secretary of state traveled to Kyiv on March 6. Her visit came on the heels of President Kuchma's state visit to Russia a week earlier. What is your assessment of Secretary Albright's trip to Kyiv on March 6?

A: I thought Secretary Albright's trip was extremely successful. It represented a breakthrough in our ability to deal with some security questions that have been under discussion between Ukraine and the United States for some time. We were able to reach an economic understanding about nuclear cooperation with Iran and on that basis the secretary and Foreign [Affairs Hennadii] Minister Udovenko initialed an agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation. They remembered that last year when the United States and China were able to reach agreement on nuclear cooperation with Iran, they signed the same kind of peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement.

Similarly, the U.S. and Ukraine were able to reach agreement in terms of Ukraine's accession to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), a further sign of Ukraine's entry into leading international institutions. These were goals we've been working on for some time, and it was very satisfying for both governments to be able to deal with that during Secretary Albright's visit.

If you judge simply by that progress you'd have to say that our strategic partnership is flourishing. We are able to resolve these difficulties because we have nearly identical views on big issues of international politics. If we hadn't had that similarity of views, we would never be able to reach agreement.