INTERVIEW: Buteiko speaks on Ukraine's foreign policy (04/26/98)

INTERVIEW: Buteiko speaks on Ukraine's foreign policy

by Yaro Bihun
Special to The Ukrainian Weekly

WASHINGTON - Ukraine's Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Anton Buteiko was among a group of Ukrainian government officials participating in a workshop on Ukraine-NATO relations sponsored by the Harvard University Project on Ukrainian Security and the Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Project. The April 8-9 workshop was held at the Brookings Institution.

Before departing Washington, Mr. Buteiko was interviewed on April 10 at the Ukrainian Embassy by this writer and Voice of America correspondent Adrian Karmazyn. He fielded questions about Ukraine's relations with NATO, the United States and Russia, as well as about the effects of the March 29 parliamentary elections on Ukrainian foreign policy.

Following are translated excerpts from the interview, which was conducted in Ukrainian.

Q: Mr. Buteiko, could we start by having you say a little bit about the Ukraine-NATO seminar?

A: During the conference we discussed the implementation of the NATO-Ukraine special relationship charter, Ukraine's participation in the Partnership for Peace program and in its peacekeeping activities.

Many interesting and practical ideas were expressed dealing with the improvement of means of cooperation, as well as with finding resources to fund these cooperative activities.

We found it meaningful that the conference was conducted in such a businesslike atmosphere. And we saw again that there is an interest on the part of the United States to transform NATO, that the doors to the organization will remain open for those who would wish to join it, and that this organization will continue peacekeeping activities in the region following current guidelines - in cooperation with the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe - and we saw the possibility that NATO could evolve into an organization that would be one of the most important elements of a future overall security structure in Europe.

Q: In his remarks to the seminar, [Deputy Secretary of State] Strobe Talbott said that the threat of instability in the region would not result so much from NATO's expansion as from halting its expansion after the first or second round. This, he said, would destabilize the region and establish a new dividing line. How would Ukraine view the stopping of NATO expansion after the first or second round?

A: Let me point out that we are interested in the transformation of NATO. And NATO is being transformed; it is changing. And, as an organization searching for its "new face," it's important that the expansion process continue but within the framework of creating a general security structure in Europe. We find great merit in this. Other countries will join in this, as did Ukraine, through its special partnership charter with NATO, and Russia, which participates in accordance with its agreement with NATO.

I don't see any particular problem in this regard. We have a more serious problem with the expansion of the European Union up to Ukraine's border and the possibility of the raising of what I would call the "paper curtain" in front of Ukraine. This would be more damaging for us than was the Iron Curtain erected by the Soviet Union.

Q: Strobe Talbott also pointed out that NATO is not only a military organization but a political one as well. What changes do you expect or would like to see in the structure of NATO?

A: We've already seen a number of changes. First, the command structure, as you know, was changed. The psychology and philosophy guiding the activities of the organization are changing. For a long time the organization was oriented on defending the territories of its member-states. Now the situation has changed. The most important change in adapting NATO to a changing situation, for the most part, came about in response to developments in the Balkans, in Bosnia-Herzegovina. No one could imagine, say eight years ago, that military units of NATO countries, Russia and Ukraine would jointly take part in peacekeeping operations and work together. This change is taking place and I think that it is basically a psychological change in attitude and approach.

And this will continue in the future. For the most part, NATO member-states no longer feel an external threat. But there are many new elements - like inter-ethnic conflicts and new forms of international terrorism - around which countries will cooperate within the NATO framework.

Q: And, after all these changes, will there be a place for Ukraine in a future NATO?

A: In NATO itself?

Q: Yes.

A: I see Ukraine's cooperation within the framework of its charter with NATO as very important, and we can do much there. It will depend, most of all, on Ukraine - on its ability, its readiness. As for its membership? Certainly, if NATO is evolving into an all-European security structure, then I can't imagine such a structure without Ukraine.

Q: If I might ask a question about President Kuchma's visit to Russia, when the bilateral economic agreement was signed. Why did this agreement elicit such a negative response from various segments of the population? The newspaper Kievskiye Viedomosti, for example, called it a betrayal of Ukrainian interests.

A: At that time it was treated in the context of the election campaign. And I personally was surprised to hear criticism of this agreement from the lips of those who had upheld our foreign policy toward Russia. The motives were related to the elections.

We must establish and develop normal relations with the Russian Federation. And if we have a long-term economic cooperation agreement with Russia, this means stability for our producers. It does not mean that cooperation with Russia closes the door on our movement toward Europe.

Our overall goal - both short- and medium-term - continues to be integration within European and Euro-Atlantic structures. Therefore, we cannot erect a curtain on one border for the sake of the other. Ukraine is a major power and it has to develop and maintain relations with all. And how can we not develop relations - especially economic relations - with such a large country as our neighbor Russia?

Q: So you view this criticism as unfounded?

A: You must understand that during the debate about the visit critics quoted from documents that had no relation to what was actually agreed to. They quoted from a first Russian draft as if it were the final agreement. Of course, had we accepted what Russia proposed in its first draft, that would have been completely unacceptable. And that is why it was, to a large measure, changed.

I understand that no agreement can be perfect. But an agreement requires that both parties agree. If one of the sides does not agree, it cannot be forced into agreement, because forced agreements do not last.

It was also important for us to balance appropriately the steps we are taking toward the European Union. It's quite possible that to a degree there was a pulling back on our part resulting from the long delay in the ratification of our agreement on friendship and cooperation with the European Union. When we signed the agreement, we expected that it would be ratified within one and a half, but no more than two years, and it contained points we considered timely and important for us. The process actually took four years. As I look at it, it was an example of Europe's general tendency and historic approach with respect to Ukraine.

Q: And do you expect the ratification of the Ukraine-Russia friendship and cooperation agreement also will take four years?

A: It will depend on who has the upper hand in the Russian Parliament. If it's those who adhere to the old way of doing things, then anything is possible. We have already seen finished agreements waiting two years to be signed. But, being an optimist, I expect that common sense will prevail and that this agreement will be ratified.

Q: Are you equally optimistic about the certification by the secretary of state at the end of this month with respect to American investor problems in Ukraine?

A: We are doing everything possible to resolve these problems. It's hard for me to say how successful we have been in this. But I would like to underscore the following:

This certification is mandated by the American legislative branch and the administration is required to report. But, to my mind, reducing the relationship between Ukraine and the United States to the question of certification is completely superficial and inappropriate. I think this issue should be viewed in the context of the full spectrum of our relationship, and the importance of Ukraine and its role on the continent. And, appropriately, they should be the paramount issues in the relationship between Ukraine and the United States.

Q: Is this the most serious problem in the U.S.-Ukraine relationship today, or are there other disputes about which we have not heard?

A: As soon as bilateral relations start to develop intensively, many issues come to the fore that need to be resolved. Should one call them disputes? There are, of course, different interests and different approaches. But we have, with the United States, a stated goal of achieving a strategic partnership, and these issues should be resolved within the framework of the spirit of this strategic partnership.

There are, of course, other issues, but many of them have been resolved in negotiations during Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's visit to Kyiv and some are being resolved right now. Life goes on.

Q: I haven't seen any press reports about any reaction by Ukraine to the recent worsening of relations between Russia and Latvia. Has Ukraine commented on this in any way?

A: I haven't reviewed any communications from Kyiv today as yet, but, personally, I feel that [Russia's] reaction is excessive. Whatever the merits of the case, we, of course, do not condone any infringement on national minority rights. Ukraine's position is that such rights should be respected. But Moscow's excessive reaction, of course, was not normal, especially in light of the fact that the Latvian side took steps to resolve the incidents that took place.

Q: Concerning the election results, Mr. Buteiko. Do you think that they will complicate the European aspect of your foreign policy?

A: It was obvious to me that domestic issues were at the forefront of the election campaign, but I also noticed a heightened interest in foreign policy issues. After the power arrangements are settled in the new Verkhovna Rada, we expect some problems early on. I would not discount the possibility that the first test to indicate the real distribution of power in Parliament may well be over a foreign policy issue. But I don't think there will be any special problems.

Q: Have you observed any signal from the voters as to what kind of foreign policy they would like to see?

A: For the past four years the main national pulpit was controlled, for the most part, by the leftists, since the Parliament was headed by a leader of the left wing. And the people - and I noticed this in the election campaign, since I campaigned myself - have a false understanding of foreign policy and how it is implemented. They are not adequately informed, and the Foreign Affairs Ministry bears part of the blame.

In the past, under the Soviet Union, after important official events and decisions, teams were sent forth to inform the public. Although we try, we have neither the time, nor the resources and personnel to do this effectively. I see now that we will have to study this problem and possibly make some changes in the internal outreach activities of the Foreign Affairs Ministry.