ANALYSIS: Belarus headed toward diplomatic isolation (07/12/98)

ANALYSIS: Belarus headed toward diplomatic isolation

by David R. Marples

On June 22, ambassadors from several countries of the European Union (EU) left Miensk in protest at President Alyaksandr Lukashenka's continuing efforts to evict them from their residences. At the same time, the United States recalled its ambassador, Daniel Speckhard, for consultations.

The departure of the ambassadors follows a period of two months of almost constant harassment of foreign diplomats housed in the Drazdy compound located just north of Miensk, and adjacent to the residence and property of the president himself. In early April there were frequent shortages of water and power, and that same month the Belarusian authorities requested that the residences be vacated temporarily for repairs and maintenance. However, the request was never followed up and the ambassadors and their families remained.

In June, the ambassadors were given a week's notice to vacate their premises. When the U.S. ambassador returned to the complex accompanied by journalists, the gates to the compound were already being welded shut. Subsequently, the government gave the foreign staff one week to move, with a deadline of June 17. Ambassador Speckhard and others denounced the demand as a violation of the Geneva Convention and akin to tactics practiced during the Cold War; they refused to leave their homes.

On June 19, all water and electricity, as well as telephone connections, to the residences were cut off by the Belarusian authorities, and checkpoints were established along the road from Miensk with scores of militia guarding them. Several embassy's cars were prevented from entering the complex. A large notice has been erected at the entrance to Drazdy, stating that the area is the property of the presidential administration of Belarus. The compound is about 20 kilometers from Miensk and a long direct road branches off to Drazdy from the main highway, Prospekt Masherov. Thus, it is easily policed. The compound itself also has a high fence and main gate, and its spacious grounds contain the residences of most embassy staffs in Miensk.

President Lukashenka has stated recently that the embassy staffs can return to the residences as guests of the president, in short signifying that the area is not considered sacrosanct foreign territory like the embassies located in the center of the city. If such an offer were accepted, then the international community in Miensk would be subjected to every whim of the president.

What reasons lie behind the actions of the Belarusian government? It is not the first time that the government has intruded into the diplomatic arena. In April of last year the first secretary of the U.S. Embassy was declared persona non grata and deported after witnessing an illegal demonstration. At that time, then U.S. Ambassador Kenneth Yalowitz was recalled to Washington for consultations, and the new ambassador of Belarus to the United States was asked to delay his journey.

There are several possibilities (other than attempting a psychoanalysis of the president) for the recent actions.

First, there is the question of security. Over the past year the Mr. Lukashenka government has expressed deep concerns about the personal security of the president. The state-run media speaks constantly of the threat of terrorist organizations and has tried to pin such a label on the youth wing of the opposition Belarusian Popular Front, albeit with little tangible success. Thus, the president may prefer to have his own home more isolated, particularly from representatives of the international community.

Second, President Lukashenka has made his reputation as a nostalgic and ideological Communist with a deep affection for the Soviet past. Originally Drazdy was the residence of the party leadership. The U.S. ambassador's residence itself was the home of the revered party chief Pyotr Masherov (1918-1980). As a president who has further elevated the cult status of Masherov, it is not inconceivable that Mr. Lukashenka covets this property (though officially it was always the property of the state, not the personal property of the party leader in person).

Third, Mr. Lukashenka clearly wants to assert himself in the international world as a major player. He has frequently been rebuffed by his closest ally, Russia - which also intends to take retaliatory action over being removed temporarily from Drazdy - and despite some efforts to develop alliances and links with the Far and Middle East, has little to show for his efforts.

Evicting ambassadors from their homes may seem like an odd way to attract attention, but it is far from atypical. Whereas Russia offers only token protests to NATO actions in Kosovo and elsewhere, tiny Belarus limits the freedom of foreign diplomats and follows through resolutely on its threats. Russian hardliners cannot fail to take note of such actions from a potential candidate for a future Russian presidential election. As Ambassador Speckhard noted, these are Cold War tactics.

Fourth, Belarus has entered a period of economic turmoil with an unstable currency and a rapidly decreasing standard of living. A show of firmness, particularly against foreign leaders, might help maintain the president's popularity among the electorate. The Lukashenka government has often alleged that the West - particularly the United States - is plotting with oppositionists to remove him from power. Two years ago he spoke of an alleged CIA plot being hatched from Poland. Such rhetoric provides a useful diversion from the harsh economic realities of President Lukashenka's Belarus. In similar fashion he has laid the blame on Russian criminal circles for the collapse of the Belarusian currency in the spring of this year.

Fifth, the events have logic if seen in the context of the government's gradual removal of autonomy of virtually every institution in the republic: commencing with the press and the media, followed by opposition parties, the Constitutional Court, non-governmental organizations, and Russian Television services operating in Belarus. Mr. Lukashenka has constantly sought to increase his powers, perceiving enemies in all quarters.

Finally, at present there are few limits on the president's authority, few restraining forces to moderate his actions. It is not inconceivable that he has simply overstepped his powers and gone too far because there is no one in his Cabinet willing or prepared to oppose such a policy. Foreign Affairfs Minister Ivan Antonovich has consistently supported the president's initiatives to the point of having none of his own. Prime Minister Syarhey Linh has little authority, and the power of the Constitutional Court was stripped after the referendum of November 1996.

Perspectives, consequences

The consequences of the recent actions are likely to be severe: the expropriation of the Drazdy compound by the president's administration will likely result in a mass expulsion of Belarusian ambassadors in the EU countries and the U.S. In the long term, Belarus could find itself diplomatically isolated from those countries that are potentially its chief investors - particularly Germany, which has already ordered Ambassador Pyotr Belyaev to leave.

The Belarusian government may have decided that it has little to lose. Relations with the West have been poor for some time and foreign investment today is less than 20 percent of the 1991 level. Organizations such as the Soros Foundation have abandoned Miensk, while neither the International Monetary Fund nor the World Bank have offered credit tranches in recent years. The EU has never recognized the validity of the 1996 referendum that greatly increased the powers of the president. Belarus, from the evidence of recent presidential trips, has decided to limit contacts with western Europe and the United States in favor of a close association with Russia and friendly relations with Middle Eastern countries (purchasers of arms for the most part) and the Far East.

However, Belarus can hardly avoid its geostrategic location in the center of Europe. On three sides it borders countries that have either joined NATO (Poland), intend to join NATO (Latvia and Lithuania), or else have developed a special relationship with the United States (Ukraine). The bulk of its trade is with Russia, which has reacted mildly to the recent actions, but is nonetheless part of the diplomatic community of Drazdy. The actions would seem unlikely to lead to favorable results for a relationship that has often been strained over the past two years (other than pleasing Communist hardliners).

The nature of presidential policies is such that a full-scale retreat on the Drazdy issue is inconceivable. The one possibility seems to be that of Russian mediation, but the diplomatic community is unlikely to accept any solution other than the right to maintain their residences as private abodes free from the intrusions of the government. Otherwise, Belarus runs the risk of being a European rogue state, which will become internationally isolated and an economic backwater. Few foreign businesses would risk investing or establishing companies in a republic where they have no diplomatic representation.

David R. Marples is professor of history at the University of Alberta in Edmonton and director of the Stasiuk Program for the Study of Contemporary Ukraine at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, which is based at that university.