NEWS ANALYSIS: Gambling with Belarus's sovereignty (01/17/99)

NEWS ANALYSIS

Gambling with Belarus's sovereignty

by Jan Maksymiuk
RFE/RL Newsline

By signing a declaration on the creation of a "union state" and two related agreements on December 25, 1998, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his Belarusian counterpart, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, have presented political analysts with yet another puzzle in Russian-Belarusian relations.

The two leaders have offered similar puzzles on two previous occasions: in April 1996, when they signed the treaty on the creation of the Community of Russia and Belarus; and one year later, in April 1997, when they transformed that entity into the Union of Russia and Belarus.

The Russian-Belarusian accords of 1996 and 1997 had one feature in common: they were worked out in secrecy and signed with great aplomb as "historic" documents. Both have subsequently caused great confusion and misunderstanding, not least among their signatories, and have produced no tangible results, with the exception of the creation of a couple of supranational bodies that have no real powers.

Judging from its content and the way it was adopted, the 1998 Russian-Belarusian declaration seems bound for the same destiny as its predecessors. At any rate, it is as vague and contradictory as the integration agreements of 1996 and 1997, calling for a single state with common leadership, but stressing that Russia and Belarus are simultaneously to maintain "national sovereignty."

It also calls for unified governing bodies, but lists no guidelines for their formation. Nor does it explain how a single monetary system and unified customs policies can be adopted in the foreseeable future, let alone by mid-1999.

There is one factor, however, that may eventually make integration easier than it appears at present, namely the unpredictable Mr. Lukashenka, who seems to be in a tight corner as his presidency nears the completion of its fifth year in July 1999. Belarusian independent media have long argued that the true driving force behind President Lukashenka's integration efforts is his ambition to succeed Mr. Yeltsin at the Kremlin. Presidential elections in Russia are due in 2000, so Mr. Lukashenka is in a hurry to join the race. But there are also two domestic reasons for his third attempt at "storming the Kremlin."

First, his policy of "market socialism" in Belarus has practically come to a halt, and the nation faces an economic disaster. Pursuing integration with Russia is Mr. Lukashenka's desperate bid to stave off total economic collapse and to improve the state of affairs at home at the expense of the Russian economy.

Second, his political position in Belarus is not as secure as his authoritarian rule may suggest. Under the 1994 Constitution (abolished in the November 1996 referendum, which has not been recognized by any European country with the exception of Russia), Mr. Lukashenka's presidential term ends in July 1999. If he continues to hold that office for two more years - as stipulated by the new constitution, adopted in the same referendum - he will cease to be recognized as a legitimate leader by European countries (as is already the case with the legislature hand-picked by President Lukashenka). As a political usurper, Mr. Lukashenka may find it extremely difficult even to deal with Russia. If, on the other hand, he were to allow presidential elections in Belarus in 1999, he would automatically admit that the 1996 referendum was a fraud.

The creation of a new state entity with Russia would result in a new legal situation in which President Lukashenka might avoid political responsibility for his past actions. And if Mr. Lukashenka succeeded in Russia's presidential race - an outcome that many consider unlikely), no one would dare impose a visa ban on him or call him a "hooligan of Europe," as one European newspaper did when reporting on the diplomatic housing scandal in Miensk.

Regardless of what might motivate Russia toward a merger with Belarus, there is no doubt the latter will have to give up some sovereign rights or even completely surrender them in the planned union state. Even Russia's staunchest proponents of integration with Belarus do not dare suggest that Belarus, with its 10 million citizens, should be given the same say in the union as Russia, whose population is 15 times larger.

For the time being, President Lukashenka speaks about "marrying" two incompatibles: Belarus's full merger with Russia and Belarus's sovereignty. Clearly, he wants to leave Belarus as a retreat for himself in the event his "storming of the Kremlin" fails.

Yury Drakakhrust, a Belarusian political analyst, commented to RFE/RL that President Lukashenka is conducting a "cynical game" in which Belarus's sovereignty is hostage to his political ambitions. "If Lukashenka fools his Russian partners, there is a risk that he will get to the Kremlin and subsequently incorporate Belarus into Russia. If Lukashenka is fooled, Belarus may become a part of Russia even before [Russia's presidential] elections," Mr. Drakakhrust commented.

If this latter scenario prevails the Belarusian opposition will be put to the test in the coming months as it seeks to avert what many regard as the peaceful annexation of one country by another.

Jan Maksymiuk is a staffer of RFE/RL Newsline.

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