ANALYSIS: Russia stalls on treaty with Ukraine (02/14/99)

ANALYSIS

Russia stalls on treaty with Ukraine

by Volodymyr Zviglyanich

Almost unnoticed by the world media was the fact that the upper chamber of the Russian Parliament, the Federation Council, on January 27 voted overwhelmingly (115-5) to postpone consideration of ratification of the Treaty on Cooperation, Friendship and Partnership between Russia and Ukraine.

Its ratification by the lower chamber, the Duma, on December 25, 1998, received much more attention in the world, creating the illusion that almost two years after the signing of the so-called "big treaty" in May of 1997 relations between two Slavic giants had finally normalized.

This illusion now appears to have been premature.

The chairman of the Russia Duma, Communist Party member Gennadii Seleznev, speaking on the Russian information program "Vremya" on January 29, pointed out that, according to the Russian Constitution, the Federation Council has two weeks to consider a document (in this case, the treaty) and either approve or reject it. If within this term it does not come to any decision, then the document goes to the president for signing. The Russian Constitution does not foresee such a measure as "postponement," Mr. Seleznev indicated.

The chairman of the Federation Council, Yegor Stroyev, also a Communist, was in Finland during the vote. He placed responsibility for the outcome on Mr. Seleznev, who allegedly said that ratification by the Federation Council is not "important" and the treaty could be considered valid after its ratification by the Duma. According to Mr. Stroyev, these words pushed upper house members to show that their vote is indeed meaninful.

Russian Prime Minister Yevgenii Primakov, speaking at the World Economic Forum in the Swiss city of Davos, indicated that he does not see anything strange in the decision of legislators in the Federation Council. They simply decided to more carefully consider the treaty, he commented.

This political carnival surrounding the ratification of the treaty with "brotherly" Ukraine at first glance reminds one of the old Russian proverb about the left hand that does not know what the right is doing. However, upon closer scrutiny, it points to deeper trends underlying a basic paradigm shift in Russian politics.

In reality, the Federation Council (and Mr. Stroyev didn't touch this subject) voted after Yuri Luzhkov, the bombastic mayor of Moscow, vehemently opposed the bilateral treaty's ratification.

His arguments could be summarized as follows.

The transfer of Crimea in 1954 to Ukraine by then Communist Party boss Nikita Khrushchev was illegal and done after a hangover.
The Crimean city of Sevastopol was not included in the transfer, i.e., since 1954 it has been under Russia's jurisdiction.
In case of ratification, this treaty would have legalized for the first time the transfer of Crimea and forfeited Russia's territorial rights.
The treaty does not envisage machinery to protect the interests of Russians in Ukraine.
Ratification will enable Kyiv to evict Russia's Black Sea Fleet (BSF) from bases in Sevastopol and hand them over to the U.S. or Turkey.
Ratification would ultimately untie the hands of Ukraine, allowing it to draw closer to NATO and eventually join it.

The reference to untying Ukraine's hands implies that Russia would lose the chance to raise territorial demands as an impediment to Ukraine's rapprochement with NATO. It shows that Russia's major concern - no matter what the cost - is to not allow Ukraine to increase its ties with the West.

Structurally, Mr. Luzhkov's arguments, with which the Federation Council obviously agreed, resemble those posed by Adolf Hitler to Czecho-Slovakia regarding the rights of Sudeten Germans before the country's occupation by Germany in 1938.

In reality, non-ratification of the treaty presents undisguised territorial claims to Kyiv. It shows also that the executive branch in Russia, whose representatives (e.g., Foreign Affairs Minister Igor Ivanov) tried in vain to persuade regional bosses to vote for ratification, is extremely weak.

Another explanation could be that leaders of the executive branch tacitly associate themselves with the "tough" stance toward Ukraine displayed by the Federation Coucil - this in the run-up to parliamentary (December 1999) and presidential (June 2000) elections in Russia, which will determine its fate for the next century. With President Boris Yeltsin's virtual disappearance from active public and political life, one could say that he no longer has control in his country. Whoever turns out to be his successor - Mr. Primakov and Mayor Luzhkov have the best chances - will be much more assertive toward Ukraine. Therefore, any politician with presidential ambitions will be tempted to play the card of territorial claims on Ukraine to gain popularity.

Mr. Luzhkov's stand regarding this issue is well-known. But the real author of the recent Russian policy of "containment" of Ukrainian "nationalism" and its possible ties with NATO and other Western institutions is Mr. Primakov. Having been Russia's spymaster in charge of foreign intelligence (1994-1996), he initiated the fundamentals of Russia's policy regarding the creation of a Slavic union to replace the USSR. A major step in this direction is the involvement of Ukraine in the Russia-Belarus Union, as well as in various supra-state bodies of the CIS. This issue has a strong mass appeal in Russia, where 99 percent of the population still consider Ukraine a part of Russia.

Speaking of possible developments, the Federation Council could agree to ratify the treaty next month, provided that Ukraine does join the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly and the Russia-Belarus union, rejects any attempts to join NATO, gives the Russian language an official status, and forever gives Russia's BSF in Sevastopol bases to Russia, etc.

It would be most dangerous if Kyiv surrendered, "for the sake of saving the principal document," to any of these demands. Each of them virtually nullifies Ukraine's independence. In Ukraine there is a strong fifth column of proponents of "reintegration" and "Slavic brotherhood" - headed by Verkhovna Rada Chairman Oleksander Tkachenko, the Communist leader Petro Symonenko, Socialist Oleksander Moroz and leader of the Progressive Socialist Party Natalia Vitrenko - who see Ukraine in the Russia-Belarus Union and/or in the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly.

In reality, non-ratification means that Russia and Ukraine do not legally recognize mutual borders. Moreover, Russia implies that only force could be a decisive factor in territorial claims - say, "extracting" Crimea from Ukraine. This does not mean that both countries should start fighting, but it does mean that they find themselves in a situation similar to that in 1918, when Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin decided to send gangs led by Major Muraviov to occupy independent Ukraine, which had gotten rid of its army. Today we have a Ukraine that has recently gotten rid of its nukes.

The Ukrainian body politic should be fully aware of the real aspirations of Russian politicians who in pre-election years will appeal to the masses who bemoan Russia's loss of "great power" status.

Ukraine must not surrender to Russian and domestic pressure to trade independence for "Slavic brotherhood."

Dr. Volodymyr Zviglyanich is adjunct professor of East European area studies at George Washington University.

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