ANALYSIS: Does Ukraine have a policy toward nuclear Russia? (03/07/99)

ANALYSIS

Does Ukraine have a policy toward nuclear Russia?

by Volodymyr Zviglyanich

When Ukraine had nuclear weapons for a brief period of time after the break-up of the USSR, its relations with Russia (even without a "big treaty") were that of strategically equal parties. Both countries faced the same tasks connected with the upgrading and modification of their arms and keeping them safe. Both possessed the possibility of a guaranteed mutual destruction, that is, the nuclear weapons played a political role as a major deterrent factor.

After Ukraine got rid of its nuclear weapons, beginning in 1993 and subsequent years, the situation radically changed. Now only Russia has the possibility to unilaterally destroy Ukraine. The tripartite agreement concluded by then President Leonid Kravchuk with his colleagues from the United States and Russia, Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin, and implemented by President Leonid Kuchma, does not provide Ukraine with a clear-cut mechanism of protection against Russia's possible nuclear attack or the threat of such an attack. It provides Ukraine only with a mechanism of "consultations," of which concrete details and order of implementation are unknown.

Therefore, Ukrainian politics is bifurcated. On the one hand, it tends towards NATO in order to acquire a clear-cut protection against a possible nuclear threat from Russia guaranteed to all NATO members by the Article 5 of its Charter. On the other hand, it relies on vague mechanism of "consultations" and tries to behave with Russia as strategically equal party, when in reality it is not. Russia has an unconditional military superiority over Ukraine and all talks about "historical destiny of Slavic peoples" and "equal partnership" are only designed to distract popular attention from that fact.

Having being put in a strategically disadvantageous position and in an attempt to legally protect its borders, Ukraine went for signing and ratification of the "big treaty" with Russia. Russia, in turn, being in a position of superiority - the position in which it feels most comfortable - first postponed ratification of the treaty and then after a nearly two-year delay, ratified it in the Federation Council on February 17, but with the condition put forward by Yevgeni Primakov: that the treaty goes into force only after the Verkhovna Rada's ratification of three agreements on Sevastopol. The major aim of these agreements is to prolong Russia's presence in Sevastopol after the termination of the initial 20-year lease. But were these amendments, whose significance from the standpoint of international law is unclear, the only additions to the treaty itself?

According to information in the Ukrainian press, the same day that the members of the Federation Council decided to postpone the vote on the Russia-Ukraine treaty, they approved the Russian-Ukraine missile attack-early-warning agreement. It allows Russia to continue to use former Soviet radar stations in Sevastopol and Mukachiv (Transcarpathian Ukraine), which form part of Russia's early-warning system against missile attacks. It makes Ukraine a de-facto part of Russia's defense system, and a de-facto includes Ukraine into military alliance with Russia (Kyiv Post, February 4).

Russia badly needs these radar stations since its own radars, as well as satellites both on geostationary and high elliptical orbits around Earth, are not working properly. Russia's anti-missile warning system is blind for six hours from the direction of the Pacific Ocean, where U.S. Trident nuclear subs are based, and for one hour in the direction of the Atlantic Ocean (The Washington Post, February 10). This could cause Russia to make mistakes and miscalculations regarding a possible missile attack. Russia's strategists think that via continuing cooperation with Ukraine in the field of early missile attack warning, it will postpone an imminent collapse of its system.

If Russia ever comes into military conflict with NATO, those radar stations would be among the first sites to be taken out by NATO forces. The stationing of the Russian early-warning stations and the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) in Sevastopol contradicts the Constitution of Ukraine, the main provision of which directly forbids the stationing of foreign troops on its territory.

The Russian BSF is a part of Russia's defense system, along with radar systems. Russia does not pay for the electricity used by the fleet, which causes problems with electricity supply, such as outages. The reasons for the most recent power outage on January 27-29 are unknown - reasons range from political (retaliation for non-ratification of the treaty) to technical (damaged cable) - but the reality is as follows: due to the power outage on January 27-29, only by happy coincidence no explosions and casualties occured (Kyiv Post, February 4).

Russia uses its BSF as a test ground for modern naval hardware and arms, such as modern cruise missiles aimed at the American 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean. It also could have nuclear warheads on its ships. If so, then Russia makes Ukraine violate the spirit of the tripartite agreement, according to which Ukraine got rid of its nuclear arms and obliged not to have any on its territory.

Even if Russia does not have its nuclear warheads stationed in the BSF, it de-facto makes Ukraine part of its nuclear forces through the exploitation of its radars. As long as Ukraine services any part of the Russia radars or BSF systems, it will be seen by any enemy of Russia as a Russian ally. Thus, Ukraine acts as a de-facto subcontractor for a state with nuclear weapons.

A treaty on leasing part of Sevastopol to the Russian BSF would follow the Federation Council's ratification of the "big treaty." According to Mr. Kuchma, the lease to Russian naval bases in Ukraine should automatically come into force after the Federation Council approves the treaty.

Having permitted Russia to use its radars for missile attack early-warning purposes, Ukraine behaved as if it was a nuclear state, as only a nuclear state could have certain element or a full-fledged anti-missile systems. Non-nuclear states do not need these systems or any involvement in the activities of nuclear states aimed at creation, modification or any other use of such systems.

So far Ukraine does not have a clear policy regarding nuclear-armed Russia or implementation of its constitutional demands to get rid of the presence of foreign troops on its territory. This increases instability in the region and decreases Ukraine's posture as an independent state.

Volodymyr Zviglyanich is an adjunct professor of East European area studies at George Washington University and a senior fellow at the Jamestown Foundation.

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