ANALYSIS: Slavs and the myth of Russian friendship (05/23/99)

ANALYSIS

Slavs and the myth of Russian friendship

by Taras Hunczak

For the past several weeks various politicians, the mass media and various commentators emphasized the alleged special position that Russia enjoys among the Slavs, particularly those living on the Balkan Peninsula.

CNN showed a multitude of Muscovites near the U.S. Embassy demonstrating on behalf of their "Slav brothers," reminding us of past images of the Russian preoccupation with the "suffering Slav brothers" who were far away, while oppressing those who were in their immediate neighborhood. All one has to do is to look through the pages of history of Poland, and especially Ukraine, to be reminded of the oppression.

That is not to say that the Russian thinkers of the 19th and 20th centuries did not display a real interest in the Slavic question. On the contrary, the question always occupied an important position because Russian thinkers and statesmen felt that Russia could exploit the Slavs for the greater glory of Russia. Thus, for example, the 19th century pro-Slav movement was a self-serving attempt to expand the interests of the Russian Empire with the help of the Slavs, or to use the Slavic population as a source of justification for the Russian policy of expansionism.

The true intention of the Russian interest in the "Slav question" was perhaps best summarized by Count Nikolai Ignatiev, director of the Foreign Ministry's Asiatic department (which included the Balkans) and later Russia's envoy to Constantinople, when he made it clear to those who championed the ideals of Slavic solidarity that Russian support of other Slavs was justified only if it would further Russian political objectives. "All my activities from 1861 to 1877 in Turkey and among the Slavs," wrote Ignatiev, "were inspired by the thoughts ... that Russia alone should rule the Balkan peninsula and the Black Sea."

Similar sentiments were expressed by other leading Russian intellectuals of the 19th century. Ivan Aksakov, for example, admonishing Gen. Michael Cherniaev to not become involved in Serbo-Bulgarian affairs, explained that "the interests of Russia stand above all else, since what is beneficial for Russia also benefits the Serb, the Bulgarian and all of Slavdom." Gen. Cherniaev responded that Aksakov need not be concerned because he expected to advance Russia's political objective. He expected that, after a victorious war against the Turks, "the ministers gradually could be named from Russians. Hostile parties would disappear and one of the Slav states would become de facto a Russian province."

These are but a few examples of the Russian self-serving idealism, or "concern," for the Slavs. One might well ask why the historical fate of the Poles was never an issue for the Russians. Was it because the Poles had a well-developed sense of national identity that excluded Russian domination? Perhaps Jovan Ristic, the foreign minister of Serbia, characterized the problem best when he stated that Russian Slavophiles were in reality "true Russophiles who regarded small Slav peoples as nice morsels to satiate Russian insatiability."

Has anything changed today, particularly when speaking about the position of Russia on the crisis in Kosovo and Serbia, from the reasons for Russian involvement in the Balkans in the previous century? I don't think so. What has changed are the geopolitical circumstances. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was a Russian empire under a different name, Russian political leaders were humbled and frustrated. They no longer were central players in global politics. Indeed, even the national republics sought to establish some distance between themselves and Moscow.

Russia's hope lies with those elements in the sovereign republics that have not been able to cleanse themselves of the colonial servitude under which they functioned all their lives. It is with these individuals - in Ukraine the best example is Oleksander Tkachenko, chairman of the Parliament - that the Russians are playing the "Slavic solidarity" card.

Now the hypothetical triad of Russia-Belarus-Ukraine could be expanded as another Slavic nation, Serbia, has appeared on the horizon, seemingly anxious to extend the Kosovo crisis by joining the Slavic union under the imperial Russian double-headed eagle.

Isn't that what the Russians always wanted? The strategy is rather simple. If Serbia retains control over Montenegro and joins some form of union or alliance with Russia, then Russia will have free access to the Mediterranean using the ports of Montenegro. It would no longer be restrained by Turkish control of the Bosphorus. I wonder, is that the real reason for Russia's alleged concern for its unfortunate Slavic brother? As an added bonus, the new reality would bolster Russia's image in the international arena as a formidable power.

One might note that Russia has not displayed any concern for the tragedy of the Albanians of Kosovo, who have been subjected to the criminal process of ethnic cleansing. Could it be because ethnic cleansing is nothing new for Russia? One need only recall that on May 17-18, 1944, Moscow ordered an ethnic cleansing of Crimea as a result of which over 200,000 Tatars were expelled from their homes and deported to various regions of Central Asia. Many of them never returned to their homeland.

In conclusion I would like to suggest that the romantic "pan" myths (pan-Slavism, pan-Germanism, etc.) be relinquished to the trash heap where they really belong. There was never any place for them in the real world.

Dr. Taras Hunczak is professor of history at Rutgers University.

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