ANALYSIS

Tilting the chessboard in Moscow: Yeltsin names another prime minister

by Paul Goble
RFE/RL Newsline

Once again, Boris Yeltsin has tilted the political chessboard in Moscow, giving himself new room to maneuver by upsetting the calculations of others - at the cost of throwing the Russian government into turmoil.

On August 8, the Russian president fired his prime minister, Sergei Stepashin, along with the entire government, and replaced him with Vladimir Putin, until now head of Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) and a longtime KGB agent.

In making this change, Mr. Yeltsin said he wants to put Mr. Putin in a position to succeed him as president, thus highlighting Mr. Yeltsin's growing unhappiness with the political coalitions now being formed against him and hinting at his approach in the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections. Further, this latest move - particularly in the context of the renewed fighting in the North Caucasus - raises the possibility that President Yeltsin will seek to postpone those votes by declaring a state of emergency or will try to gain more influence over the electoral process by putting himself in a position to do precisely that.

But any short-term gains he may have made in the overheated politics of Moscow may be swamped both by the probable reaction of his political opponents and the even more predictable reaction of international financial markets and Western governments.

Precisely because most of Mr. Yeltsin's opponents are likely to view his motives as a transparent threat to themselves and because the president has used similar tactics in the past, political leaders in the Duma and in Russia's regions are likely to redouble their efforts to gain power at his expense.

The electoral coalitions that have emerged in the last few weeks are likely to consolidate rather than crack as a result of Mr. Stepashin's departure and Mr. Putin's appointment. Those involved in such coalitions will doubtless conclude that President Yeltsin's move is directed not only against their current clout but also their future power in the Russian state.

That may make the confirmation of Mr. Putin more difficult rather than less. It may also lead to new demands for President Yeltsin's impeachment and possibly trigger other kinds of political maneuvers against an action that many political figures, not to mention the Russian public, are likely to view as the latest indication of Mr. Yeltsin's arbitrariness and unfitness for office. Thus, once again, it is likely to be proven that the hottest month politically in the Russian capital is August.

Moreover, this pattern of domestic unhappiness with Mr. Yeltsin's move may be compounded by the reaction of the West. Both financial markets and international financial institutions are likely to react negatively to this latest indication of instability within the upper echelons of the Russian state.

The reaction of the markets is almost certain to be both quick and negative, driving down the ruble's exchange rate, reducing still further the willingness of private firms to invest there, and thus further exacerbating Russia's economic difficulties. All those developments will only highlight the conditions that are behind the growing opposition to President Yeltsin among the Russian people.

The initial reaction of Western governments is likely to be more cautious. On the one hand, many are likely to view Mr. Yeltsin's latest move the same way they viewed earlier ones of this kind - as a high risk but as perhaps the necessary step by someone many have come to view as the only reliable partner they have in Moscow.

On the other, precisely because Mr. Yeltsin has used this stratagem so often and precisely because it is once again threatening to destabilize the political situation in Moscow, ever more voices in Western capitals are likely to begin to ask questions about his reliability and about relations with Moscow after President Yeltsin.

The latter response is particularly likely because of Mr. Yeltsin's suggestion that he would like to see Mr. Putin as his successor. Some are certain to be concerned by the prospect of a longtime Soviet spy at the head of the Russian government, while others will be worried by the possibility that Mr. Yeltsin may suddenly transfer power to Mr. Putin as a means of avoiding a loss in the upcoming parliamentary elections.

Each time President Yeltsin has tossed the Russian chessboard into the air in order to maintain power, there have been suggestions that he has used this strategy once too often. That is certain to be the case once again this week. And regardless of whether this is Mr. Yeltsin's final August ploy, the suggestions themselves will cast an ever larger shadow over Russian politics, the Russian people and Russia's relations with the West.

Paul Goble is the publisher of RFE/RL Newsline.

Copyright © The Ukrainian Weekly, August 15, 1999, No. 33, Vol. LXVII

| Home Page |