ANALYSIS: A trip to Miensk highlights political conflicts in Belarus (10/10/99)

ANALYSIS

A trip to Miensk highlights political conflicts in Belarus

by David R. Marples

On September 4, I flew to the Republic of Belarus, at the behest of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and specifically its Advisory and Monitoring Group (AMG) in Miensk, headed by the German diplomat, Ambassador Hans Georg Wieck. I was invited as an expert on Belarus, to take part in a seminar of the National Executive Committee to help resolve the political impasse in the country.

The AMG was established to help resolve a constitutional crisis and to facilitate a dialogue between the president and the Parliament of the 13th session that was abruptly dissolved by President Alyaksandr Lukashenka in November 1996, and replaced with a truncated version of 120 deputies. In this same period, the president held a doctored referendum in Belarus to amend the 1994 Constitution, to increase his own powers, and to extend his own five-year period in office from the date of the referendum rather than the date of the presidential election (July 20, 1994). Thus for the opposition, July 20, represented the end of the presidentís mandate, after which he was no longer be recognized as a legitimate ruler by foreign powers. On this date, according to the original Constitution, power passed to the chairman of the parliament of the 13th session, Syamon Sharetsky. But, fearing for his safety, and after taking temporary shelter in the OSCE offices, Mr. Sharetsky had promptly fled to Lithuania where he remains today.

Since he has been in Miensk, Ambassador Wieck has come under fire from different directions. Journalist Mikhail Podoliak, writing in Narodnaya Volya (August 19), claimed that Mr. Wieck had become a "middleman" for the presidency, with the implication that the ambassador was assisting the government to redeem itself. From Vilnius, Mr. Sharetsky maintained that he had been pressured by Ambassador Wieck to take part in talks with the presidency and that sometimes this pressure was in violation of international principles. The ambassador has strenuously denied both charges.

The International League for Human Rights, in its special issue of September 1, has stressed that before any meaningful dialogue can take place, political prisoners must be released and the opposition be permitted free and equal access to the media. Many leading oppositionists have questioned the sincerity and commitment of the government in the talks. For some, the talks have appeared to give legitimacy to a regime that has none.

The political psychologist Uladzimir Padhol provided a different analysis. He pointed out that the real fear was as follows: if the plans of the OSCE leaders are realized, and a democratically elected Parliament is restored, in Belarus then this Parliament may ratify the agreement about the union of Russia and Belarus, which will then be signed by President Boris Yeltsin of Russia and the illegitimate president of Belarus. A new parliament will, in his view, provide more supporters than opponents of the Union because of the constant portrayals in the (state-controlled) media of the opposition as the enemies of the people. Thus, a democratic election, in this instance, cannot provide a meaningful result because of the months of state propaganda through the media vilifying the opposition and its views. In this way, the results of a well-intentioned OSCE program may be the loss of independence and the beginning of what Mr. Padhol terms a "new imperialism" on Belarusian lands.

In this chaotic situation, the role of the AMG has been difficult, to say the least. But Ambassador Wieck is a persistent man, and under his supervision a dialogue has duly begun between the government and the opposition. One of the premises was the relative success of similar roundtable discussions in neighboring Poland.

Our conference was an attempt by the National Executive Committee (NEC) led by the Chairman of the Parliament of the 12th session, Myacheslau Hryb, to come up with a guiding formula for democratic change. Simultaneously, the government and the opposition were each to appoint six members for the official discussions; this seemingly straightforward proposition was complicated by the fact that eight political parties were vying for the six places. Both meetings centered on the parliamentary elections scheduled for the year 2000 as the best means to resolve the crisis. Both were held in the relatively plush BIB Belarusian-German joint venture hotel in west Miensk, which was considered the closest to a neutral venue.

Upon arrival in Miensk, I was whisked through the airport, bypassing customs and passport control, and into a waiting OSCE minivan. I had not received such treatment in this part of the world since a visit to the Chornobyl station in 1989, at which time my host was the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was a far cry from the usual pedestrian process at customs at Miensk-2 airport where I have frequently found myself the lighter for duty free goods.

On Belarusian TV that night I heard a government spokesperson droning on that the OSCE represented the "European opposition" in Miensk - the implication being that NATO is the real authority in Europe. But then, I reflected, the government has to try to convince the public (or itself) that there are reasons for its participation in the dialogue.

I had meetings with the OSCE mission leaders, including Ambassador Wieck, a lively man of 72, and with the German ambassador to Belarus, Horst Winkelmann, at the German Embassy. It was immediately obvious that there are different approaches to dealing with the Lukashenka government. Mr. Winkelmann pointed out that the role of ambassadors is to find means of communication. Cases like the Drazdy affair of the summer of 1998 - when 11 ambassadors left the country in protest at the demand to leave their residential complex on the grounds that it required repairs - in his view, represented a failure on the part of the western missions to reach a compromise. Had he been in Miensk at the time, he emphasized, the walk-out of the western ambassadors would not have occurred.

In addition, according to the German ambassador, he has to deal with the government in power, even though, in theory, his country recognizes that President Lukashenka no longer has a mandate. He noted that the activist Viktar Hanchar, former chairman of the Central Election Commission, is clearly seeking power himself, even though he has never subjected himself to an election and has been revealed (over the reported results of the May 1999 opposition presidential elections) to be "a liar."

He commented also that the opposition frequently behaved as if it was in power, whereas in reality no individual politician can claim a high percentage of support among the electorate.

He said also that one should not regard the members of the two new assemblies as exclusively pro-Lukashenka. His experience had shown that in the House of Representatives there are many people of independent views who are not government puppets.

We concurred on the point that President Lukashenka missed a golden opportunity by not holding new presidential elections upon the expiration of his term. Had these occurred, the president would certainly have emerged victorious, thus resolving the constitutional crisis - though not problems related to human rights and democratic rule.

I met Ambassador Winkelmann also at his stately home in the suburbs, along with the Belarusian Popular Front (BPF) strategist, Mr. Padhol. It was a contrast in styles: Mr. Winkelmann, sedate and dignified, firm in his view that the role of ambassadors is to resolve problems rather than take offense: ("If you ignore the wasps," he told me as I fought over a piece of ham with three insects, "they will go away"); Mr. Podhol, with a bald dome of a head, gulping drafts of red wine and relating the current political intrigues (the latest was Mr. Shushkevich's decision to give an interview to Radio Liberty in which he accused Ambassador Wieck of bankrolling Mr. Hryb).

The night before the seminar (September 7), I was a guest at a formal dinner between the AMG and the NEC, at which, along with others, I was able to put questions to Mr. Hryb and company. It began tentatively. I felt very "western," sitting to the left of Ambassador Wieck, the voice of reason. Mr. Hryb was the most moderate of the hosts, who included newspaper editors, economists and politicians, including the former Chairman of the National Bank, Stanislau Bahdankevich, and three members of the Belarusian Social Democratic Party (BSDP). Most of them wanted, first and foremost, to remove the president from office; anything less seemed immaterial.

The following day, I was one of eight people (and one of two foreigners; the other being a civil servant from France, who was an expert on "vertical systems of government") to present a report to the seminar "Belarus: Options for Choice" chaired by Mr. Hryb. Most of the reports concentrated on the economy and the lack of change since 1991 in Belarus.

The first speaker was Leonid Zlotnikov, a member of the political council of the United Civic Party, who spoke on "Catch-up Development: A Strategy for Belarus." He was followed by Ivan Nikitchenko, a highly reputable scientist and agricultural expert, whose talk was titled "The Principal Conceptual Provisions for the Restoration of the Economy in the Republic of Belarus"; and by Yuri Shevtsov, a lecturer at the European Humanitarian University, who presented a paper on "Belarus: A Slow Drift Toward Europe."

The fourth speaker was Yuri Drakokhrust, a well-known reporter from the newspaper Belorusskaya Delovaya Gazeta, who provided statistics on the views of Belarusians toward several critical political issues. Next was Yaroslav Romanchuk, executive director of the Belorusskaya Gazeta newspaper, who focused on the "Geopolitical Choice of Belarus."

My talk was the sixth. Its focus was "Belarus: History and Politics in the Post-Soviet Period," making the case that an independent Belarus was not an anachronism at the end of the 20th century in Europe. It was followed by that of Aleksey Korol, editor of the newspaper Politika, the organ of the BSDP, on "Adapting to Europe, Part 1." Dennis Perrin of Paris, gave the final report before lunch, on "Local Administration in France." The last report, by Leonid Loiko, a member of the BSDP, was a follow-up to Mr. Korol's paper called "Adapting to Europe, Part 2."

Several people took part in the seminar but did not present reports. They included Valery Kharbalevich, political observer of the newspaper Svobodnye Novosty and a member of the United Civic Party; Syarhey Levshunau from the analytical center Strategia and a member of the National Executive Committee; Uladzimir Matskevich, a political scientist; Alyaksandr Sosnau, a member of the political council of the United Civic Party; Alyaksandr Potupa, president of the Center for the Research of the Future; Mr. Padhol; and Christopher Panico from the AMG.

There were plenty of questions after my own report. During the coffee break there were more. It was never far from my mind that these delegates were debating their own future, whereas I was following a professional calling, free to catch the next plane to Frankfurt whenever I chose. Most of the talks provided a consensus on certain issues: Belarus, the speakers held, must embark on economic reforms - particularly in agriculture, an area of near disaster. Second, all speakers agreed that Belarus must reorient its foreign policy toward Europe and either away from Russia or concurrently with agreements with Russia. Third, the delegates all agreed that the preservation of an independent state is critical. Given Mr. Padhol's warnings, I also considered that this was the major issue and that otherwise the conference and government-opposition talks would be meaningless.

Later a dapper fellow took the seat (and microphone) next to mine. He was Raul de Luzenberger, the head of the TACIS office (European Union) in Miensk. To my surprise he informed the delegates that their economy was really not so bad. Belarus had no major debts like Russia or Ukraine, thus it was quite feasible to embark on reforms. Clearly then, from this perspective, Belarus has benefited by standing still, ignoring calls for privatization and re-establishing state control over the economy. On the other hand, the man from TACIS was more likely trying to inject a note of optimism amid the general gloom.

As the conference drew to a close, some delegates (including Mr. Padhol) left in haste to attend a demonstration in the town center, held by the BPF to commemorate the Battle of Orsha (September 8, 1514), when the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Poland, allegedly with the willing participation of Belarusians, defeated the Russian army. This seemed to me an admirable myth (most Belarusians were conscripted into this army and the victory was qualified, in that the real goal had been to capture Smolensk), the sort of thing that might convince some locals that the country really has nearly half a millennium of national aspirations. One delegate, the editor of an opposition newspaper (there are at least six that operate in some fashion), told me that the republic reached its national fruition in the late 19th century.

The atmosphere in Miensk was highly charged, the politicking and debates intense. On the Saturday before I left there was a major crisis: all supplies of vodka had disappeared from the stores. Was it a government plot? Russian Premier Vladimir Putin arrived in Miensk during this same time and appeared to scotch any idea that the Russia-Belarus Union could be finalized in the immediate future. Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma rescinded a "preliminary invitation" to President Lukashenka to attend a summit in Yalta on September 10-11 of 14 countries from the Baltic and Black Sea regions, evidently because of the general lack of acceptance of Lukashenka's legitimacy as president of Belarus.

Following its incomplete congress in July 1999, which resulted in a division of delegates almost equally between two rival leaders, Zyanon Paznyak, and V. Vyachorka, the BPF held a "soym" (assembly) in Miensk, led by Mr. Vyachorka. Mr. Paznyak reacted angrily to the holding of such an assembly in his absence, claiming that the meeting was illegal. He also subsequently founded the Conservative Christian Party of the BPF. This, in turn, was declared illegal at a session of the BPF board, held in Miensk on October 3. It was a poignant reminder not only of the divisions among the opposition, but also the growing rift within the major opposition political party. At the time of writing, much is dependent on the reconvened BPF Congress to be held on October 30-31, though this can be expected to confirm the divisions rather than overcome them.

Of all the analyses I heard during the week, I found that of Ambassador Winkelmann the most succinct and perceptive. "You know," he told me, "in the final analysis the people in villages don't give a hoot about all this. They think politics is a game that the former nomenklatura in Miensk plays to fill its time. I doubt if they even know the names of the political parties. All they care about is bread on their tables." Yet if politics is a game there are still rules to which to adhere. And it seems to me that Alyaksandr Lukashenka has broken most of them.

Dr. David Marples is a professor of history and acting director of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta.

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