ELECTION ANALYSIS: Between the Russian and Belarusian scenarios (10/31/99)

ELECTION ANALYSIS

Between the Russian and Belarusian scenarios

by Jan Maksymiuk
RFE/RL Newsline

Regardless of who wins this year's presidential elections in Ukraine, no one should expect the country's dire economic situation to improve soon. That, at present, is the only certainty with regard to Ukraine at the present time.

Ukraine's foreign debt stands at $12 billion, of which $3.1 billion is due to be paid next year, while reserves of The National Bank of Ukraine total $1.3 billion. Thus, the country is facing a default on its foreign debt.

Meanwhile, the government's domestic debt, in unpaid wages, pensions, and social benefits, totals 10 billion ($2.5 U.S. billion). Some 80 percent of the population lives below the poverty line, and real unemployment stands at 25 percent. Some 17 percent of Ukraine's labor force is occupied in the shadow economy, which accounts for more than 50 percent of the country's economic activity. Corruption is pervasive. And one-third of the population wants to leave the country because of economic woes.

Even if these data - taken from the newspaper Den, which supports Yevhen Marchuk's presidential bid and is very hostile to incumbent President Leonid Kuchma - are exaggerated, the true picture of Ukraine's socio-economic condition is unlikely to be much rosier.

All observers of the Ukrainian political scene agree that none of the presidential hopefuls will obtain more than 50 percent of the vote on October 31, meaning there will be a runoff on November 14. Observers also tend to agree that Mr. Kuchma will be one of the two participants in that second round. However, it is anybody's guess who the incumbent will be running against.

Ukrainian opinion polls suggest that the most likely candidates to reach the runoff with Mr. Kuchma are Natalia Vitrenko, Petro Symonenko, Oleksander Moroz or Yevhen Marchuk. However, many hopefuls, as well as political analysts, have repeatedly cast doubt on the objectivity of polls in Ukraine, claiming they are biased.

Of the front-runners, Mr. Symonenko, the uncharismatic leader of the Communist Party, appears the rival against whom Mr. Kuchma would prefer to compete on November 14. Many analysts argue that in such a case, Mr. Kuchma's election team could successfully apply Boris Yeltsin's campaign tactics of 1995, when the Russian president faced Communist Gennadii Zyuganov in the run off and, with the concerted help of the Russian electronic media, effectively instilled the fear of a "red revenge" into the electorate. Those analysts assert that Mr. Kuchma could successfully use the same strategy against Mr. Symonenko. They also point out that Mr. Kuchma's campaign is already closely following the "Russian scenario": the Ukrainian incumbent, like his Russian counterpart four years ago, is employing the services of a host of pop stars and celebrities to promote him in the provinces.

Mr. Kuchma's potential duel with the leader of the Progressive Socialist Party, Ms. Vitrenko, would be more difficult and its outcome less easy to predict. That scenario could be called the "Belarusian" one because of Ms. Vitrenko's extremely populist election ticket, which strongly recalls Alyaksandr Lukashenka's in the 1994 Belarusian presidential vote. The October 2 attempt on Ms. Vitrenko's life has most likely boosted her surprisingly high popularity.

The unpredictability of a possible Ms. Vitrenko challenge to Mr. Kuchma lies in the fact that her electorate cannot be defined in terms of its social or economic status. Ms. Vitrenko's populism finds its appeal among different social layers of the Ukrainian population, whose only common denominator may be disappointment with Ms. Kuchma's rule. It is easy to make mistakes in trying to neutralize the populist appeal in the post-Soviet area, as the case of Belarus five years ago amply demonstrated.

Many would argue that Socialist Party leader's possible runoff could be the worst scenario for Mr. Kuchma. Despite his fierce and not always fair criticism of the incumbent, Mr. Moroz is seen as a moderate leftist and, in contrast to Mr. Symonenko, a likeable one. In the second round, Mr. Moroz might be able to enlist the support of both Mr. Symonenko's and parliamentary Chairman Oleksander Tkachenko's electorate - a goal he failed to achieve while campaigning within the so-called Kaniv Four election alliance with Mr. Marchuk, Tkachenko and Volodymyr Oliinyk. However, the failure to arrive at a political compromise even with Mr. Tkachenko (who is now supporting Mr. Symonenko) means that Mr. Moroz is less likely to appear in the runoff than either Mr. Symonenko or Ms. Vitrenko.

Mr. Marchuk's chances of reaching the second round seem even more remote than Moroz's. In fact, Marchuk is seeking support among the same electorate as Mr. Kuchma - that is, among those supporting both Ukraine's pro-market reform and strong statehood. Voters may prefer President Kuchma, who has already proven himself to be a reformer, if only a half-hearted one, and a staunch supporter of an independent Ukraine.

Ukraine's presidential election campaign has so far been less than exemplary, to say the least. It has been characterized by language that is invariably harsh, very often offensive and sometimes vulgar. The administration keeps the electronic media - both state-controlled and commercial - on a tight rein, not allowing those media to give more air time to Mr. Kuchma's rivals than was prescribed by the Central Election Commission. At the same time, Mr. Kuchma receives extensive coverage in the state media as the incumbent head of state.

It appears, however, that neither Ukrainian citizens nor the international community would protest very much if President Kuchma were elected for another five years. For many inside and outside Ukraine, such an outcome would mean continuation and stability, even if embarrassingly low political and economic standards continue to prevail.

Jan Maksymiuk is the Belarus, Ukraine and Poland specialist on the staff of RFE/RL Newsline.

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