ANALYSIS: "Epoch-making" union treaty is fourth of its kind in four years (01/02/00)

ANALYSIS

"Epoch-making" union treaty is fourth of its kind in four years

by Jan Maksymiuk
RFE/RL Newsline

PRAGUE - On December 8, 1999, the eighth anniversary of the Soviet Union's demise, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his Belarusian counterpart, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, signed a treaty on the creation of a union state of Russia and Belarus. This was the third attempt by these politicians to breathe life into the common state project, which had remained largely on paper. Mr. Yeltsin commented that the treaty is "epoch-making." Mr. Lukashenka - who had called the document a "laughing stock" in October - was quick to remark that he will sign another accord with Mr. Yeltsin before the end of the Russian president's term in office. He revealed to journalists that the next treaty will deal simply with a union state, not with the creation of a union state.

On October 9, 1999, Russia's Rossiiskaya Gazeta and Belarus's Sovetskaya Belorussiya published the draft treaty for "public discussion." That discussion reportedly resulted in 1,500 proposals to amend the document, but no definitive version of the draft was made public before its signing. Belarusian officials working on the draft commented last month that 99 percent of the amendments included in it were "purely technical." However, it remains unclear in what kind of state the Russians and Belarusians have been living since December 8, 1999.

The discussion of the treaty draft, which was allegedly conducted in both countries, provoked a slew of sarcastic comments by Russian and Belarusian independent commentators alike. Belarusian official media reported that some 1.5 million people took part in this debate, including 1.1 million in Belarus. "It turns out that 400,000 Russians decided the fate of the remaining 150 million," one Russian newspaper commented wryly. Belarusian independent media reported that the "public discussion" in Belarus took the form of Soviet-style meetings at plants and factories, where management praised the unification with Russia, while workers - instead of stormily applauding as in older times - sat gloomily silent.

According to the draft, the new union state will have the following joint bodies: a Supreme State Council, a bicameral Parliament, a Council of Ministers, a court, and an Accounting Chamber. The signatory states are to voluntarily surrender part of their sovereign powers to these bodies. The document also calls for conducting coordinated foreign, military, and social policies. At the same time, however, Belarus and Russia will maintain their "sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, political systems, constitutions, state symbols, and other statehood attributes." The draft does not explain how these contradictory goals can be achieved in practice.

The signed treaty is accompanied by a timetable for the phased implementation of unification goals, for example, the introduction of a joint tax system in 2001 and a joint currency in 2005. The timetable, like the treaty itself, lacks any specifics regarding its implementation.

For Mr. Lukashenka and his regime, the 1999 treaty - even if it does not differ in essence from those signed in 1996 and 1997 - has several obvious benefits. First, it ensures Russia's political protection and patronage for the Belarusian leader, who has become a pariah in international politics. Second, it extends Russia's economic assistance to Belarus's unreformed economy (Miensk will continue obtaining cheap Russian gas and oil and selling its products, which are unwanted elsewhere, on the Russian market). Third, it increases Mr. Lukashenka's possibilities as a player on the Russian political scene and doubtless will help sustain his desire to make it to the Kremlin as the ruler of both Russians and Belarusians.

Russia's benefits from the treaty are less obvious. From the economic viewpoint, there are virtually none. However, as some Russian commentators note, economic considerations in the union with Belarus are not paramount. Russia, those commentators argue, has never come to terms with the "loss" of Belarus and Ukraine eight years ago, and is ready to pay dearly to get them back under its wings. Now, as Russian troops level Chechnya and Russians slowly recover their former sense of "imperial pride," Belarus's "voluntary" merger is a sign of brighter times for greater Russia. Besides, integration with Belarus is an important issue in the electoral rhetoric of all Russia's political forces.

Although it cannot be ruled out, it is hardly conceivable that Mr. Yeltsin, as his health continues to deteriorate rapidly, would want to use the merger with Belarus as a pretext for extending his term in office for yet another five years. On the other hand, it is also highly unlikely that anybody succeeding Mr. Yeltsin in the Kremlin would allow Mr. Lukashenka to influence, let alone participate in, Russia's political decision-making. Therefore, an "epoch-making" treaty, the fourth of its kind in four years, is most likely to be the next chapter in the Russian-Belarusian integration story.

It is difficult, however, to predict the end of this story. Will the Kremlin eventually absorb Belarus as the 90th subject of the Russian Federation? Or will it install a new leader in Miensk, as loyal to Moscow as Mr. Lukashenka, but devoid of pan-Slavic aspirations? The latter scenario might prove positive for the pauperized country of 10 million, all of whose energies seem harnessed either to fanning or hindering Mr. Lukashenka's personal ambitions.

Jan Maksymiuk is the Belarus, Ukraine and Poland specialist on the staff of RFE/RL Newsline.

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