INTERVIEW: Belarusian Popular Front leader on developments in Belarus
Following is the text of an interview with Vintsuk Vyachorka, chairman of the Belarusian Popular Front (BPF), conducted in Miensk, Belarus, on December 21, 1999, by David R. Marples and Yulia A. Shimko. On August 1, 1999, at the VI Congress of the BPF in Miensk, the party became polarized with almost equal support for the then leader Zyanon Paznyak (currently living in Warsaw, Poland) and Mr. Vyachorka. Ultimately, delegates elected Mr. Vyachorka as the new leader by a vote of 228 to 11.
CONCLUSION
Q: One of the problems I have studied most is the problem of national consciousness in Belarus. Why do you think it might be possible to raise national consciousness? My view is that [President Alyaksandr] Lukashenka really benefits from the fact that in the countryside, especially in the eastern parts of the country, there is very little recognition of the historical roots of the Belarusian past as opposed to the Russian-Soviet model.
A: Do you know the recent results of the population census?
Q: I haven't seen the new census, no.
A: The larger percentage of ethnic Belarusians (after the exclusion from our passport of the section in which you have to declare your ethnic origin) - 81 percent of the population - declared themselves to be Belarusians and more than 80 percent among these put Belarusian as their native language. I suppose it is a totally normal situation. To some extent it is a result of the short period of the existence of an independent Belarusian state. The less there is of Homo Sovieticus, the more Homo Europeus emerges. The speculation about Soviet nostalgia, populist or Communist slogans was possible here only because of the weakness of national consciousness.
I think we don't need to raise artificially the degree of national consciousness. It exists. Our people don't identify themselves with Russia; they know they are not Russians.
I have no figures in front of me, but I know from my everyday contacts that the main motivation for this "reunion" with Russia is not ethnicity, but the nostalgia for Soviet times. This is why Lukashenka was elected, not because of promises to restore Slavic brotherhood, but because he promised that he would return to Soviet times with cheap sausages, etc.
But if the regime destroys the basis of national consciousness, if it attacks the Belarusian language, instruction in Belarusian from kindergarten to universities, if it openly mocks Belarusian language as weak - it was a very interesting statement that he made at the press conference in Homiel that there are only two languages in the world, Russian and English by which one can express high feelings...
Q: Ultra-chauvinism?
A: Yes, it is chauvinism. I am sure that after the return to democracy in our country we will not have problems with national consciousness. There were no protests against the use of Belarusian language in schools, except in two or three places where the majority of students came from the families of Russian officers.
In the first half of the 1990s people perceived this as a natural thing. They said: I personally don't speak standard Belarusian very well (they usually spoke in the vernacular), but let my children or grandchildren learn standard Belarusian. The whole system of education started to be gradually changed from kindergartens, it was a quite normal process.
The recent attacks on history, the changes in the strategic perception of our historical science show that Lukashenka and the circles around him pay attention to the questions of historical memory and of historical self-identification of Belarusians. The authorities replaced Academician [Mikhail] Kasciuk at the Institute of History with [Nikolay] Statkievic, a specialist in the history of the Communist Party. This is no accident - it is part of the official strategy. Purposeful changes in the system of writing schoolbooks on history, in the Board of the National Encyclopedia show that there is no need to construct artificially the consciousness: it is being destroyed by Lukashenka, so it exists.
Q: In other words, it should be a gradual process. That seems a little different from Mr. [Zyanon] Paznyak's conception because he always seemed to me to want to change everything immediately.
A: It is not necessary to do it immediately. People do not oppose the process itself, so we should choose natural means for this, not break the harmony.
Q: How do you think the Western countries could help the Popular Front? What would be an effective form of assistance? To provide more publicity, for example?
A: I prefer to think not about help to the BPF, but to Belarus. What does it mean? I understand the West has to choose between two possible tactics: to contact the regime, waiting when it will be destroyed from within, or to isolate the regime, supporting the democratic alternative. To insist on negotiations at any price means the first variant. The regime is not isolated and, as a result, feels itself confident.
For example, the Czech Republic gives credit to Lukashenka to buy grain. I suppose the grain will be used to produce spirit, to sell it in Russia and to enlarge the "black budget." No isolation means enough resources for the regime to suppress opposition.
On the other hand, support for the democratic alternative strengthens the democratic process in the country and the negotiations really can have real results. At the moment the planned negotiations simply serve as a decoration for the direct way to legitimize the regime after July 20.
Let me make one more digression about the negotiations. According to the "union agreement," elections to a "union parliament" are planned. Usually, Russian elections a priori are regarded as democratic. So, if Lukashenka combines national parliamentary or even presidential elections with "union elections," the results of all can be internationally recognized, and Lukashenka is legitimized in Western eyes without negotiations. This scenario is only one illustration of how closely questions of independence and democracy are connected in Belarus.
One more remark about Western assistance. We here have no illusions about Russia. There is a real danger that the new Kremlin power camp is built around a bloody KGBist, to be honest. His main victory is ethnocide in the Caucasus. It is very dangerous that all the colors of the Russian political scene now are united under the banner of genocide and imperialism. It shows that this country is very far from returning to the family of civilized nations.
At the same time, Russia is the main factor that ensures the stability of the Lukashenka regime because the regime is strategically important for it. "Integration" and the "Russia-Belarus union" are the pseudonyms for restoration of empire. So, Russia should receive a strong and unambiguous message from the Western side: no assistance is delivered to Russia if support for the puppet regime in Miensk and the imperialistic scenario of "integration" is continued.
Assistance for the BPF? Unfortunately, we were the victim of a propaganda campaign by the Communist regime, the [Viachaslau] Kiebic government, and the Lukashenka regime. We are not nationalists in the sense of Le Pen. Our name "the Belarusian Narodnyi Front" should be properly translated as the Belarusian Popular Front, and we identify ourselves within the spectrum of Western political parties. We see ourselves more or less like the European People's Party, as the faction in the European Parliament is called, or the American Republicans, though the American political scene is not the same as ours.
It is very difficult now to find groups or formulate interest in social democracy or conservatives because the real political scene will only be formed after the return here to democracy and an unchangeable independence. But we are not ethnic nationalists. We are for the independent statehood of Belarus; we have no illusions about Russia, but we are not anti-Russian in the ethnic sense. There are a lot of ethnic Russians in our leadership. For example, [Lyavon] Barcheusky, who for two years carried out the duties of the exiled leader Paznyak, is an ethnic Russian. So the ethnic question is absolutely irrelevant.
It is important for us to change our image in the eyes of the Western political scientists and decision-makers, because we really are the main political force here. We are not so large, but we have the best structure, we have units in every raion with the exception of the Chornobyl regions. We have a lot of responsibility and many activists who are ready to work for democracy and Western values. Thus, we don't want to be excluded from contacts, we want to be perceived in an appropriate way.
Q: It is probably difficult for popular fronts that were prominent 10 years ago. None of them are really in a position of power. Rukh in Ukraine has really dwindled as a political force. But your situation is very different.
A: Rukh was involved in power. Ukrainian people hoped that democracy would bring them prosperity. They failed. It was not such a model of democracy as in Estonia and Poland - [it was the] oligarchy model. But my opinion is that Rukh is now obliged to share the responsibility. Unfortunately, even people who on the one side were for independence and on the other for future prosperity tried to find forces and politicians other than Rukh. They believe that when Rukh was in power nothing happened. It was strange to me that nationalists such as Slava Stetsko supported the ex-KGBist [Yevhen] Marchuk.
Q: It was also odd that western Ukrainians supported [Leonid] Kuchma.
A: Yes, but what about us? From the very beginning typologically we were similar to those types of movements in the three Baltic states and in Ukraine. The movement was smaller in Belarus and not so influential because of the comparative weakness of self-identity here, but it was a real force and in 1991 we did not exploit this enough. We could have done everything, as I understand now, but there was insufficient experience, there was not the readiness to go to the nomenklatura and dictate what must be done.
The only thing we achieved was [Stanislau] Shushkevich. Shushkevich was placed in his position [as chairman of the Supreme Soviet] thanks to the BPF, thanks to the people in Independence Square demanding change. But the BPF cannot be accused of sharing power. There was a very good chance in 1992 when we collected half a million signatures in support of new elections, but we did not collect people in Independence Square to demand this referendum. It is history.
Then there were several years of self-sufficiency of our organization and only now are we changing our image to be more open, to be ready to create coalitions. It is senseless to be afraid of coalitions in our situation. We are a strong organization, so for us and others there is a chance to multiply our resources - not merely add to them. And now we avoid the unrealistic scenarios. We want realistic proposals. For example, now we hope that the spring of 2000 should be rather tempestuous because we will try to combine social protest with purely political protest against pro-Moscow dictatorship. And sadly we have ignored the social component of protest. This was our mistake - not strategic, but important.
Q: I want to ask you about your goals for the year 2000. If there are parliamentary elections, for example - I don't know to which Parliament there would be elections - would the BPF take part in them?
A: This is the point. Elections to which body? If the present law remains or the election code elaborated by the upper house remains, we will not take part in the elections. The BPF was the first to ignore the local elections last spring. Several other democratic parties declared that they would participate because it provided an opportunity to visit apartments, to propagandize and so on, but after several decrees that completely restricted the possibility to participate, then they agreed with us. And the international community did not recognize the results of these local elections, so the move was a success. Even those elected - several Communists and LDP members - can do nothing within these bodies. They have no power. And the assembly has no power either.
And if there is no presidential pressure, but normal power, then it is a matter for debate. What should be the basis: the Constitution of 1994 or the hybrid constitution? Or should there be a new constitutional council that will elaborate step by step the principles of new elections? There can be no elections without common agreement between the government and the opposition. And this agreement can be reached only after preconditions have been fulfilled: the release of all the political prisoners; an end to all the politically motivated criminal cases; and real access to the media. Normal conditions.
I am rather skeptical, but the hot spring will put pressure on the regime to agree to the negotiations. That is our prognosis. And so we will participate in the coalition, together with the United Civil Party and the Social Democrats.
Q: OK. The last question I have is about the expansion of NATO and the European Union to the border of Belarus. This surely puts a lot of pressure on Belarus to turn in one direction or the other: either toward Russia, or toward Europe, or NATO. My impression at the moment is that Belarusians are in favor of the EU but opposed to NATO. It is difficult to discern, but do you think it is a case of one or the other alternative, will it take some time before Belarus decides which way to go?
A: From a historical perspective, we have no choice but to join European structures. We have been neighbors of Russia for a thousand years and we know that it is very dangerous to be a neighbor of such a state. To this moment the BPF has not declared that its aim is to completely join up with Western structures.
But on the other hand, the typical attribute of our marches here is the slogan: Lukashenka to prison! Belarus to NATO! What about the younger generation of Belarusians? It is natural for them to identify themselves with all the Western institutions, including NATO. But we here live in a monopolized information space. We have only one Belarusian TV channel that I hope you have had the experience to watch.
Q: Oh yes.
A: And we have from two to six Russian channels. And the Yugoslav war was shown here only in a propagandized form from one channel to another. There is no pluralism of the media here and this had an impact on the attitudes toward NATO. Thus it will take some time to change public opinion.
What about NATO? The neutrality of our country was an important point of the first program of the BPF. It was the only way to stress that we were separate from the Warsaw Pact, from the Tashkent treaty, and all the other treaties initiated by Moscow. This position of our program was only partially fulfilled in the Constitution of 1994. The striving for neutrality was written in the Constitution - a very interesting formula that allowed pro-Russian forces here to make military agreements with Russia.
I think that the steps should be in several stages: first, real neutrality from Russia; second, dissolving the treaties, and then gradually joining Western structures. But I stress that this is all for the future, it is not our current slogan.
David R. Marples is professor of history and acting director of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta in Edmonton. Yulia A. Shimko is a graduate of the Belarusian State Economic University in Miensk.
CONCLUSION
Copyright © The Ukrainian Weekly, March 26, 2000, No. 13, Vol. LXVIII
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