ANALYSIS

Newly inaugurated Russian President Putin chooses repression by selective prosecution


by Paul Goble
RFE/RL Newsline

Newly inaugurated Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to have embarked on a strategy long favored by authoritarian leaders: the selective prosecution of his opponents for legal violations.

That chilling conclusion, only four days into the new president's term, is suggested by the May 11 police raid on a major Russian media group that has long been critical of Kremlin policy in general and of Mr. Putin's approach to a variety of issues, in particular.

Early on May 11, armed tax police searched the headquarters of the Media-Most Group, headed by Vladimir Gusinskii. This group controls NTV, the radio station Ekho Moskvy, the daily Segodnia, and the weekly magazine Itogi. The Federal Security Service (FSB) said the raid was intended to find evidence of tax irregularities or what an FSB spokesman insisted was "a regular financial offense." Later the same day FSB officials reported finding not only the evidence they said they were looking for but indications of other criminal activity, including the use of unauthorized eavesdropping devices.

But Mr. Gusinskii and his supporters, who have often been the objects of official attention for their critical coverage of the government, viewed the police action in a very different way. Mr. Gusinskii himself suggested that "it is obvious that what is happening is a factor of political pressure." Another Media-Most leader, Igor Malashenko, said the action "contradicts the norms of the Constitution of Russia and is against freedom of speech."

Because of the nature of the Russian political and economic system over the last decade, both the FSB and Mr. Gusinskii are right in some sense.

Given confusion over tax policies and the underlying corruption of Russian society, virtually no firm in that country has always been able or willing to conduct its affairs in full compliance with the law. Consequently, the authorities are likely to be able to find evidence justifying prosecution almost anywhere they choose to look.

But it is precisely because the authorities have the possibility to pick and choose whom they will prosecute that Mr. Gusinskii and the Media-Most team have the better argument. They properly point out that they have been singled out from among all the other potential targets of investigation. And they plausibly suggest that the government has done so not out of a concern for law enforcement but rather to build its power.

Even a cursory examination of the Russian media scene suggests that Mr. Gusinskii's group is no more "illegal" than that of other media barons, but Media-Most distinguished itself from other such holdings: it has been very critical of the Kremlin. The May 11 raid suggests that the Kremlin has decided to respond to that criticism and to do so in an ostensibly respectable way by using the provisions of the law itself rather than brute force to move against freedom of the press and those who seek to defend it.

Such a strategy has three major advantages for a leader like President Putin, who has made it clear that he wants to ensure his control. First, it can be used to silence or break those who oppose his regime, either by drawing them into legal cases or financially ruining them.

Second, actions of this type intimidate other groups that might be thinking about opposing him. The latter can see what the costs of such an approach are and may therefore decide to remain silent or otherwise go along with the regime.

And third, because such actions are cloaked in a mantle of legality, they often escape any criticism from democratic governments. Such governments can and do say to themselves that the Russian police are, after all, only enforcing the law.

But for all three of these reasons, this "legal" threat to media freedom and to other forms of freedom that rely on it may be even more insidious than the direct application of force. Thus, the May 11 raid on Media-Most may prove an even more significant turning point in Russia's political development than Mr. Putin's inauguration as president four days earlier.


Paul Goble is the publisher of RFE/RL Newsline.


Copyright © The Ukrainian Weekly, May 21, 2000, No. 21, Vol. LXVIII


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