ANALYSIS: Putin's Chechnya problem (06/04/00)

ANALYSIS

Putin's Chechnya problem

by David R. Marples

Russia's new president, Vladimir Putin, has already revealed himself as intransigent on the issue of Chechnya, rejecting several overtures from Chechen leader Aslan Maskhadov for a unilateral ceasefire. Media-Most's NTV is currently under fire for its unpatriotic depiction of the war. Why does Russia cling to this tiny region? Why is it so important to the Russian government?

The Western attitude - particularly that of the United States - is somewhat hypocritical. Russia's tactics in the second Chechen war were modeled partly on NATO actions in Kosovo. The Chechens have had more success since the active operations ended and they could return to more common tactics of ambushing convoys and resorting to guerrilla raids. The Chechens, to be frank, are hardly freedom fighters. They are led by warlords who would likely be fighting each other but for the Russian presence. The Chechen people are pawns in a bigger game.

Chechnya has been part of Russia for 140 years, longer for example than Canada has existed, though a fragment of time compared to the ancestral claims of the Chechens themselves. But superficial observations provide less evidence of a territorial mentality on the part of the Russian government than the issue of security. The Caucasus enclave is linked to terrorism in Russia - particularly in Moscow - to drug smuggling, gun running, and gang warfare in Russian cities. Chechnya could also spark a new separatism in the Russian Federation that would see other, more valuable parts seeking greater autonomy or independence.

President Putin's memory is probably more short-term. In January 1921 the Chechens, Muslims of the Sunni following, became part of the new state of Soviet Russia as Chechen-Ingushetia. There was nothing voluntary about this process and many Chechens openly welcomed the German invasion of the former Soviet Union in June 1941. As the Germans approached the republic, this agitation increased, prompting the vindictive Stalin to label all Chechens and Ingushi as ipso facto collaborators and subsequently order the deportations of 1944-1945.

Nikita Khrushchev restored the autonomous republic in 1957, and surviving Chechens or their offspring gradually returned to their homeland. But the Soviet marriage was never a happy one and thus Russians slowly moved into the towns at the behest of the Soviet authorities. By 1989 the population was declared to be 1.27 million, of which Chechens comprised 715,000 and Russians 269,000. In urban areas - including the capital, Grozny - the proportion of Russians was often close to 50 percent,

In November 1990 the Chechens and Ingushi declared state sovereignty of their common republic, and Russian president Boris Yeltsin magnanimously assured them that more autonomy would be forthcoming. The Chechens, however, went further, declaring independence on November 2, 1991, some seven weeks prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union. By the following spring a constitution had been published. The actions were so sudden and rapid that they probably took the Russian government by surprise.

The war of 1994-1996 seems inexplicable now in terms of Russian tactics. The Russian ground forces were ill-trained, often young conscripts who all too easily were demoralized and fell into Chechen ambushes. The war was a stark reminder of the general decline of the Russian military, a modern-day Finnish campaign, except that on this occasion Russia suffered its most humiliating defeat.

This defeat, rather than the immorality of the Chechen leaders, the Caspian oil pipeline that passes through Chechnya, or even anti-regionalism on the part of Moscow, may have been the spark for the latest war. Many influential Russians felt that Russia was no longer taken seriously as a military power by 1996. But until NATO's Kosovo campaign, Russia had no leeway or excuse to undertake a new campaign. The indiscriminate and shocking assault on the Serbs convinced Russia that it could undertake a similar operation without strong international repercussions.

President Putin, like other politicians, is concerned primarily with image. He is often seen in military uniform, he has flown to the battle zone. His image now reflects that of the nation: Russia's strength is reflected in its military standing.

Thus, the Chechens have been anathematized as rebels and terrorists (some are, most are not). The war will end not in a compromise but only with an unconditional surrender. All forces in society, from the Cabinet to Vladimir Gusinsky's NTV, must support such an ending and Mr. Putin's success and even survival as Russian leader is dependent upon it.

David Marples is a professor of history at the University of Alberta.

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