EXCLUSIVE: Excerpts from Kostiantyn Morozov's forthcoming book, "Above and Beyond"

by Robert De Lossa

In the spring of 1995, Kostiantyn Morozov, a senior research fellow at Harvard University, began work on a book about how he became independent Ukraine's first defense minister and what he did in that role. Last week and this week, we publish excerpts from that book, "Above and Beyond: From Soviet General to Ukrainian State Builder," published by HURI and available later this month.

"Above and Beyond" traces Mr. Morozov's family history, early years and military career. He speaks as a former Soviet pilot and general officer about military life and the Communist Party's intervention in the armed forces. The turning-point of the book is Mr. Morozov's narrative of the August 1991 putsch. He provides a detailed account of what he and others did at the time, and the events that led Leonid Kravchuk to choose him to be Ukraine's first defense minister.

In 1991 and 1992 most pundits in the West and in Russia said that rebellion and massive bloodshed would result from his efforts. But Gen. Morozov managed to pull off the unimaginable. By the time he retired from his post, Ukraine had a loyal army that was one of the largest in the world.

* * *

"Above and Beyond: From Soviet General to Ukrainian State Builder" by Kostiantyn P. Morozov; introduction by Sherman W. Garnett. 320 pp., four maps, 39 color and black-and-white photos, 13 documentary facsimilies and translations, notes, index. $29.95 (hardcover). ISBN 0-916458-77-6. For ordering information call HURI Publications at (617) 495-4053, e-mail [email protected]; or fax (617) 495-8097.

"Challenges to My Ideals: The Events of August 1991"

(Excerpts from Chapter 6)

In spite of the great turmoil, such as the vociferous and public protests staged by the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers in the early months of 1991, the actual coup attempt in August of that year came as a great surprise to all of us. When I look back on this period, I see that my preoccupation with day-to-day administrative affairs prevented me from immediately understanding what was taking place. On Sunday, August 18, we celebrated Aviation Day, a holiday also known as Air Force Day, and as a member of the Kyiv Military Council I was directly involved in the celebrations leading up to this holiday. In connection with the festivities I had been designated to deliver a major speech to military personnel and the public at large on Friday, August 16.

The speech went off uneventfully, and most of my colleagues went home for a rest over the holiday weekend. My duties, however, kept me on the move. I was responsible for overseeing all the air force garrisons in my jurisdiction, which covered an enormous geographical area, stretching from the northern part of Chernihiv Oblast all the way to Belarus and to Zhdanov (Mariupol), south of Donetsk, as well as to the Baherove Air Force Base in Crimea. Because this huge territory had to be monitored daily, I returned on Saturday to my command post to maintain contact with garrison commanders and to oversee the implementation of our aviation transportation plans.

The air army under my command was not an integral part of the Kyiv Military District. Rather, it was subordinate to the USSR's central headquarters in Moscow, with Marshal [Yevgeny] Shaposhnikov as commander-in-chief. Contacts with the headquarters of the Kyiv Military District were usually limited to dealing with operational issues, such as the organization of our daily program, military discipline, combat readiness and preparations for mobilizing forces. Thus, although I was a member of the district's military council, I was quite surprised when suddenly I received a call from the chief of staff of the Kyiv Military District.

Naively, I thought that the chief of staff had simply remembered that Sunday was Aviation Day and that he wanted to congratulate the aviation personnel of this district. I did not at all expect what I got instead - his instructions to prepare a plane for Gen. Viktor S. Chechevatov, the military district's commander, who was on vacation in Crimea and who had to be brought to Kyiv. I was led to believe that the flight was necessary so that Chechevatov could return to his regular duties the following week.

[...]

On Sunday, a crew left for Crimea as planned and picked up Chechevatov at the Bilbek airport for the return flight to Kyiv, where he met with [Gen. Valentin] Varennikov, recently arrived by plane from Moscow. Then the military district's headquarters ordered that I arrange for a return flight to Bilbek on the same day. This request convinced me that all this commotion was designed to satisfy the personal plans of the top brass, who, I concluded, were simply flying to Crimea for a vacation. Varennikov, no doubt, was probably planning to have some rest and relaxation at Chechevatov's dacha. But why had Chechevatov been summoned to Kyiv, and why had his vacation been interrupted? Whatever the case, I was satisfied that the flight crew was back on duty, that these flights had been approved by the air force central command, and that we were able to carry out this request without straining our resources.[...]

During the next few days the veil of mystery around this flurry of activity on August 17 and 18 was quickly lifted. As I soon learned, Varennikov had been one of the key representatives of the military involved in planning the August coup. On August 17 he had requested that Shaposhnikov, who had been left out of the inner circle plotting the coup, keep a special plane ready to fly him to Kyiv, supposedly on a military inspection mission. Shaposhnikov had accepted this explanation. After arriving in Kyiv on August 18, Varennikov met up with Chechevatov, and the two of them flew to Crimea, where they joined the Moscow delegation, which apparently confronted [Mikhail] Gorbachev and attempted to persuade him to support the coup. When Gorbachev refused, most members of the delegation flew to Moscow to confer with their colleagues on the next steps they would take. Varennikov, however, had been designated to ensure the support of all three military district commanders in Ukraine for the plot and to gain the support or acquiescence of Ukraine's senior political elite. Thus, he returned to Kyiv, where on the morning of Monday, August 19, he was to supervise the implementation of the plans of the State Committee for the State of Emergency (SCSE).

[...]

I finally managed to contact Marshal Shaposhnikov in between his meetings. I asked him what he thought of the situation and whether he had any additional instructions for me. He replied that he had received a directive from the minister of defense and had begun working on the appropriate instructions for the air force. Soon, he said, I would receive a coded message with further information. He then asked me about the activities of the army I commanded, and I informed him that we were not wasting time and were continuing to work with students from military schools, implementing our existing training plans. He did not directly comment on this activity, but he did not dissuade me either. I even sensed that although Shaposhnikov's spoken comments were noncommittal, he agreed with what I was doing. After this conversation I felt even freer to proceed as I best saw fit, and I ordered that all those scheduled for a second or third shift be allowed to go home so that we could proceed with our original plans. [...]

Still, I found myself in a difficult situation. In the past I had never had any difficulty interpreting Shaposhnikov's commands. This time, however, something was wrong. A long time passed before I received the coded message he had mentioned, and when it did arrive, it contained nothing to explain the state of emergency and prepare us to deal with this new situation. It simply stated that a State Committee for the State of Emergency had been set up, that our activities should be in accordance with plans to maintain an increased combat readiness status, and that all measures should be taken to defend our weapons and ammunition. (A number of weapons recently had been stolen from military bases, and in a confused or chaotic situation criminals could take advantage of these circumstances. Measures to secure the weapons sounded reasonable, but Shaposhnikov's message portrayed them as being tied specifically to the implementation of the state of emergency regime.)

After reading this telegram I was more convinced than ever that the army under my command should continue its normal everyday activities. I decided that we would not carry out any additional measures to increase our combat preparedness. I cannot say that this was because I realized that the state of emergency had been declared by reactionaries or that a surprise of some kind was being prepared for us. More likely, it was simply because I wanted to continue preparing student trainees without disrupting our regular schedule. I did not want to get involved in intrigues that would lead to regrets about wasting valuable time for no good reason. [...]

Shaposhnikov was supporting [Boris] Yeltsin in Moscow much the same way that I was supporting [Leonid] Kravchuk and the decisions of the Ukrainian Parliament in Kyiv. Realizing the bankrupt nature of the Communist Party, which had spent its last ounce of strength defending its own pernicious ideology rather than the people - and which had ominously and dangerously tried to drag the armed forces into that absurd process of self-preservation - Shaposhnikov, with his innate sense of justice and honor, distinguished himself as one of the first to act against that tide. And his subordinates sensed how he distinguished himself.

[...]

Before the fate of the coup became clear, a number of dramatic developments took place on August 20 that required decisive action. As commander of the Kyiv air army, I was responsible for managing all air traffic over Ukraine's territory. Our army was in charge of the zonal air traffic management center, which also had branches in Lviv and Odesa, and we were responsible for coordinating the plans of all three air armies stationed in Ukraine. Any plans we approved had to be coordinated with the air defense forces, whose commander and staff were also responsible for maintaining order in Ukraine's air space.

All of a sudden, without any preliminary warning from the appropriate authorities, I discovered that a large number of transport planes from the Baltic region was being transferred to Kyiv and would be landing at the Boryspil Airport just to the east of the city. Furthermore, because of the nature of the bases from which they had departed, I concluded that these planes must be carrying troops. I had not received any flight plans for these planes, had not approved their entry into Ukraine's air space and had not given any instructions for these planes to be monitored. As if that were not enough, we were informed that these planes had been instructed to fly directly over Kyiv.

Imagine an armada of some 30 heavy transport aircraft flying low over this city in clear weather. Military and political strategists knew exactly what an impact such a show would have on the citizens of Kyiv and all of Ukraine. It was an effort to exert psychological pressure on Rukh activists and, more significantly, on the leaders of Ukraine, who, as the coup leaders saw us, were insufficiently eager to support them. Certainly I did not know of any official measures by senior officials in Ukraine to support the coup plotters.

Since I was not involved in planning the flight of these aircraft, I did not have the right to order their crews to return to their bases. I categorically forbade them, however, to fly over the city. [...] My office received a number of calls from the district headquarters complaining about my decision, and the chief of staff reminded us that the original orders had been confirmed, that this was a very important matter, and that Varennikov was supervising this operation. However, I told my subordinates to reply that they were simply following their commander's orders, and everything proceeded according to my instructions. The planes thus crossed the northern part of Kyiv Oblast and kept at least 30 kilometers away from Kyiv. Although the troops landed at Boryspil and stayed there for two days, I believe, they were not deployed in any way, nor were they even allowed to set up camp, and their living conditions must have been terrible. There was no attempt to satisfy even their most basic human needs, and they must have been terribly confused by the situation in which they found themselves.

[...]

I was convinced that the [Communist] Party's involvement in the coup was anti-constitutional anti-democratic, and thoroughly reactionary. On August 22 I shared my thoughts on this matter with my fellow officers, including the head of the air army's political department, his deputy and the secretary of the party committee. Further, I proposed that the officers under our command be given the opportunity to make their own independent decision concerning their party membership. Needless to say, my recommendation did not draw rounds of applause from my colleagues, for it was truly unprecedented. Since my fellow officers did not support my general proposal, I told them that I would confirm my personal decision concerning my party membership at a meeting the next day - that is, Friday, August 23[...] For me, the only decision I could personally live with was contained in a written statement of resignation. To ensure that I was following proper procedures, as soon as the meeting was over, I submitted the statement to the secretary of the appropriate party committee. With that, I resigned from the Communist Party.

Copyright © The Ukrainian Weekly, November 19, 2000, No. 47, Vol. LXVIII

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