ANALYSIS: Ukraine: "returning" to Europe? (02/18/01)

ANALYSIS

Ukraine: "returning" to Europe?

by Dr. Roman Solchanyk

Anyone following developments on the European continent cannot but have noticed the evolving debate about what constitutes "European-ness" under present conditions. Increasingly, academic conferences are being organized devoted to this subject, and articles and books are being written that address one or another aspect of the central question of where Europe begins and ends.

The stimulus for this discussion can be traced directly to the dismantling of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the subsequent collapse of the "people's democracies" in what has long been known as "Eastern Europe," and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In the aftermath, Europe embarked on the process of reconfiguring and redefining itself through the integration of "Eastern Europe," a concept that was largely artificial in nature - that is, the product of the post-war division of Europe into spheres of influence that grouped together such geographically and culturally disparate countries as the German Democratic Republic and Bulgaria.

The emergence of the new Europe, as it were, is being driven primarily by the enlargement of two institutions: NATO and the European Union (EU). Three of Ukraine's neighbors, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, are well on their way to returning to Europe as the newest members of NATO; in two or three years' time they will join the EU. Other former "Eastern Europeans" will follow as will the Baltic states - certainly insofar as the EU is concerned and perhaps NATO as well.

For Ukraine, these developments are more than just of passing interest. For some time now, the leadership in Kyiv - its "multivector" foreign policy notwithstanding - has been declaring that it seeks to integrate Ukraine into European and trans-Atlantic political, security and economic institutions. Full-fledged membership in the EU is a stated goal of the Ukrainian government. The president of Ukraine, among other prominent officials, has argued that Ukraine must "return" to Europe; that integration into European structures is a "strategic choice." Indeed, in the fall of 1999 former Minister of Foreign Affairs Borys Tarasyuk insisted that the "European idea has become Ukraine's national idea and a consolidating factor for its society."

Let's forget for the moment the rather problematic question of returning to Europe, which, after all, implies having been there at some point and the even more problematic question of the European idea having become Ukraine's national idea.

On a practical level, the sad fact remains that hardly anyone in places like London, Paris, Berlin or Brussels is waiting for Ukraine to "return." Indeed, it seems that more or less the same sentiment prevails among some of Ukraine's "Eastern European" neighbors. Although Warsaw, Prague, Bratislava, and other "Eastern European" capitals have an obvious interest in a secure and stable Ukraine, and although Poland has gone to great lengths to promote Ukraine's interests in Brussels, the extent to which they see it as a "European" country is questionable. Certainly in Prague public opinion views Ukrainians, who are quite visible in the Czech capital, as "those Russkies."

The problem, one suspects, is Huntingtonian in nature, somewhat analogous to Turkey's problems with Europe. It was one thing for Turkey to become a member of NATO, which it did in 1952, and thereby secure Europe's southern flank, but it was not until almost 50 years later that the EU decided that it could begin accession talks with Ankara. In a similar vein, the EU opened accession talks with Romania in 1999, whose economic "successes" are more or less comparable with those of Ukraine, but it has consistently rebuffed Ukraine's pleas for greater integration.

The problems with Ukraine's "European choice," however, are not entirely one-sided. It would seem that most Ukrainians do not want to be "European." An October 2000 poll conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology for the U. S. Department of State's Office of Research revealed the following:

52 percent of those polled regard Russia as the key guarantor of Ukraine's security;
only 14 percent want close ties with the United States and NATO; and
61 percent favor joining a confederation with Russia and Belarus, while 32 percent are opposed.

The "good news" is that while 40 percent want Ukraine and Russia to merge into one state, 49 percent are opposed to such a merger.

Three in four (75 percent) have a favorable opinion of Russia, and nearly as many (69 percent) have a positive opinion of the Russian president. A small minority of 12 percent name Russia as the principal threat to Ukraine's security.

A majority of Ukrainians have - 55 percent - confidence in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), but fewer than half have confidence in the EU (37 percent), the Council of Europe (33 percent), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (33 percent), and NATO (31 percent).

Another poll, conducted by the SOCIS Center for Social and Marketing Research in December 2000, showed that 42 percent preferred relations with Russia and the CIS as a priority while only 8 percent opted for Western countries. Another 33 percent claimed to support a "balanced" foreign policy. A solid majority (61 percent) would support a president who favors a "Slavic union." This, by the way, was more or less what the incumbent Ukrainian president was promising in his 1994 election campaign. It may be recalled that in his first inaugural speech there was the almost casual assertion about Ukraine quite naturally belonging to the "Eurasian space."

Still another survey, commissioned by the Academy for Humanities and Social Studies in Moscow, also conducted last December, found that 53 percent of Ukrainians favored the unification of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia into a single state. The corresponding figure for Russians was 61 percent and for Belarusians 69 percent.

Clearly, survey research should not be taken as the last word on any given issue. On the other hand, it does capture the public mood at the given moment. And, at this moment, nearly 10 years after independence, the mood in Ukraine is such that Russia and the CIS are in, and Europe is out. This, coupled with Europe's less than enthusiastic response to Kyiv's claim to "European-ness," provides food for thought as to whether the "European choice" is in fact a viable option for Ukraine.

Dr. Roman Solchanyk is an analyst of international security policy in Santa Monica, Calif. His book "Ukraine and Russia: The Post-Soviet Transition" was published by Rowman & Littlefield in January.

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