NEWS AND VIEWS: Pragmatism in foreign policy is a necessity for Ukraine (04/08/01)

NEWS AND VIEWS

Pragmatism in foreign policy is a necessity for Ukraine

Below is the text of the address by the minister of foreign affairs of Ukraine, Anatolii Zlenko, delivered at the Harriman Institute, Columbia University, on March 22.

Pragmatism has become a fashionable coinage among diplomats.

For Ukraine it is not a fashion, but a vital necessity.

The political romanticism of the beginning of 1990s and exaggerated expectations in lieu of real economic reforms led to painful setbacks. The geopolitical importance of Ukraine remains appealing to the United States, but it is clearly not sufficient to convince the European Union. No talk about internal political stability could persuade foreign investors to settle in the Ukrainian market without proper legislation.

Therefore a new pragmatic approach was needed, both in domestic and foreign policies.

At home, it began over a year ago when we finally got the Parliament and government to work together. Remarkably, despite the current political tumult and occasional frictions between the two authorities, they continue to issue necessary decrees and pass legislation. The economy continues to grow, wages and pensions are being paid, the reforms go ahead.

In foreign policy, the first thing done was to put an end to endless debates about "East or West" and to present clear-cut priorities. Priority No. 1 is integration into the European Union. The two others include enhancement of strategic partnerships with Russia and the United States.

The logic thereby is very simple. The cornerstone of all foreign policy activity is the national interests of Ukraine.

Membership in the European Union fully corresponds to these interests. The relationship with the United States is indispensable, because it supports the European choice of Ukraine. Stable good-neighbor relations with the Russian Federation are part of our European policy, since they are welcomed by the EU and the U.S. So, where is the dilemma?

Two significant points should be mentioned here to make the picture complete. First, no other direction of Ukrainian foreign policy may be considered as an alternative to the European. Second, any initiatives or proposals, no matter how attractive or economically lucrative, if they could seriously endanger our European integration, will be dismissed.

Once the priorities are set, pragmatism requires also different arguments and techniques. A differentiated approach is most appropriate here. For example, geopolitics, among others, remains a reasonable argument when we have to deal with such critical issues as the ultimate limits of the EU and NATO enlargements, the ABM Treaty and nuclear disarmament, and consolidation of Ukraine as a regional leader.

At the same time it would be fruitless to appeal with such an argument to international financial institutions or foreign investors. The strategic crossroads location of Ukraine is a good argument to claim the status of a convenient energy transit country or to focus attention on the problem of illegal migration. But it would hardly suffice without upgraded highways and a pipeline network and a comprehensive migration policy. The economic achievements of the past year are the best argument ever in negotiations with the European Union and an incentive to foreign businesses. Intensive diplomacy with our Western neighbors convinced EU to pay adequate attention to the possible negative consequences of the EU enlargement.

Recent economic agreements with Russia have nothing to do with big politics. They stabilized the Ukrainian energy market, promoted creation of new jobs and opened good prospects for high-tech and industrial cooperation. We heard no concern from the EU or WTO.

So, what's the fuss about? This is pragmatism. It has nothing to do with the desire to look nice or to be arrogant in the eyes of our respective strategic partners. We say principally the same things in Washington, Brussels and Moscow.

We say that Ukraine feels nothing about the idea of joining its union with Belarus. And we make that clear to the Russians as well.

We say that Ukraine is not ready to join NATO. And we don't make that a secret for Brussels.

We say that Ukraine cannot support revision of the ABM Treaty. And we put it plainly in Washington.

We joined our strategic partner Poland to voice a serious concern about the Russia-EU intention to build gas pipelines bypassing Ukraine.

All these statements and projects would not correspond to our national interests, which cannot be compromised by any other considerations.

On the other hand, we highly appreciate U.S. support of Ukraine's European integration and its cooperation in international financial institutions. We joined NATO in KFOR to keep peace in this troubled region. We recognize the valuable contribution of Washington in the Middle East peace process and collaborate closely with your delegation on this and many other issues on the U.N. Security Council.

Ukraine is in favor of expanded economic cooperation with Russia and other new independent states. We share the Russian views on the need to launch effective combat against terrorism. We believe that regional and humanitarian cooperation with Russia will promote good-neighborly relations.

At the same time, Ukraine welcomes the open-door policy of NATO and maintains its position that each country has the exclusive right to seek adequate means to ensure its national security. We are engaged in large-scale practical cooperation with the Alliance because it helps to modernize our armed forces and develop national sciences.

This enumeration of common interests or differences can be extended. But the essence is clear: Ukraine unambiguously defined its national interests and foreign policy objectives and is consistently and pragmatically implementing them.

Let me dwell on some peculiarities that arise when pragmatism in foreign policy needs to take into account strategic partnerships. The latter notion implies that such partnerships should be mutually reinforcing and sometimes mutually condescending.

One cannot impose or beg for a strategic partnership. There should be no elder and younger brothers, regardless of differing size or political weight of the nations. The respective countries should have a genuine and equal interest in the success of one another.

Ukraine seeks a successful modus vivendi and reasonable compromises with each of its strategic partners. When we abandon a lucrative economic contract with a third state to meet the interests of our strategic partner, we expect adequate economic or political compensation for it. We may be ready to accommodate the economic or humanitarian interests of another strategic partner, but we also expect this partner to meet some of our needs. Otherwise it is a one-way street.

Re-evaluation of our strategic partnerships, giving them more flesh and a distinct future, is also part of pragmatism in Ukrainian foreign policy.

I cannot leave unattended a topic, for which I actually came to this country. This month Ukraine is chairing the U.N. Security Council. And here again we act quite pragmatically.

The Ukrainian initiatives, voiced by President Kuchma at the Millennium and Security Council summits and developed currently, are significant enough and very specific, but not over-ambitious, correctly matching the current weight of Ukraine in world politics.

Among them I should mention enhancement of preventive diplomacy through adjustments in the peacekeeping policy of the United Nations. Primary attention is to be paid to early warning and counter-crisis measures at the initial stages of their eruption.

Simultaneously, since assuming its functions as a non-permanent member of the Security Council, Ukraine increased its participation in PKOs by 23 times, thus becoming the biggest contributor to U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKOs) among the European states.

The Ukrainian proposal to review the sanctions mechanisms was laid down in the declaration of last year's Security Council summit. This was supported by many countries that had suffered from previous and current U.N. sanctions against other countries.

Another initiative aims to resolve one of the frozen conflicts in Abkhazia (Georgia). On March 15-16 the Georgian and Abkhaz leaders met in the Ukrainian city of Yalta in another attempt to narrow their differences.

To sum it up: preventive peacekeeping, review of sanctions and meltdown of frozen conflicts are three principal initiatives that will remain on the agenda long after Ukraine leaves the Security Council. This is our tangible contribution both to global and to our own national security.

Your fellow citizen Robert Oppenheimer is credited with the following saying: The optimist thinks this is the best of all possible worlds. The pessimist fears it is true. The pragmatist, I presume, knows well that it is not true; but uses every opportunity to make it better.

The pragmatic foreign policy of Ukraine is designed to make Ukraine a strong and prosperous democracy. It is a happy coincidence that this objective fully corresponds to the national interests of the United States.

Thank you for your attention.

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