EDITORIAL: The Kinakh nomination (05/27/01)

EDITORIAL

The Kinakh nomination

Since it is unlikely that Viktor Yuschenko will again head the Ukrainian government any time soon, Anatolii Kinakh, nominated by President Leonid Kuchma to be Ukraine's 10th prime minister in as many years, may well be the best alternative. He is relatively young at age 46, is a committed free marketer, if not an avid exponent of radical reforms, and has a strong background in management.

This is not to say that if confirmed Mr. Kinakh will continue the dynamic policies of his predecessor. Ukraine will probably see a return to a Pustovoitenko style of government, where the prime minister is simply the chief government apparatchik. However, when considering that the next prime minister will merely be a transitional figure, regardless of who is finally confirmed, the choice of Mr. Kinakh is not the worst that could have been expected. The president of the League of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs is also not closely associated with any single business clan, and this will allow him to play off their various interests and balance their demands.

It seems that because the oligarchs could not agree on a candidate from among themselves, President Kuchma decided to nominate someone who has their respect, if not their endorsement. Most important for the president, Mr. Kinakh is a long-time political partner and trusted confidante. No less important is the fact that Mr. Kinakh, who is not the sort that evokes strong emotions among people, has the best chance of anyone who was in the running to receive parliamentary approval. Some experts have said that Mr. Kinakh's confirmation is crucial because the president must show he can get his nominee approved or risk not only the chance that the next prime minister will officially become a caretaker, but that the president may become a lame duck with three years still remaining in his second term.

To obtain the 226 votes he needs for confirmation, Mr. Kinakh now must convince various ideologically opposed factions in the Verkhovna Rada that he can deliver the goods they desire. He must persuade the Communists he will pay heed to their demands for more social protection programs and the return of subsidies, which the Yuschenko government did away with. If he succeeds in gaining their support, it will give them influence over the budget and could signal a return to deficits, increased borrowing and economic stagnation, trends that would quickly bring an end to his government. He must also be ready to hand over key ministerial posts to the Social Democrats (United), Labor Ukraine and the Democratic Union factions, which means they will have sway over the energy sector they so desire and the economy in general.

In the end his need to appease very different interests will leave the new prime minister with very little room for movement. His lot would have been much easier if he could have convinced the center-right factions to vote for him. Then he could have dispensed with the leftists and concentrated on a pro-business program, which in all likelihood both the center and center-right would have supported. Because the centrist factions that represent the major business clans not only voted for, but also organized, the ouster of the Yuschenko government, Mr. Kinakh will receive no support from the center-right for whom the outgoing prime minister was a hero.

Even if Mr. Kinakh is approved, he will take the reigns of what will be in practice, if not in fact, a caretaker government - effectively a doomed government from the start, unless he attains unexpected and unsurpassed success in the months he has before the parliamentary elections in March 2002. Few political experts doubt that after a new Verkhovna Rada is seated the government will be dismissed in favor of one that will support the whims of the new majority that will assume power. In the months before the elections, those who will be pulling his strings will demand policies intended to optimize their potential to take a majority of parliamentary seats in 2002.

President Kuchma could have done worse than Mr. Kinakh. He could have buckled to the demands of the business clans and nominated a person who would have given them control over the government and a good seat from which to steer themselves toward overwhelming victory in the 2002 elections. However, he has nominated a person who may be able to temper their insatiable political appetite, while continuing to keep the Ukrainian economy at least pointed toward reforms.

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