THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF UKRAINE'S INDEPENDENCE
INTERVIEW: An academic and professional viewpoint of Ukraine
by Andrew Nynka
On August 24, 1991, Ukraine stepped, albeit hesitantly, onto the international stage, for the first time in over 80 years, to create its own independent future. Its rich natural resources and emotionally optimistic diaspora fueled a belief that Ukraine was moving towards a strong footing among European circles. On the other hand, academics and professionals were very well aware of the leaderships inexperience, a frail and crumbling infrastructure, Soviet mentality and rampant corruption and believed that she would quickly become yet another bloody Eastern European uncertainty.
The forecast among this group was extreme indeed but ten years has proven neither concept quite right. Ukraine has managed, although questions of transparency, corruption and human rights still exist, to keep a state of relative peace among its citizens and has accomplished the first democratic transfer of power from its inaugural president to its second.
At this critical crossroads, 10 years after its initial declaration, Ukraine must evaluate and learn from its past. As this past is not only a chronology of events but an indicator of the future. It is a textbook to decipher and learn from. Ukraine must begin to evaluate this textbook in order to develop and strengthen its choice of democracy.
The following interviews are the first of a three-part series conducted with professionals and academics aimed at reflecting upon Ukraine's ten-year development and their outlook for her future.
OREST DEYCHAKIWSKY is a Staff Advisor for the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE; The Helsinki Commission).
Q: Can you comment on the expectations of the diaspora regarding the possibilities of Ukrainian independence in the late 1980s and early 1990s?
A: The achievement of independence for Ukraine was a major historical event - both for Ukraine and for Europe, the importance of which cannot be overstated. And it was an unexpected event - it's now easy to forget that most people, including Ukrainian Americans, never thought that independence would occur in their lifetimes. If someone, say, in 1987 or even 1988, would have said that Ukraine will be independent by the end of 1991, he or she would have been given looks of skepticism, or worse. Yet Ukraine did achieve that independence, and it has lasted now for ten years. With respect to diaspora expectations, there was a fairly high degree of understandable euphoria, especially among the post-war political emigration. Although many understood that change would not be automatic, my recollection is that most expected that there would be more progress than has been the case, especially on issues such as the use of the Ukrainian language.
Q: Decades of Soviet rule have left a consequential, and in most instances, negative mark on the mentality of the Ukrainian people. Has Ukraine made any significant reform-oriented achievements in the last ten years to overcome that mentality?
A: The very fact of the achievement of independence is to be celebrated and the fact that this independence has lasted. In the early 1990's, there were some analysts who predicted Ukraine would break apart and made much of the differences between eastern and western Ukraine. Yet Ukraine has survived. And there have been real achievements, over the last ten years, including internal stability, the development of state institutions, tolerance for its national minorities, constructive relations with its neighbors, cooperation with the West, especially the United States, and the recent positive economic indicators, including the recent rise in GNP and industrial production. And anyone who hasn't seen Kyiv in the last ten years will most certainly be in for a pleasant surprise. On the other hand, despite the progress, the quality of Ukraine's independence leaves something to be desired.
Q: Ukraine has had ten years now to find its place - whether in the European community, the eastern/Russian embrace or some combination of the two. Do you see any significant factors that may lead you to believe Ukraine has found its place in the foreign context?
A: I find it hard to have a great deal of enthusiasm for the tenth anniversary celebrations partly because Ukraine has not yet found its place. Yes, everyone recognizes that the deep scars left by Soviet communist oppression will take time to heal and change does not take place overnight. But what troubles me is the direction in which Ukraine has been heading in the last few years. Problems with media freedoms, murdered journalists whose investigations raise serious concerns about the rule of law and democratic processes in Ukraine, and pervasive corruption at high levels, among other problems, raise profound questions about whether Ukrainian authorities are truly committed to becoming part of the Euro-Atlantic community, despite their rhetoric. There's a saying, "if you talk the talk, you have to walk the walk." Ukraine still very much needs to "walk the walk."
Q: Over the past ten years Ukraine has faced many uncertainties and challenges as it struggles with democratic reforms (the lack of 'rule of law', corruption, issues with transparency, mafia/oligarchic control of media, etc.). In your opinion, which of these has troubled Ukraine the most?
A: While all of these have a destructive influence on Ukraine, the effect of large-scale corruption is especially corrosive, and I believe has made Ukraine vulnerable to the influence of Russia. In fact, I think that those - a minority - who argue against criticizing Ukraine because somehow this will push Ukraine in the direction of Russia have the argument backward. Moreover, I doubt if those who gave up their lives over the centuries for the ideal of an independent Ukraine would have wanted to see an independent Ukraine which benefits a small corrupt elite at the expense of the overwhelming majority of the population and keeps Ukraine from realizing its full economic potential. The behavior of the oligarchs and their patrons in Ukraine - who have thwarted economic reforms and a favorable climate for most foreign investment - indicates little in common with Ukraine's stated European aspirations.
Q: What factors continue to undermine Ukraine's efforts at democratic reform and what can Ukraine do over the course of the next ten years in order to prevent it from falling backward and move forward with democratic reform?
A: Continued widespread corruption, the lack of rule of law and the lack of true separation of powers undermines Ukraine's independence. Every effort should be made to support democratic political forces, non-governmental organizations, and the independent media and to encourage democratic processes - including free and fair elections - as this will truly serve to strengthen Ukraine's independence. Progress with respect to economic reform is also essential. If this occurs, then we will really have something to celebrate ten years from now on the twentieth anniversary.
Q: The United States recognizes Ukraine as a pivotal and strategic player in bridging the gap between Eastern Europe and the West. How have U.S.-Ukrainian relations changed since Ukraine became independent?
A: I would say that there has been a radical transformation - first and foremost, by the very fact that prior to independence, Ukraine, for all practical purposes, was a colony isolated from the world. It had no attributes of a state. As a result, there was relatively little knowledgeabout Ukraine, not only among the general public, but even within the U.S. government and among the so-called "foreign policy establishment." Within the U.S. government Ukraine tended to come up mostly through our concerns about human rights issues and Captive Nations annual proclamations. I must note that prior to independence the U.S. Congress was active on behalf of Ukrainian issues - human rights, Helsinki Monitors and other political prisoners, defense of the banned Ukrainian Catholic Church to a rather significant extent - something that I've found many political leaders in Ukraine aren't really aware of.
Following independence, the United States established relations with Ukraine as it would with any other "real" country. Moreover, there has been a significant evolution in understanding Ukraine, especially its geo-strategic significance.
Immediately after independence, there was a tendency to see Ukraine through the prism of the nuclear disarmament issue, or through the prism of Russia, but this changed. Relations improved markedly in the mid-1990's and Ukraine became - and still remains - one of the United State's largest recipients of bilateral assistance and a cooperative and constructive relationship has emerged in the military, security, economic, cultural and other fields.
Now, everybody in government and the foreign policy establishment except perhaps the most obtuse or stubbornly Russo-centric understands that a genuinely independent, stable, democratic Ukraine is absolutely in United States and Western interests. Moreover, I think that the United States and Canada are definitely ahead of the Europeans (with the obvious exception of Poland and several other of Ukraine's neighbors) in understanding Ukraine's importance.
This is not to suggest, however, that there is not room for improvement on the part of the United States in forging a more coherent policy towards Ukraine.
There have been some setbacks in U.S.-Ukrainian relations of late. Problems with respect to democratic development and the rule of law, corruption at very high levels, the ouster of Prime Minister Yuschenko, a non-conducive environment for foreign investment, and even the latest example, Ukraine's stubborn failure to halt CD. piracy, have frustrated even longtime friends of Ukraine in both government and Congress. As a result, Ukraine has faced more criticism from the West than before, although the powers-that-be in Kyiv should understand that this criticism is motivated by a desire to see Ukraine as an independent, democratic, prosperous European country. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice had exactly the right message during her recent visit to Kyiv, in saying that Ukraine's integration into Europe depends on democratic reforms, transparent probes into killings of journalists and fair elections, emphasizing that we'll be watching the Rada elections in 2002.
Despite the frustrations, however, I am confident that the United States will continue to remain engaged with Ukraine, helping her to eventually become a member of the Euro-Atlantic community of nations.
TARAS KUZIO is a research associate at the Center for International and Security Studies at York University. His recent publications include: Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence, Second Edition (London: Macmillan, New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), ISBN: 0312216750 and Ukraine: State and Nation Building (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), ISBN: 0415171954.
Q: Can you comment on your personal expectations, in August of 1991, for the newly emerged democratic Ukraine? Did you believe Ukraine would be capable of standing on its own two feet or would it, as some have forecasted, be lucky to last through the year and how has it lived up to those expectations?
A: I think that all of us, in the diaspora in general and even those in academia and journalism, were optimistic at the start of Ukraine's independence. At the same, time we have to remember that we did not expect Ukraine to become independent as quickly as it did. Most of us thought it would take several years for the Soviet Union to slowly disintegrate. The fact that independence landed in our lap was very surprising to all of us; nevertheless, we had highly romantic expectations of the country. One of the features that comes out in any academic study of Ukraine over the last ten years is the degree to which we, both academics and diaspora, underestimated the legacy of Russian and Soviet rule in Ukraine.
This legacy is far deeper than any of us wanted to believe at the time and we can see this by the fact that events have moved far differently, far slower and in the fact that, pretty much, the people running Ukraine today are not that different from the people who ran Ukraine in the late Soviet era. It's not surprising, therefore, that the mentality of many in the leadership hasn't changed substantially.
I would say that over the last ten years less has been done than could have been done. I think the impression many people will have is that there has been a lot of wasted time. That's from the viewpoint of somebody who wants to see progress, but obviously, for those who have been enriching themselves in the country this has not been wasted time. On the contrary, it's been a process of converting political clout that these people had in the early 1990's as members of the Soviet Ukrainian elite, into economic clout in the second half of the 1990's, and, as the world bank put it - "then capturing the Ukrainian state."
Q: Ukraine has yet to firmly resolve the question of state and nation-building. Can you comment on the mentality that has slowed Ukraine's progress in that respect?
A: One has to look at the people who are in charge of Ukraine. They are part of the former Soviet Ukrainian elite who basically, in the late Brezhnev era, although still officially members of the Communist Party , unofficially laughed at the Communist Party. Hence, it was very easy for them to ditch the CP. They had a very nihilistic, cynical view of life, of the public at large and of events in general. What Ukraine has seen in the last ten years is that this Soviet Ukrainian elite, which now turned into a sort of Oligarchic elite that runs Ukraine, has been unable to formulate any ideology, any vision of what they are building both domestically and in the foreign policy arena.
Q: Because of the fact that they're self absorbed?
A: Yes, they're basically ex-national Communists that have lost an ideology. They lost that ideology in the late Brezhnev era when people were still members of the Communist Party but didn't really believe in the future of Communism. And they went on to transform their political clout into economic clout by creating a myriad of centrist political parties that are very amorphous and have no ideological underpinnings apart from defending a particular group's access to states resources.
So these ex-national communists are de-ideologized in the complete sense of the term, and as much, they cannot adopt and cannot formulate a clear vision of what they are building domestically. They espouse the rhetoric of building a civil society, of democratization, a free market economy, building Ukraine as a political nation-state, but this is nothing more than empty rhetoric. Similarly, when they talk about foreign policy, they talk about returning to Europe, but it means absolutely nothing. The fundamental aspect of all of this is that they have no ideology and their sole purpose is to enrich themselves and to maintain power.
Q: Can we compare any of this to what is currently happening in Belarus under the authority of Aleksander Lukashenka as regards the process of state and nation-building?
A: The situation is somewhat complicated given that the elites in Ukraine will never move in the direction of Belarus. For the Ukrainian elite, Belarus and Lukashenka are unusual. They can't comprehend somebody giving away their statehood and sovereignty to another country. Belarus' actions are basically seen as the giving away of sovereignty to Russia. The Ukrainian elite will never go in that direction because they enjoy the trappings of power, as has been the case throughout the former USSR.
Many states in Central Asia never wanted independence. Belarus was very reluctant as well, but now that these Ukrainian elites are in power they enjoy the power and international status. In the Soviet era, they could never have dreamed of having such power when they were state- and KGB-controlled. Unfortunately, the kind of state-building they're undertaking at present is very corrupt and has basically evolved, not towards a liberal democratic Anglo Saxon or Western type of state, but more toward a Latin American corporatist state, where there's a very close connection to both the political economic arena and the state.
Q: Ukraine has had ten years to show signs of progress - of moving along with policies to promote reform. In which general area do you believe Ukraine has had the least success?
A: I would say that probably the saddest aspect is in the arena of nation-building. The former Soviet Ukrainian elite and the current oligarchic elite don't really have a problem with the blue and yellow flag, the tryzub, or for that matter, Hrushevsky's historiography. On these points they're willing to defer to the national democrats because they don't really have any alternative. An independent state has to have it's own symbols, but then again, it took ten years of course to take the hammer and sickle off of the Ukrainian Parliament.
Q: Can you comment on the development of the Ukrainian language?
A: This is something that is close to the heart of many people in the diaspora. It's rather a complex situation. Basically, the business elite in Ukraine are largely Russian-speaking, but the Kuchma elite understand the importance of language as a factor sustaining independence. (Specifically, in view of the Belorussian paradigm; they have no language and therefor that's led to a loss of independence).
Ukraine has had a half-hearted commitment to language; it's not a commitment that we readily understand. One can see this if you go around Kyiv and look at the book fairs and see what's for sale. One should look at the media in particular, where there's been an explosion of Russian-language publications. It is not an anti-Ukrainian language policy like in Belarus, where the state is forcibly moving out the Belorussian language in favor of Russian. But neither is it a policy that encourages the Ukrainian language. And in that respect they are failing with the issue of language. It all goes back to a lack of any real program and vision for a Ukrainian state on the part of the current ruling elite.
Q: Do you believe that sometime in the future, perhaps within the next five or ten years, specifically referring to some of the new blocs forming such as Yulia Tymoshenko's or Victor Yuschenko's blocs, Ukraine will develop a group of politicians that could ascend to the higher ranks and bring vision to Ukraine and create meaningful change?
A: Well, yes, the situation was never that bleak. The level of corruption, the tax on journalists and human rights, and the language situation are probably the worst examples, but there are other areas that do show progress. Ukraine can really go three ways: It can go the Belorussian way; it can stay what it is, which is not deciding what it wants to do and remain unclear in its domestic and foreign policies; or, it can go the Yuschenko way which is to have a clear cut policy in every area in terms of nationality, foreign policy, politics and economics.
I don't believe that Ukraine's elites will ever go the Belorussian way because for them it would mean basically a return to the Soviet system of dependence on Russia. The one good thing about the last ten years, and this is where Russia has been really good in helping us, is that the Ukrainian elites have a very strong distrust of Russia. And the Russian's are their own worst enemies in this respect. So that scenario is not likely.
The other scenario, the one you mentioned with regard to Yuschenko, would entail the undertaking of domestic policies that would facilitate integration with the West. But there are some key differences between the Yuschenko bloc and the current ruling elites. First of all, it's generational; there's no question that the current ruling elites, i.e. the de-ideologized ex-national communists, have an in-bred cynicism which stems from the Brezhnev era. At their stage in life to ditch communism was fine but in return they wanted to be well-paid for it. Thus, they have an orientation that is basically schizophrenically divided as an economic and cultural orientation to the East (i.e. to Russia - culturally in terms of the Russian language and culture and economically because that's where they can make short-term corrupt deals).
The orientation towards the West is for political and security issues because they need the West, particularly the United States and NATO to support them geopoliticaly. So this kind of schizophrenic division is a reflection of the current people in power. But such people as the Tarasiuks and Yuschenkos who've traveled to the West, who've been trained in the West and who haven't been corrupted by the stagnation of the Brezhnev era are not inbred cynics. The latter have a different orientation, and for this they are seen as such a threat to the Kuchma elites. They are economically oriented to the West, because they don't want short-term, corrupt economic gain; they want transparent economic reform and Western, not Russian, investment. They are culturally oriented to the West. They speak the English language, they look to Western culture and civilization; they want to be seen as part of Europe.
The Kuchma elites can't decide whether they're part of Europe or part of Eurasia. And that's an important thing to grasp because the current elites talk about Ukraine's integration and return to Europe, but it's pure rhetoric meant to keep Russia at bay. But this goes back to my first point that the process of de-Sovietization in Ukraine is far more drawn out than we thought and hence, the shift from the Kuchma to the Yuschenko generation will take longer then we expected.
Q: So we've recognized three possibilities where Ukraine can move: the first being the Belorussian way; the second being the middle or "muddled way;" and the third the Yuschenko way. If Ukraine does continue down the muddled way will the IMF or other Western organizations that loan money or provide assistance to Ukraine continue to do so?
A: The IMF and the World Bank will continue to give money to Ukraine even if Ukraine follows this middle path. Why? Because these organizations are based in Washington, and Ukraine will always be key to America's geopolitical designs in Europe and basically the IMF and World Bank will do what the United States says. The United States, particularly with president George Bush at the helm (an ineffective Reaganite who sees geopolitics as being more important than reform), will allow Ukraine to get away with the muddled way and will continue to receive aid and both sides will continue to espouse rhetoric about Ukraine's rejoining Europe in the great reform process currently underway in Ukraine. And that situation is also true of NATO.
NATO's interests are primarily geopolitical and the key country in NATO is the United States. So for the West, for institutions like the IMF, World Bank and NATO which are linked to American geopolitical interests in Ukraine, Ukraine can muddle along - for them, it's not a matter of serious concern; as long as there is at least some muddling and not a complete return to a Belorussian status.
The situation is different with regard to Western European organizations - i.e. the European Union and the Council of Europe, for whom muddling along is not acceptable. The interests of these organizations are in reform, human rights and the democratic process - not in geopolitics. The whole pyramid of importance is shifted; it's the opposite of the IMF, World Bank, NATO and the United States. The only feasibility where these organizations could see Ukraine integrating further into Europe is to not go the muddled way but to basically go the Yuschenko way.
Q: Does this have anything to do with Ukraine's progress over the last ten years in the field of geopolitics?
A: Ukraine excels at geopolitics and the Ukrainian elites are very good at playing off Russia against the West on geopolitics. One can see that in the Kuchma-gate scandal when Kuchma threatened to go to Russia if the West continued to attack him and, low and behold, the West panicked and the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the NATO Secretary General went there and now Javier Solana is in Kyiv. Ukraine will always excel at this. Unfortunately, Ukraine's geopolitical status is both a positive and negative thing for Ukraine because it allows the elites to get off the hook and allows them to continue along the muddled way.
Q: The House of Representatives recently voted to drop funding by 44 million. Do you see that as a sign of dissatisfaction with Ukraine or its progress?
A: This does not reflect President George Bush's policy in Ukraine; rather, it is a reflection of the frustration within the U.S. Congress. I think "frustration" is a key word here and we're all frustrated because of the evolution of events in Ukraine since the late 1990s that has been marked by a trend toward greater authoritarianism. The fact that it's now nearly a year since Heorhii Gongadze was abducted, killed and still there's been no solution to the situation and, given that Ukraine has a reputation, according to the Journalists Without Borders organization, of having the worst record in Europe on journalists, shows that there hasn't been progress. If anything the general situation has gotten worse.
Thus, the U.S. Congress may decide to cut back aid which was going to the opposition, NGO's and civil society. This wasn't going to Kuchma or anyone person specifically. If anything, if you really want to hurt Kuchma you'd cut back on IMF or World Bank aid, not on American aid. But I think there's a sense of frustration - that they can't really do much more. Nevertheless, it's interesting that the Bush Administration was opposed to the move; the Bush Administration believes that they can still continue to work with Ukraine regardless of this move.
Q: As regards Ukraine's involvement with Western institutions, do you see Ukraine leaning towards NATO? Do you see a spot for Ukraine in NATO?
A: No, only if the Yuschenko group becomes ascendant in Ukraine. The current elites in Ukraine used the NATO card, up until 1999, very effectively to force Russia to accept Ukraine's borders. It's not a coincidence that in May 1997 Boris Yeltsin came to Kyiv to sign a treaty with Ukraine and two months later Ukraine signed a charter with NATO. Nor is it a coincidence that in early 1999 both houses of the Russian Parliament ratified the Ukrainian treaty which basically sealed the question of the Ukrainian-Russian border and then Ukraine suddenly stopped talking about NATO membership. Subsequently, from 1999 Ukraine only talked about aspiring to the EU and no longer to NATO. So prior to 1999 Ukraine talked about integrating into Trans-Atlantic and European structures, i.e., NATO and the EU right? But from 1999 it only talks about joining European (i.e., EU) structures. So the NATO card was used very effectively to get Russia to recognize Ukraine's borders and it continues to be used now as part of this schizophrenic orientation I have talked about.
Q: If you're looking at the three different directions Ukraine can move towards, whether its the Belorussian way, the muddled way, or the Yuschenko way, in your opinion, which avenue do you think Ukraine will take?
A: In the short term I think it will be the muddled way, and in the medium- to long- term it will be the Yuschenko way. Because the muddled way cannot continue indefinitely, once that whole generation moves out, once there's a critical mass in the private sector and civil society that can act upon its interests, then the muddled way will just be unacceptable.
One can see this in the population at large - the fact that Yuschenko is the only politician, and I want to stress this point, who has had such a positive and high rating. What does that tell you about the rest of the politicians? The public at large see Yuschenko as someone who is not corrupt, who is not concerned with his own interests. He is interested in the state and the population at large. Yuschenko is popular not just in western Ukraine, but throughout Ukraine. So from that point of view it's a matter of the Soviet legacy that has left a population that feels very inadequate in forcing through its mandate.
The one thing you notice in opinion polls in Ukraine is that a large percent of the population, as was in the Soviet era, feel they can't exert any influence. And that's very different from the former Communist countries in Central Europe or the Baltic States where there's a far more critical mass in civil society. Now once that changes, then the current elites in power will not be able to muddle along. They were in office, basically, for their own personal interests, not for anyone else's interests. It's not a coincidence, that the "muddled way" prime ministers where in power for x number of years (Lazarenko, Postovoitenko, and Marchuk) when wages and pensions were never paid. Yuschenko comes in and within four months pensions and wages are paid. That would indicate that the money was being stolen, there's no question about that.
Q: As far as the economic question: there's been a significant change and it looks like the economy is growing now - pretty positively - with inflation back down and pensions paid. Is that a continuing sign of a growing economy or did Yuschenko have something to do with that and now that he's gone it's going to come back down again?
A: Well, I think it's a number of things. Some economists, colleagues of mine, say this is a short-term glitch and not a basis of long-term growth. To have long-term growth you need structural reform and you need foreign investment, Western investment not Russian investment (which is basically asset striping) and you need a business elite which is interested in not just short-term economic 'grabization' but in ensuring the building of an economy for future prosperity and growth (i.e. putting off profits today for future profits). Do we have that situation yet? I don't think so.
I think the business elite is still interested in short-term economic gain. One of the reasons for this is that economics is still linked to politics and the state. And so if you put off short-term gain on economic terms then the feeling is that you won't have the funds to influence politics. Ukraine still has this problem of having an image that Western investors don't like to see. And so, I think those problems are still there despite the good economic indicators.
I think the signs are good but the current prime minister, Anatolih Kinakh, is a typical example of the muddled way. I don't think he has any clear idea of what he's doing apart from what he's being told to do by the president, and except of course espousing the right rhetoric. But are the foundations there within the human factor to build a Western style economic system? I doubt it. The Ukrainian economy has collapsed to such a degree that you can't keep on collapsing; eventually you have to start going up. There are positive indicators but I think the jury's still out as to how sustainable this is.
PART I
Copyright © The Ukrainian Weekly, August 19, 2001, No. 33, Vol. LXIX
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