FOCUS ON PHILATELY

by Ingert Kuzych


The last hetman

I have always enjoyed examining (and sometimes translating) original historic documents signed by famous people. Recently I obtained a copy of the postal card illustrated in Figure 1, which motivated me to do some research and compose this article. While perhaps not all that distinguished historically, the card was signed and mailed by an important personage of the 20th century, the last monarch to rule Ukraine - Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky.

The postal card was sent January 23, 1945, from Berlin, where the exiled hetman then resided, to a S. Starow in Freiburg. The message reads:

Berlin. January 23, 1945

Highly Esteemed Sir!

Enjoyed reading your letter. I am very happy for you that you live well but even so I think that the constant anxiety would disturb your scientific work.

Thank you for your delightful intentions for my son. May he work for the Fatherland, for his Family.

(signed) Truly yours respectfully,
Pavlo Skoropadsky

Three months and three days after dispatching this card the hetman would be dead, killed in a bombing raid. What was the hetman doing in Germany at the close of World War II? Why did he have to leave his homeland? And what did the reference to his son mean? The answers to these questions are best revealed in examining Pavlo Skoropadsky's rather eventful, yet controversial, life.

Background

The man who would be hetman has been vilified as a traitor, a treasonous German puppet who usurped the legitimate Ukrainian government in the spring of 1918 only to be willing to hand the fledgling state over to the Russians by the close of the year. On the other hand, he has been apotheosized as a Ukrainian savior, one of Ukraine's greatest statesman and patriots, whose rule did more to set the country on its course to statehood in his seven and a half months than the governments that preceded or succeeded him.

So, which viewpoint is correct? As usual when passions are polarized about controversial figures, the truth lies somewhere in between.

Pavlo Skoropadsky was born May 15, 1873, in Wiesbaden, Germany, into a distinguished Ukrainian family. One of his ancestors, Ivan Skoropadsky, was hetman from 1708 to 1722. Pavlo grew up on his father's estate, Trostianets, in the Poltava region. After completing the Starodub Gymnasium, he graduated from the elite Page Corps cadet school in St. Petersburg. In 1897, he married Oleksandra Durnovo; they would have six children, three sons and three daughters.

Young Skoropadsky chose to be a cavalry officer and soon began an impressive rise in rank and commanded a company of the Chita Cossack Regiment in the Russo-Japanese War. By 1905 he was aide-de-camp to Tsar Nicholas II; in 1906 he was appointed a colonel and in 1910 received command of the 20th Finnish Dragoon Regiment. The following year he was named major general and commander of a cavalry regiment in the tsar's House Guard.

During World War I Skoropadsky commanded several cavlary units, always distinguishing himself. He was decorated with the Order of St. George and promoted to the rank of lieutenant general, commanding the 34th Army Corps. Following the overthrow of the tsar in the February Revolution of 1917, Skoropadsky undertook the Ukrainianization of the 34th Corps. Russian and other nationality troops and officers were replaced with counterparts of Ukrainian background, and the unit was renamed the 1st Ukrainian Corps. In October of 1917 he was named honorary otaman of the Free Cossacks, the Ukrainian volunteer militia that sprang up to maintain civil order in the confusion sown by the Bolsheviks (Figure 2).

Shortly thereafter (October-November), the disciplined 60,000 men of the First Corps and the Free Cossacks seized all of the railway lines leading to Kyiv. They thereby halted the pro-Bolshevik military units advancing into the heart of Ukraine from the southwestern and Romanian fronts. These forces were disarmed, demobilized and sent on their way into Russia. Not only Kyiv, but all of Dnipro Ukraine was thus saved from plundering.

Prelude to power

By the end of 1917 war-weary Bolshevik Russia began peace negotiations with the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria) in Brest (present-day Belarus). The Central Rada, which governed Ukraine after the abdication of the tsar, also sent representatives to these meetings. The Central Powers, however, refused to negotiate with delegates of a non-independent Ukrainian government, which at that time was still contemplating federation with Russia.

This attitude compelled the Rada to finally proclaim an independent Ukrainian National Republic (UNR) on January 22, 1918. A few weeks later, on February 9, the Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed between Ukraine and the Central Powers. The terms called for German and Austrian assistance in clearing Ukraine of Bolshevik forces. In return, Ukraine would provide foodstuffs to its new allies.

The Central Powers kept their part of the bargain and within weeks began to move on the Red Army. By the end of April, Ukrainian territories had been cleared of the Communist menace. Unfortunately, the Ukrainian government had difficulty meeting its requirement of grain deliveries. Frustrated, the German military decided to take matters into its own hands and replace the incompetent leadership in Kyiv with someone it felt could more effectively deal with the situation. The person singled out was Ukraine's highest-ranking military leader - Pavlo Skoropadsky.

On April 29, 1918, at the Congress of Landowners in Kyiv, many of the roughly 6,500 delegates from all over Ukraine voiced their dissatisfaction with the policies of the Central Rada. They heartily greeted Skoropadsky and conferred upon him the ancient title of hetman. The Rada, which had governed Ukraine for 14 months, was disbanded.

Difficult partnerships

In theory, the new hetman was supposed to be heading a provisional government, which would be replaced by an elected Ukrainian parliament. In practice, the opportunity for elections never really occurred and Skoropadsky ruled by fiat. His period in power has come to be known as the Hetmanate.

The position in which the hetman found himself was extraordinarily difficult and complicated (Figure 3). The presence of 400,000 German and Austrian troops on Ukrainian soil was necessary to protect the fledgling country's frontiers. Yet, this foreign military structure functioned almost as a parallel government to his own. The persistent interference of the German military into Ukrainian internal affairs undermined Skoropadsky's authority and intensified anti-German sentiment. (Punitive German expeditions requisitioning grain often resulted in bloodshed.)

Additionally, the hetman had difficulty forming an effective government. Many potentially capable Ukrainians refused to work for the new government, forcing the hetman to rely on holdover tsarist-era bureaucrats, who were in most instances unsympathetic toward the new state. Nevertheless, although his new Cabinet did not contain many nationalists, it did include a number of skilled administrators.

At the same time, Skoropadsky failed to endear himself to the Ukrainian populace. His government was closely associated with the (mostly Russian) propertied classes, which sought to undo the land allocations previously won by the peasants. Large segments of the rural population were thus alienated. Protests soon turned to violence and armed resistance.

During the period of the Hetmanate, Ukraine was an island of stability compared to anarchic Russia; it became a refuge for great numbers of the former tsarist elite. The bureaucracy of Ukraine became inundated with Russians who sought only to restore an "indivisible Russia" and who cared nothing for Ukrainian sovereignty.

Nation-building

Despite the fact that his regime was so heavily dependent on outside support for its existence, the period of Skoropadsky's rule is noteworthy for its very positive impact on Ukrainian national development. The Hetmanate has been quite accurately described as "authoritarian in form, [yet] Ukrainian in content."

In the diplomatic area, Ukraine was recognized as a new state by a number of countries. In addition to the Central Powers, consular relations were set up with Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Romania, Kuban, Soviet Russia and the Don Republic.

In internal affairs, the transportation system - ruined by the Bolshevik invasion - was restored and this helped bring about an economic revival. In fiscal matters, a new Ukrainian currency, the hryvnia, was introduced (August 1918) and it inspired a reasonable amount of confidence. To raise funds for the treasury, revenue stamps were introduced in June 1918 for use on documents and theater tickets. The following month Ukraine's first postage stamps were released. In August all remaining Russian stamps in Ukraine were ordered overprinted with the national trident emblem. This action provided for stamps of more denominations, helped minimize Russian influence, and generated funds for the treasury, since after October 1 all old Russian stamps became invalid without the overprint. (Because unique tridents were overprinted in most of the major cities and towns of Ukraine, dozens of different types were produced resulting in a specialized collecting area that remains very popular to the present day.)

The greatest legacy of the Hetmanate was in the cultural and educational spheres. The Ukrainianization of schools and gymnasia begun in 1917 by the Rada was dramatically expanded by the hetman's government, as were Ukrainian courses for teachers and the publishing of Ukrainian textbooks. In October new universities were opened in Kyiv and Kamianets-Podilskyi, and a college of history and philology was opened in Poltava. Each of these institutions now had departments in Ukrainian subjects. Existing universities in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa and Katerynoslav (present-day Dnipropetrovsk) received chairs in Ukrainian history, law, language, and literature.

In the summer and fall of 1918, Kyiv became the seat of a Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, a National Gallery, a National Museum, an Academy of Fine Arts, a National Chorus and Symphony, a Ukrainian State Theater, a National Library and a State Dramatic School. Therefore, the Hetmanate can, be credited, with laying the intellectual infrastructure for the new Ukrainian state.

The fall of the Hetmanate

By autumn of 1918 it was becoming evident that the Central Powers would lose the war and that the Hetmanate would lose its military prop. Belatedly, negotiations were undertaken with various opposition groups, and in October a new, more representative Cabinet was formed. Plans were even formulated to introduce land reforms and to convene a Parliament.

Within a few weeks, however, relations between the government and the main opposition Ukrainian National Union (UNU) had deteriorated to such an extent that the latter had decided to organize an uprising against the hetman. Simultaneously, Ukrainian Bolsheviks continued to agitate the already discontented peasant population.

With the situation rapidly deteriorating, Skoropadsky deemed it essential to come to some understanding with the Allied Powers (France, the United Kingdom, Italy and the United States). The leaders of the Allies, however, did not favor the fragmentation of the Russian Empire and did not look with favor at Ukrainian independence. Rather, they supported a union of all anti-Bolshevik forces under the "White" Russians in a common struggle against the "Red" Communists.

Faced with all of these competing pressures, the hetman made a fateful decision and carried out an audacious declaration on November 14. In an attempt to curry favor with the Allies and obtain aid from the "White" Russian forces, he proclaimed a federative union with a future non-Bolshevik Russia.

This single act has remained a key source of disagreement to the present day. Many "republicans" consider Skoropadsky's action treasonous, a complete abandonment of the principle of Ukrainian statehood. His "hetmanite" supporters, however, see the declaration as a tactful move to save the Ukrainian state by making it the nucleus of an anti-Bolshevik coalition. Regardless of the motives or reasoning, the gamble failed and the hetman's fall was sealed.

On November 14-15, 1918, the UNU, now led by its own government called the Directory (under the leadership of Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Symon Petliura) began its uprising against the hetman. Within a week, the Directory's forces reached Kyiv, but were unable to take the city defended by units loyal to the hetman and by German troops. A standoff followed that was to last three weeks.

Just prior to the hetman's ill-fated decision, Germany signed an armistice with the Allies ending World War I (November 11). German troops, eager to finally go home, entered negotiations with the Directory and were allowed safe passage to leave in return for neutrality. On December 14, as these troops left the city, the Hetman abdicated his office and fled to Germany by way of Switzerland. His government then surrendered power to the Directory.

Skoropadsky's note of abdication follows:

I, Hetman of All Ukraine, over the course of seven and one half months, have put forth all of my effort to extricate this country from the difficult position in which it finds itself. God has not granted me the strength to bring about this task, and today, owing to the conditions that have now developed and guided exclusively for the well being of Ukraine, I relinquish my authority.

December 14, 1918, City of Kyiv
Pavlo Skoropadsky

Left behind in the treasury, untouched, were 3.3 billion karbovantsi in precious metals for the successor government.

Exile

For most of the interwar years, Skoropadsky lived in Wannsee, near Berlin, and indeed such an address appears on the postal card in Figure 1. During his time in exile, he headed the hetmanite movement, consisting of various monarchist émigré organizations. In 1926 he founded the Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Berlin which, until its liquidation by Soviet occupational forces in 1945, carried out many valuable programs (lectures, courses, publications and exhibitions) publicizing Ukraine and its struggle for freedom. During these years Skoropadsky never relinquished his claim to Ukraine.

In 1938 Danylo Skoropadsky, the hetman's son, was designated heir apparent. That same year the scion moved to England to continue to work for the hetmanite movement in the country most amenable to a monarchic system of government.

During the second world war, Pavlo Skoropadsky lobbied the Nazi government for the release of Ukrainian nationalist leaders imprisoned in concentration camps. Seeking to find a safe haven during the close of the conflict, he fled to Bavaria, but was wounded during an Allied air raid on the Plattling railway station (April 16, 1945). He passed away 10 days later and was buried in Wiesbaden, the city where he was born (Figure 4).

Epilogue

A concise and balanced assessment of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky's reign is provided in a paragraph by Oleh Gerus in "A Survey of Ukrainian History." It serves as a fitting closing statement:

"Pavlo Skoropadsky was a good-intentioned but a weak-willed and irresolute man who could not divorce himself completely from his Russian training and environment. It was in exile that he became a genuine Ukrainian patriot, actively promoting the idea of Ukrainian independent statehood. While in power with the help of the German military, Skoropadsky was held responsible for the oppression of the peasantry and for the revival of Russian influence, even though much of what happened - forcible grain requisitions and German punitive expeditions - were beyond his control. Ukraine had become a German satellite as the result of the Brest-Litovsk agreements. The Central Rada voluntarily, though reluctantly, accepted German-Austrian protection with the inevitable impositions of definite restrictions on its sovereignty. Skoropadsky inherited this dependency but, nonetheless, strove to enhance the prerogatives of his office and the Ukrainian state. The hetman succeeded in elevating the formal sovereignty of Ukraine, though not its real independence."


Ingert Kuzych may be contacted at P.O. Box 3, Springfield, VA 22150 or at his e-mail address: [email protected].


Copyright © The Ukrainian Weekly, October 7, 2001, No. 40, Vol. LXIX


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