ANALYSIS: Caucasus conflicts are eclipsed by world focus on Afghanistan (11/04/01)

ANALYSIS

Caucasus conflicts are eclipsed by world focus on Afghanistan

by Richard Giragosian
RFE/RL Newline

Overshadowed by ongoing U.S.-led military anti-terrorist strikes against Afghanistan and the intense diplomatic consultations on cooperation between world powers to counter global terrorism, rising tensions in the South Caucasus threaten to create yet another front of instability where a new outbreak of hostilities would have significant implications extending beyond the regional borders.

A new war in the Caucasus would not only threaten to destabilize the broader Caspian Basin, but could present a challenge to the emerging U.S.-Russian strategic partnership.

Demonstrating the linkage of the conflicts in the Caucasus, the recent clashes in the breakaway Georgian region of Abkhazia reportedly involve a force of several hundred made up of ethnic Georgians allied with Chechen rebels. Although geographically limited to the Kodori gorge of Abkhazia, the fighting has already claimed the lives of more than 50 ethnic Greek, Armenian and Abkhaz villagers, as well as five United Nations observers.

Although serious questions over the Russian and/or Georgian roles in this crisis remain unanswered, it seems evident that the situation may very well lead to a clash of interests among the various regional powers. One possible analysis points to an attempt by the Georgian leadership to utilize Chechen fighters and guerrillas recruited from the ranks of Georgian displaced persons from Abkhazia as part of a broad campaign to retake control over much of the breakaway region. However, such a scenario is a dangerous gambit for Georgia, as it already seems evident that the conflict has spiraled beyond the ability of the Georgian military to effectively contain the situation.

The key question that remains is how these fighters were able to travel undetected for nearly 500 kilometers from their base in the Pankisi gorge, infiltrating Georgian territory prior to launching raids on Abkhaz villages. The Georgian government has long been criticized by Russia for being unwilling or unable to halt Chechen operations from its territory, and this new outbreak may offer Russian hard-liners a fresh justification for intervening. In perhaps the most serious confrontation between Moscow and Tbilisi in several years, this Abkhaz crisis poses a serious test of the firmness of the newly revised Russian foreign policy and may test the very survival of the Georgian government.

Although as of October 18 the fighting appeared to have abated, a Georgian military contingent remains in the upper reaches of the Kodori gorge and the Abkhaz anticipate that the force may launch a new attack. Meanwhile, further complicating the situation, Abkhaz leaders have added a new dimension to the conflict by calling for an association agreement with the Russian Federation.

Responding to the Abkhaz crisis, on October 12 Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a backing-off policy, pledging non-interference in Georgia's "internal affairs" and offering to withdraw the 2,000 Russian troops deployed along the border between Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia as part of the Commonwealth of Independent States' (CIS) peacekeeping mandate.

Although seemingly a reflection of the overall new Westward orientation of Russian foreign policy, it seems more likely to be central to a strategy exploiting the increasing vulnerability of the Georgian state. That interpretation is reinforced by the recent deployment of Russian troops along the Russian border with Georgia, a move cloaked in the veil of a defensive response, yet undoubtedly seen by Tbilisi as an exercise in intimidation.

Meanwhile, the chances of a political settlement of the Karabakh conflict appear to be receding, while a resumption of hostilities appears increasingly possible. Driven by a series of aggressive statements by Azerbaijani officials and politicians threatening to retake Nagorno-Karabakh by force, tension has escalated in recent weeks as Armenia and Azerbaijan traded diplomatic barbs, with each branding the other as a terrorist state.

Azerbaijan has sought to utilize the shifting geopolitical landscape by arguing that it has a right to embark on an "anti-terror" campaign of its own directed at retaking control of Nagorno-Karabakh. For its part, Armenia has branded Azerbaijan as a haven for operatives for Osama bin Laden, exaggerating the putative Azerbaijani connection to international terrorism. Such diplomacy, to the detriment of these states, has only tended to contribute to a "culture of conflict."

Possibly the most disturbing factor in the developments of the last few weeks is that the geopolitical status quo in the South Caucasus is so tenuous that it can be destabilized by a mere handful of freebooters in the case of Georgia, and incautious militant rhetoric in Azerbaijan.

That dangerous momentum toward conflict demonstrates the need for the new U.S.-Russian cooperative relationship to initiate a coordinated response to stabilize the Caucasus, at least by trying to kick-start the stalled mediation efforts of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). As two of the three co-chairs of the OSCE's Miensk Group mediating the Karabakh conflict, Moscow and Washington should recognize the inter-relationship and interdependence of instability on both sides of the Caspian Sea. Similarly, as members of the "Friends of Georgia" group, the United States and Russia could, and should, induce the United Nations Security Council to place Abkhazia higher on its list of priorities.

Richard Giragosian is a Washington-based regional analyst and publisher of the monthly newsletter TransCaucasus: A Chronology.

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