NEWS AND VIEWS: "Ruling class" of today's Ukraine has deep roots in Communist past (06/30/02)

NEWS AND VIEWS

"Ruling class" of today's Ukraine has deep roots in Communist past

by Ihor Lysyj

The Western press usually refers to Ukraine as "an impoverished former Soviet republic." Such a characterization is not entirely accurate. In fact, Ukraine as a country is quite rich. Its currency is stable, and its economy is expanding at a healthy rate. As a matter of fact, its rate of economic expansion has been the best in Europe in recent times. It does not need foreign loans to fuel economic expansion, and Ukrainian ruling classes live quite well.

Whether one considers Ukraine rich or poor depends largely on that person's perspective and environment. While visiting Kyiv a friend writes: "It is a vibrant and beautiful city, alive with activity, festivity, fine restaurants and cheap shopping. It is the Paris of Eastern Europe." A different impression is projected when one visits the slums of Dnipropetrovsk with the rusting mega-factories and grinding poverty, where people make a living by stealing and then selling metal from live electrical wires. The problem is that the distribution of wealth in Ukraine is rather uneven. As a result, post-Soviet Ukrainian society can be broadly divided into two groups, those who have everything and those who have nothing. Or paraphrasing Ernest Hemingway, it can be divided into the "have's" and "have-not's."

Those who "have" are largely members of the Communist nomenklatura of the former Soviet Union. During 11 years of post-Soviet trauma this group of opportunists managed to consolidate into their hands all the wealth of the country, leaving the rest in desperate poverty. During so-called "privatization," red directors of industrial and agricultural enterprises simply appropriated the state (i.e., the people's) property that was under their control during Soviet times. They considered such state property their rightful and just inheritance from the wreckage of the Soviet Union. This often corrupt assortment of red directors is called, somewhat ironically, "the Ukrainian elites," or simply "the new Ukrainians."

The ruling class in Ukraine (Ukrainians refer to them simply as "vlasti," or the authorities) has deep roots in the Communist past. It is interesting to note that such political leaders as President Leonid Kuchma, former President Leonid Kravchuk, and former chairman of the Parliament Ivan Pliusch remained on the roster of the Communist Party (registered in 1991) until they were officially expelled from it at a party congress in Kyiv on April 26.

The "have not" class is the disenfranchised majority of the Ukrainian population. They were prevented from sharing in the wealth of the country during the "privatization" era by the ever-present and powerful red directors. The "have-not's" also had little say in the political arena dominated by the same red directors. The results of election contests in Ukraine were usually settled by the former communists (current "vlasti") and the current Communists (the Communist Party). The national-democratic parties were so fragmented and incompetent that they had virtually no effect on the outcome of elections. So the majority of the electorate voted for the lesser evil.

The situation changed somewhat in the parliamentary elections on March 31 of this year. The electorate was presented this time with three real choices: the former Communists (current "vlasti"); the current Communists; and the bloc of national-democrats and opposition parties, who were better organized than they usually are. Given the choice, the electorate voted overwhelmingly in favor of national-democrats, consolidated in the Our Ukraine bloc under the leadership of former Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko. The oligarchs, with support from Communists, removed Mr. Yushchenko from office in 2001. His transgression in the eyes of the "vlasti" was the stabilization of the economy and the reversal of 10 years of economic downslide in Ukraine. He also addressed, with some success, the needs of the poor and the desperate population of the country. These constructive actions cost him the post of prime minister. Supported by the "have-not's" his political bloc gained an impressive victory in the parliamentary elections on March 31 with 24 percent of the popular vote. The New York Times described his political comeback as "The Triumph of a Reluctant Critic."

Mr. Yushchenko is characterized in the Western press as an opposition leader. Actually, he is nothing of the sort. He is a reformer. And there is a distinct difference between opposition and reform. His vision for Ukraine is presented in what amounts to a manifesto, officially called "The Agreement for Joint Action in the Ukrainian Parliament." The document, which is addressed to all political parties in the Parliament, proposes a broad spectrum of changes in the social and political fabric of the nation. In its entirety the document represents no less than an attempt to fundamentally change the form of governance in Ukraine. The proposed changes are to be accomplished by acts of Parliament and fundamental changes in the Constitution of the country. The result will be change from an autocratic to a democratic form of governance. Keeping in mind that Ukrainian society has known nothing but authoritarian rule throughout its history, implementation of such a bold change is not a small undertaking.

To understand the significance of "The Agreement for Joint Action" one must examine briefly the nature of the present form of governance in Ukraine. Currently, essentially all levers of political and economic power in Ukraine reside in the hands of one person, the president of the country. Here are the specifics.

The police and security apparatus of the country reports directly to the president. This apparatus includes the Ministry of Internal Affairs (formerly the NKVD/MVD), the Security Service of Ukraine (formerly the KGB) and the office of the Procurator-General. These agencies perform essentially the same function that they performed in Soviet Ukraine. And their methods of doing business have not changed very much. One only has to be reminded of the treatment of Yulia Tymoshenko and her family.

The revenue generating agencies, including tax and customs bureaucracies, also report directly to the president. The president appoints the prime minister and all the members of the Cabinet. All the heads of regional administration, the governors of provinces (oblast) and administrators of counties (rayon), are also appointed and controlled by the president. The reshuffling of regional administrators has been going non-stop since pro-presidential forces lost the March 31 parliamentary elections. In the past few days the president replaced 15 administrators of counties in eight provinces in order to consolidate his control over the provinces.

The president also effectively controls the Parliament by application of "administrative resources" to individual deputies of the Parliament as the need arises. The term "administrative resources" is a euphemism for the strong arm of the police and the procuratorial apparatus as well as the tax collection agency. Using such "administrative resources" the president had no difficulty in electing his man as the chairman of the Parliament, although the pro-presidential bloc won only 12 percent of the popular vote in the parliamentary election, and that was mainly by cheating.

The president also controls the media through a state agency that assigns airwave frequencies to the broadcasters. This agency is very quick on the trigger to revoke broadcasting licenses from any outlet that expresses any degree of criticism of the ruling regime. Broadcasters with an objective point of view, such as BBC, Radio Free Europe and Deutsche Welle have great difficulty operating on Ukrainian airwaves. Ukrainian stations that rebroadcast Western media have had their licenses routinely revoked.

The overall picture of the political landscape in Ukraine is that the president exercises direct and full control over all aspects of the political and economic life of the country. Analyzing the political situation in Ukraine, opposition leader Ms. Tymoshenko commented recently that the chairman of the Parliament, the prime minister and the president of the country are one and the same person - Leonid Kuchma. As this comment indicates, the method of governance in post-Soviet Ukraine is not much different from the method of governance in the former Soviet Ukraine.

Mr. Yushchenko in his "agreement" proposes to disassemble this authoritarian structure brick by brick and rebuild the political structure of the country using blueprints of Western democracies. Specifically, he proposes the following reforms. The Cabinet of Ministers is to be appointed by the majority of the Parliament, rather than by the president. This includes also the post of prime minister. The tax collection and customs services are to become functions of the Cabinet of Ministers, rather than the organs of the presidential administration. The Parliament is to assume control of police and procuratorial functions by the power of appointing and dismissing the procurator-general and the heads of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Security Service of Ukraine. All regional authorities, including governors of provinces and administrators of counties, are to be elected by popular vote rather than appointed by the president.

And finally, the election of parliamentary deputies is to follow a proportional system based on party lists. Currently, such elections are carried out on the basis of a mixed system of party lists and single-mandate districts. The single-mandate district election method works in the favor of "vlasti" that control regional "administrative resources."

In proclaiming his "agreement" Mr. Yushchenko acted more like a statesman than a politician. If implemented, his proposals will severely diminish the authoritarian power of the president, a position that Mr. Yushchenko may occupy two years hence.

Mr. Yushchenko's proposals have strong support in the Parliament across all shades of the political spectrum. The Communists, not to be outdone by the national-democrats, have proposed their own government reform plan that on all major issues mirrors the Yushchenko plan point by point. There is also a general realization in the country that authoritarian rule has outlived its usefulness. It no longer serves the interests of oligarchs, and it never served the interests of the general population.

To achieve his objectives Mr. Yushchenko has chosen the path of compromise and reconciliation. The president, on the other hand, has chosen the path of political confrontation by appointing the abrasive and high-handed leader of the SDPU as the head of his administration. It is that old and familiar Soviet game - "administrative resources" against the people.

The newly appointed head of the presidential administration is the archenemy of Mr. Yushchenko and was instrumental in his removal from the office of prime minister. And that leaves very little room for the compromise and reconciliation that Ukraine so badly needs. Can Mr. Yushchenko win? It is a tall but doable order. And if he losses, we might be faced with a worst-case scenario for Ukraine as predicted by the Economist of London. This prediction sees Russia marching into a bright future hand in hand with the West, while Ukraine and Belarus continue to stagnate in the post-Communist swamp of corruption, thanks to their less than illustrious presidents.

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