ANALYSIS: Back to the USSR? Ukraine holds Soviet-style 'discussion' of political reform (05/04/03)

ANALYSIS

Back to the USSR? Ukraine holds Soviet-style 'discussion' of political reform

by Taras Kuzio

In several CIS states - especially Russia, Belarus, and Moldova - there is increasing evidence of nostalgia for the former USSR and a resurgence of Soviet-style attitudes and political culture. One aspect of this trend is the use of elections not as vehicles for free democratic competition, but to legitimize ruling elites and their "parties of power."

Opposition parties and civil society are increasingly seen in a negative and distrustful light as "extremists" or "destructive forces." Legislation is selectively applied, especially against the opposition, while deception is deeply ingrained. Soviet political culture is especially evident in the discrepancy - as seen previously in the USSR - between official rhetoric and policies in the pursuit of reform, the struggle against corruption and the achievement of foreign-policy goals. Most importantly, the executive branch and the "party of power" seek to exercise monopoly control over the Parliament, civil society, the media and the economy.

Why is this occurring now, more than a decade after the USSR collapsed? In some cases, this is in response to political crises and the growth of opposition activity (e.g., Ukraine and, to a lesser extent, Kazakstan). More broadly, the ruling elites feel stronger domestically after having converted their Soviet-era political power into economic wealth and then back into political control. In addition, in Russia they have a strong external ally with whom they can exchange domestic assets in return for political support (e.g., Belarus, Ukraine and Armenia).

When presidential proposals have been blocked or ruling elites wish to prove their "democratic" credentials, referendums are held to demonstrate the "popular will" in which the proposals in question are endorsed by wide margins. Belarus (1996), Ukraine (2000), Uzbekistan (2002) and Kyrgyzstan (2003) all resorted to this tactic.

According to audiotape recordings in the possession of former presidential security guard Mykola Melnychenko, the Soviet-style overwhelming endorsements of Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma's four questions in the 2000 referendum were the result of outright falsification. Mr. Kuchma has denied the authenticity of the Melnychenko tapes.

On March 6, President Kuchma introduced to the Verkhovna Rada the political reforms he first proposed in August 2002. A two month "national discussion" was duly launched, with Mr. Kuchma threatening to hold a referendum if his proposals are not implemented by Parliament. Referendums "with legally binding results," President Kuchma claimed in his April 15 state-of-the-nation address to Parliament, "are the highest form of people power."

Threats by the Ukrainian executive to hold referendums are nothing new. In 1996 they helped unblock five years of discussions surrounding a post-Soviet constitution, although not in Mr. Kuchma's favor. In 2000 a referendum was actually held. Our Ukraine National Deputy Mykola Tomenko has predicted that a referendum could be held either in the summer or by December at the latest.

Why is President Kuchma again threatening a referendum?

Two analysts from the Razumkov Center for Economic and Political Studies pointed out in the April 5-11 edition of Zerkalo Nedeli/Dzerkalo Tyzhnia that the ultimate aim of the executive is to control Parliament, toward which Mr. Kuchma - in the manner of most CIS leaders - has always been intolerant and impatient.

Interviewed in Moloda Ukraina on April 2, two-time former Parliament Chairman Ivan Pliusch explained that the executive branch views Parliament as a rubber-stamp body that should be told what to do and what to sign - just like the former Supreme Soviets of the constituent Soviet republics.

Mr. Kuchma's reforms would reduce the size of the lower house of Parliament from 450 to 300 deputies, elected proportionately, and create an appointed upper house, the Council of the Regions. Presidential power therefore, would be enhanced at the expense of the Parliament.

Writing in the April 12-18 Zerkalo Nedeli/Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, Socialist leader Oleksandr Moroz said an upper house would mean the "liquidation of [the parliamentary system] as such, the final subordination of the Verkhovna Rada to the president and his administration."

In a speech to parliament during discussions of the reforms, Our Ukraine leader Viktor Yushchenko also defined the real purpose of the executive in proposing the changes as extending "power unlawfully" and ensuring its "self-preservation."

Although President Kuchma called for roundtables and the involvement of think-tanks in the discussion of his proposed reforms, this has not occurred. The opposition's call for televised debates also has gone unanswered, and state-run Channel 1 and oligarch-controlled channels 2 and 3 are not permitting a free debate. As in the Soviet era, there is merely an imitation of "free discussion," the purpose of which is merely to rubber-stamp official policies.

In a September 2002 secret instruction (temnyk) that was leaked to Mr. Tomenko, head of the parliamentary committee on Freedom of the Press and Information, and reprinted in a new Helsinki Watch report on censorship in Ukraine (http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/ukraine0303), the presidential administration recommended to television stations that they ignore opposition discussions of executive plans for political reform. The temnyk requested that television "exclude from broadcasts any theses that cast doubt on the seriousness of the president's initiatives."

The organization of the "nationwide discussion" harks back to the era of former Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. The Odesa branch of Our Ukraine described the fake discussion as a "repeat of the depressing experience of the Soviet era." In Mr. Pliusch's Chernihiv electoral district, he was told that official protocols endorsing the president's reform proposals were handed out to organizations that were then ordered to sign them.

The presidential website (http://www.reforma.org.ua/regions) features numerous Soviet-style endorsements of his proposals by "workers" and "peasants' collectives" from throughout Ukraine, who are supported by state institutions and pro-presidential parties. Suspiciously, the proposal most supported is the one to hold all elections in the same year, thereby postponing the 2004 presidential elections and holding them concurrently with the 2006 parliamentary elections, which would give President Kuchma two additional years in office.

But some observers, even pro-presidential ones, have cautioned that the referendum could backfire, as the situation in Ukraine today is radically different from that in 1996 or 2000. They point out that authoritarian regimes are most vulnerable during periods of transition, citing the examples of former Chilean President Augusto Pinochet, who held a referendum in 1998 to extend his term in office, and of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, who called an early election in 2000 hoping to win the Yugoslav presidency. Both lost power.

Dr. Taras Kuzio is a resident fellow at the Center for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Toronto.

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