NEWS ANALYSIS: The "Putin Doctrine" is amended


by Roman Kupchinsky
RFE/RL Newsline

At an October 9 press conference in Yekaterinburg, Russia, that included Russian President Vladimir Putin and visiting German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov declared that Russia reserves the right to intervene militarily within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in order to settle disputes that cannot be solved through negotiation. At the same press conference, President Putin declared that the pipelines carrying oil and natural gas to the West were built by the Soviet Union and it is Russia's prerogative to maintain them in order to protect its national interests, "even those parts of the system that are beyond Russia's borders."

These seemingly new additions to the "National Security Concept" adopted in January 2000 (shortly after Boris Yeltsin handed over his presidential powers to Mr. Putin) and subsequently known as the "Putin Doctrine," codified what some observers might consider Russian claims to hegemony in the CIS and an unveiled threat to Georgia. The international media did not comment on Chancellor Schroeder's seemingly silent acquiescence to the declarations by Messrs. Ivanov and Putin.

It seems clear that Messrs. Putin and Ivanov both know full well that Russia - with an economy the size of that of the Netherlands - is not strong enough at the moment to dictate its will beyond the newly drawn borders of its former empire. But time is on their side. In a decade or two, with petro-dollars flowing into the Russian economy, this will change; but presumably the Putin Doctrine will remain in force and Russian aspirations will continue to grow.

Mr. Ivanov also announced that U.S. bases in Central Asia, presently being used in the war on terrorism in Afghanistan, will have to be dismantled once that war is over. His statement provided few clues as to who might determine when that war is over: Russia or the United States. Furthermore, it was unclear whether Messrs. Ivanov and Putin had the consent of the presidents of the sovereign states in which those bases are situated to make such a statement, or whether they even bothered to ask. Nevertheless, they placed Washington on notice.

Thirty-five years earlier, in November 1968, a similar "doctrine" was proclaimed by Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. Czechoslovak reformers under the leadership of Alexander Dubcek had been attempting to implement "socialism with a human face" via reforms that came to be known as the "Prague Spring." Brezhnev declared that the USSR has the right to intervene in the internal affairs of members of the Warsaw Pact if their social system is threatened. This, of course, meant preserving the totalitarian nature of "advanced socialism" and was cited as justification for the armed invasion of Czechoslovakia that took place in August of that year.

Some observers see the revised Putin Doctrine as pandering - in the run-up to December's State Duma elections and the presidential elections due in March 2004 - to the imperial nostalgia of a segment of the Russian population that continues to mourn the loss of empire. But all indications are that President Putin's re-election is already virtually assured and there is, therefore, no need to promulgate such a dangerous "doctrine" merely to win votes.

This amended doctrine seems to be the logical extension of a series of recent moves by some in the Kremlin to reassert control over what they consider to be Russia's sphere of influence over a vitally important region.

An agreement signed in September on the creation of the Single Economic Space (SES) in which Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan relinquish some of their sovereign rights to a supranational body in which Russia has the largest bloc of votes, was one such move. Mr. Putin's declaration to the European Union that Russia will not give up state control over its oil and gas pipelines was another. This was a further indication that Russia intends to challenge the United States (and China) in the oil-rich Caspian region and in Central Asia, with its enormous natural gas reserves.

Mr. Ivanov adopted an even more ominous tone on October 2, when he reiterated and expanded upon the original Putin Doctrine. Mr. Ivanov said the role of nuclear weapons remains a key tenet in Russia's defense strategy, and that Moscow does not exclude the possibility of pre-emptive strikes - if need be - to defend Russia's interests or those of its allies. In the National Security Concept adopted in January 2000, there was no such emphasis on "allies."

Russian officials argue that the newly revised Putin Doctrine will bring greater stability to the region; and stability is the name of the game concerning energy supplies to Western Europe, which currently depends on Russia for 28 percent of its gas supplies, and potentially to the United States.

This consideration no doubt figured in the timing of the announcement - during Chancellor Schroeder's visit to Russia. Germany, which is dependent on Russia for 12 percent of its natural gas and 18 percent of its oil, is vitally interested that the pipelines and stability be maintained.

The stability argument implies that Russia is positioning itself to be the guarantor of regional stability throughout the CIS. But the policies outlined by President Putin and his defense minister - which might or might not represent a general consensus among policymakers in the Kremlin - are likely to increase suspicion of every Russian move by its neighbors. Suspicion often leads to misunderstandings, or worse. The ongoing standoff concerning the construction of a Russian dam near the Ukrainian border in the Sea of Azov is a case in point.

If the Putin Doctrine intends to reverse history, not for the sake of ideological purity but as an assertion of its newly discovered power, the West and China might find themselves re-examining their relationship with Russia - sooner or later.


Roman Kupchinsky is the author of RFE/RL Organized Crime and Terrorism Watch.


Copyright © The Ukrainian Weekly, November 2, 2003, No. 44, Vol. LXXI


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