ANALYSIS: Why is the opposition weak in Ukraine? (12/28/03)

ANALYSIS

Why is the opposition weak in Ukraine?

by Taras Kuzio
RFE/RL Poland, Belarus and Ukraine Report

The "velvet revolution" last month in Georgia that led to the resignation of President Eduard Shevardnadze should make us contemplate why similar developments did not take place in Ukraine in 2000-2002. The severity of the Kuchmagate crisis, after all, led to opposition demonstrations as large as those in Georgia (20,000 to 50,000 people). Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma was on the defensive from November 2000, when the Kuchmagate crisis began, to March 2001, when he regained the initiative after violence erupted at a mass opposition demonstration in Kyiv.

Although the authorities did poorly in the proportional half of the March 2002 parliamentary elections, they made up for this when most deputies elected in one-seat constituencies joined pro-presidential factions. Since the elections, the authorities have consolidated their power by taking control of all key institutions.

Ukrainians are disillusioned with politics as a whole, and not just with the authorities. All institutions - presidential and parliamentary - obtain low levels of public trust. A June poll by the Democratic Initiatives polling center found that a striking 48.8 percent of respondents did not trust NGOs and political parties; 57.5 percent said, in the main, that they did not trust those groups.

A November Democratic Initiatives poll found that only five parties could make it through the 4 percent threshold of parliamentary representation, of which two were pro-presidential: Ukraine's Regions and the Social Democratic Party-United (SDPU). None of the parties that belong to Our Ukraine would individually make it (unlike the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, and Yulia Tymoshenko's Fatherland Party).

Most Ukrainians believe change is required but do not believe that they have the power to push these changes through. A poll cited by the Ukrayinska Pravda website back on March 11 found that only 7 percent believed few changes were necessary in Ukraine. Meanwhile, 45 percent, 38 percent and 11 percent, respectively, believed that "radical," "evolutionary" and "revolutionary" changes were needed in Ukraine.

Nevertheless, this does not translate into support for opposition activities. A Razumkov Center poll cited in Zerkalo Nedeli on September 27 found that half of Ukraine's population did not back the opposition protests. A poll cited by Interfax on April 25 found even higher negative views of demonstrations, with 69.2 percent of respondents unwilling to take part in them.

Does the public desire to learn the views of the opposition (something which is difficult because they have limited access to television)? When asked if they knew the views of the opposition, 64 percent said "no," according to a May 28 combined poll by four leading sociological organizations on the Ukrayinska Pravda website. When asked if they wished to learn more, only 46 percent said "yes" or were partially interested, whereas even more - 54 percent - said "no" completely or were primarily disinterested.

How is this explained? A Center for Sociological and Political Research poll reported by the Ukrayinska Pravda website on April 25 found that, although 33.2 percent supported the opposition and only 15.9 percent the authorities, a striking 31.4 percent supported neither side.

This reflects a high degree of atomization of the population. An August Razumkov Center poll found that 90 percent and 92 percent of Ukrainians believe they have no influence over, respectively, local and central authorities, while 91 percent also believe that human rights are regularly infringed.

During the 2002 election campaign Volodymyr Lytvyn, then head of the presidential administration, said that the "opposition does not enjoy the support of the population," according to an UNIAN report of February 23, 2002. Although the four opposition parties and blocs (Our Ukraine, the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, the Socialist Party and the Communist Party) obtained nearly two-thirds of the votes in the proportional half of elections, Mr. Lytvyn's comment is partially true.

This, of course, does not mean the authorities are popular either. A November poll by Democratic Initiatives found that if elections were held at that time, 1.5 percent would vote for President Kuchma, 1.3 percent for Mr. Lytvyn, and 3 percent for current head of the presidential administration, Viktor Medvedchuk, whose SDPU is one of Ukraine's largest by membership.

The problem for the opposition is that large negative votes are to be found both for the authorities and for the opposition. In a May poll by Democratic Circle Ms. Tymoshenko and Communist Party leader Petro Symonenko obtained two of the highest negative ratings - 29 percent and 26.9 percent, respectively. Both leaders suffer from different problems - Ms. Tymoshenko is a "dissident oligarch" and Mr. Symonenko is a Communist hard-liner. The November Democratic Initiatives poll gave both Messrs. Kuchma and Medvedchuk negative ratings of 50 percent. That was not good news for the opposition as Ms. Tymoshenko and Mr. Symonenko followed closely with negative ratings of 44 percent and 25 percent, respectively.

Even Our Ukraine leader Viktor Yushchenko - always the most popular candidate in polls, does not escape some negative ratings. Mr. Yushchenko is the only opposition leader who obtains higher positive than negative ratings and the lowest negative ratings. At the same time, 32 percent of Ukrainians would never vote for Mr. Yushchenko, according to a poll cited by the Ukrayinska Pravda website on August 18.

In December 2002, Democratic Initiatives and September Democratic Circle polls, Mr. Yushchenko's negative ratings were between 14.4 percent and 17 percent. Mr. Yushchenko reached the peak of his popularity in April 2002, just after the elections with 29.3 percent, which declined to between 18 percent and 21 percent in September of the following year.

Questions of "trust" are also a factor in public attitudes toward the opposition. The December 2002 Democratic Initiatives poll gave low levels of "trust" and high levels of "distrust" to Mr. Symonenko (14.8 percent versus 46.6 percent), Ms. Tymoshenko (12.5 percent versus 53.8 percent), and Socialist Party leader Oleksander Moroz (12.2 percent versus 42.6 percent). The September poll by Democratic Circle found that Mr. Yushchenko was trusted fully or mostly by 48 percent of Ukrainians, although 37 percent still distrusted him completely or partially. Higher levels of distrust than trust were found for all other leading Ukrainian officials and opposition leaders.

Large numbers of Ukrainians will never vote for the majority of leading politicians. According to the September poll by Democratic Circle, this ranges from 34 percent to 36 percent for Mr. Medvedchuk, Ms. Tymoshenko and Mr. Symonenko, and 20 percent to 25 percent for Mr. Lytvyn, Prime Minister and Party of Regions leader Viktor Yanukovych, and National Bank Chairman and Labor Ukraine leader Serhii Tyhypko. Messrs. Yushchenko and Moroz are the most popular: only 19 percent and 22 percent, respectively, would never consider voting for them.

Dr. Taras Kuzio is a resident fellow at the Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Toronto.

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