NEWS ANALYSIS

Ukraine faces radical changes in its constitutional system

Editor's note: The analysis below was written before the Verkhovna Rada on December 24, 2003, passed in its first reading one of three bills on amending the Constitution of Ukraine. A total of 276 deputies voted in favor of a bill co-authored by Communist leader Petro Symonenko and Viktor Medvedchuk, presidential chief of staff, which would make 2004 the last year that popular and direct presidential elections are held in Ukraine, instead giving this prerogative to the Parliament. The following analysis provides pertinent background that is crucial for an understanding of the issues and forces at work.

by Jan Maksymiuk
RFE/RL Poland, Belarus and Ukraine Report

The Verkhovna Rada is scheduled on December 23 to consider three political-reform bills that were drafted to introduce crucial amendments to the Ukrainian Constitution of 1996.

According to a majority of Ukrainian observers, one bill, registered in the Parliament under No. 3027-1 and authored by an ad hoc parliamentary commission (which included opposition activists Oleksander Moroz and Anatolii Matvienko), stands no chance of being approved.

The real parliamentary debate is expected to focus on bills No. 4105 (prepared by the presidential administration headed by Viktor Medvedchuk and preliminarily approved by Communist leader Petro Symonenko, and therefore referred to as the Medvedchuk-Symonenko draft) and No. 4180 (prepared by a group of pro-presidential lawmakers, the so-called Havrysh draft).

The Medvedchuk-Symonenko and Havrysh bills propose that the president be elected by Parliament instead of by direct ballot, but they differ in their suggested dates of implementation of such a move. The Medvedchuk-Symonenko bill wants the president to be elected via universal ballot in October 2004 and serve until the new president is elected by the Verkhovna Rada in 2006, within a month after the inauguration of a newly elected legislature. Since the regular parliamentary election is expected by the end of March 2006, such an "interim president" would serve for some 18 months.

The Havrysh bill proposes that the Parliament elect the president already in October 2004, the current Verkhovna Rada's term is extended by one year, and the new president is elected again by lawmakers in 2007.

The Medvedchuk-Symonenko bill was reportedly supported by the signatures of 292 lawmakers (300 votes are necessary to change the Ukrainian Constitution).

Ukraine's Constitutional Court recently ruled that both bills conform with Articles 157 and 158 of the Constitution of Ukraine, which set a number of general restrictions on constitutional amendments.

The procedure for amending the Constitution by the Verkhovna Rada requires two steps. First, the amendments need to be approved "in the first reading" by a simple majority (at least 226 votes). Second, they must be approved by a two-thirds majority (at least 300 votes) at the legislature's next regular session. Thus, if the Verkhovna Rada wants to apply new rules to the October 2004 presidential election, it must endorse either the Medvedchuk-Symonenko bill or the Havrysh bill (or both of them, or a mix of the two) by at least 226 votes on Decembe 23, before its winter-holiday recess.

The mustering of 226 votes for the Medvedchuk-Symonenko draft by the pro-presidential parliamentary majority seems to be an easy task, since the Communist Party is essentially in favor of strengthening the parliamentary prerogatives at the expense of presidential ones. The Communists are offering their support to the constitutional reform in exchange for the introduction of a fully proportional, party-list system of parliamentary elections.

What else may change in Ukraine's political system apart from the way of electing the country's president if the Medvedchuk-Symonenko bill is adopted in its current form?

The president's right to propose the entire Cabinet of Ministers will be limited to four officials: prime minister, defense minister, foreign affairs minister, and head of the Security Service. The prime minister will propose all other Cabinet members, as well as the heads of state committees. The prime minister will also nominate all regional governors. The Parliament will be given the right not only to approve Cabinet members and other high-ranking officials, but also to dismiss them.

The president will receive the right to dissolve the Parliament if it fails to form a pro-government coalition within 30 days, form a Cabinet within 60 days, elect a president within three months, or convene for more than 30 days during the ongoing session.

A people's deputy may be stripped of his/her parliamentary mandate if he/she fails to participate in plenary sitting for more than 60 days, quits the caucus of the party that placed him/her on the ballot, or fails to suspend his/her salaried activity outside the Parliament.

There is little doubt that the constitutional reform was primarily devised by the presidential administration either to prevent Our Ukraine leader Viktor Yushchenko - the country's most popular, Western-oriented politician - from becoming the president in 2004 or to limit his possible presidential term to a year and a half.

The presidential administration is seemingly aware that none of the potential candidates from the "party of power" - be it Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, presidential administration chief Viktor Medvedchuk, or National Bank of Ukraine Chairman Serhii Tyhypko, for instance - is able to beat Yushchenko in a nationwide presidential ballot.

On the other hand, President Leonid Kuchma and his aides turned out to be masters of backstage maneuvering when after the 2002 parliamentary election, which was won by Our Ukraine, they managed not only to form a fairly viable pro-government coalition without the Communists, but also to reduce the role of Mr. Yushchenko's bloc in the Verkhovna Rada to that of political extras. Apparently, the presidential entourage expects that it will be able to retain its current leverage in the country through controlling the future Parliament as well.

No less surprising than Mr. Kuchma's ingenuity in developing different schemes to diminish the political clout of his adversaries is Mr. Yushchenko's lack of a vision of what he plans to do in Ukrainian politics and with whom. To the disappointment of many in Ukraine, he failed to create a parliamentary coalition and run a government in 2002 following the victory in the parliamentary election. Now many fear that he is set to lose the fight for a full-fledged presidency.

One of his most natural potential allies, Yulia Tymoshenko, is becoming more and more impatient and irritated by his reluctance to strike a cooperation deal with her bloc (possibly, Mr. Yushchenko is afraid that Ms. Tymoshenko's public image of an oligarch involved in dubious financial machinations may do him more harm than good).

Another potential ally, Socialist Party leader Oleksander Moroz, has apparently received no reasonable proposal of cooperation from Mr. Yushchenko, since the Socialists seem to be generally in favor of the Medvedchuk-Symonenko constitutional-reform plan, even if some of them object to electing the president by Parliament.

And, judging by recent examples of the hostile reception of Mr. Yushchenko in eastern Ukraine, he has failed to convince any of the country's influential oligarchs to take his side in politics. On top of that, there have been no reports testifying that Mr. Yushchenko tried or even signaled his willingness to strike a kind of Yeltsin-Putin deal with Mr. Kuchma, whereby he would guarantee the current Ukrainian president (and some of his aides) quiet retirement from politics and immunity from prosecution in exchange for his smooth takeover in 2004.

Instead, Mr. Yushchenko is apparently pinning his hopes on ordinary voters. He has launched a campaign to collect signatures in support of the demand that the president continue to be elected in a universal ballot. The petition reportedly has so far been signed by more than 3 million people. Public surveys show that more than 80 percent of Ukrainians want to exercise their right to elect the president directly. Good for Mr. Yushchenko.

But what will happen if the authorities fail to heed this demand? The Kyiv-based Razumkov Center found in a poll in November that if the authorities launch a campaign of repression against the opposition and abolish the direct presidential election, no more than 27 percent of respondents would find the courage to provide "active" support to the opposition. Some 27 percent were unable to answer what they would do in such a situation, while 30 percent said they would do nothing at all.

As demonstrated by the "Ukraine Without Kuchma" and "Rise Up, Ukraine" opposition protest campaigns in 2000-2002, the political apathy of Ukrainians, or their reluctance to publicly demonstrate their discontent with the authorities, was even greater than that suggested by the above-mentioned poll. There is no reason to believe at the present moment that the implementation of the Medvedchuk-Symonenko constitutional overhaul may provoke an uprising against the Ukrainian authorities.

On the other hand, this possible overhaul also will not spark any significant public enthusiasm or instill the nation with new hope for a better life. The planned reform is not about a better life for the people but for their rulers.

Jan Maksymiuk is the Belarus, Ukraine and Poland specialist on the staff of RFE/RL Newsline.

Copyright © The Ukrainian Weekly, January 11, 2004, No. 2, Vol. LXXII

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