NEWS AND VIEWS

Russians go to the polls, but Putin cannot lose


by Bohdan Klid

On March 14 Russians choose a president in an election which the incumbent, Vladimir Putin - with 70-80 percent approval ratings - cannot lose. These astronomical ratings reflect his masterful ability to exploit the Russian people's yearning for order, which many Russians believe would come with a leader who rules with a strong hand (in colloquial Russian, khoziayin; literally, master), and nostalgia for empire, following the chaos, wild capitalism and loss of territory following the Soviet Union's collapse.

Mr. Putin was first elected president in March 2000 at the height of Russia's second war to crush Chechen independence. Following a series of apartment bombings in September 1999 - blamed on the Chechens - Mr. Putin, who was then prime minister, launched what he called an anti-terrorist operation. While the bombings provided a pretext, the aim of the second military campaign was to reverse the settlement following Russia's defeat in the first war (1994-1996), when Chechnya gained de facto independence.

The failed first war was symptomatic of the presidency of Boris Yeltsin, during which post-Soviet Russia lost its status as superpower and rival to the United States. Little Chechnya rubbed salt on to wounded Russian pride when it defeated the much better armed and far more numerous Russian army.

The Yeltsin administration also oversaw the collapse of the Russian economy. The remedy his administration prescribed for Russia's ailing, state-run industries was "shock therapy." In practice, this consisted of the rapid, and mostly rigged, privatization of state assets, which resulted in the instant enrichment of a small group of insiders, christened "oligarchs," who further looted state assets in 1996 in what became known as the loans for shares scandal. Another result of shock therapy was the liberalization of prices and hyperinflation, which wiped out the savings of the Russian populace and led to the collapse of their already low living standards.

Although Mr. Putin became president with the blessings of Mr. Yeltsin and allied oligarchs, his previous career in the KGB and its successor, the FSB, indicated support from this murky and blood-stained organization as well. Soon after assuming office, President Putin began re-establishing centralized control over Russia's regions - given autonomy under Yeltsin - symbolized by the appointment of former KGB and military officers to key government posts. Russia's Parliament, the Duma, has now been transformed into a rubber-stamp body. In parliamentary elections held last December, the Unity Party, which was created to support President Putin, gained a majority. Two of the largest opposition parties in the new Parliament are ultranationalist, adding shrill voices to the choir of Putin sycophants. Russia's president has also moved against the more independent-minded oligarchs: two have been driven into exile, while a third, the oil tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky, is in jail awaiting trial.

Mr. Putin's campaign against the oligarchs has been popular, but also highly selective. While he has gone after those tycoons who supported opposition political parties or owned media outlets critical of his regime, privately, Mr. Putin has advised the oligarchs that they can keep their assets as long as they stay out of politics (and, implicitly, support the president).

Inasmuch as major privatizations under President Yeltsin were largely fraudulent, and most Russian companies kept two sets of books to avoid paying ruinous taxes, they were breaking the law. However, the selective use of state power against businessmen who are also political opponents of the regime is what one researcher has aptly called the tactics of a blackmail state, not actions based on the rule of law.

Since becoming president, Mr. Putin has often said that he aims to restore Russia's greatness and power. In practice this has meant, first of all, regaining Chechnya. In the still ongoing second campaign perhaps as many as 100,000 Chechen civilians have been killed (80,000-100,000 died in the first war), and at least several thousand Russian soldiers and much treasure have been squandered.

Mr. Putin's greater aim, however, is to re-establish control over the republics of the former Soviet Union which gained independence upon the empire's collapse. In a recent speech he lamented the Soviet Union's demise as "a national tragedy" which in his view benefited only the "nationalists and elites" of the newly independent countries, like Georgia and Ukraine.

Mr. Putin's words and actions have resulted in astronomical approval ratings. To the people of Russia, many of whom lived miserably under Soviet rule but became further pauperized under President Yeltsin, his assault against some of the oligarchs is popular, and has given them a sense of satisfaction and revenge. Yet, most Russians today are still poor, while government and business practices remain corrupt.

By promising to restore Russia's greatness, President Putin has applied balm to the Russian people's bruised hubris over lost empire. In a highly symbolic act, he has partially rehabilitated Joseph Stalin, whose criminal and genocidal policies resulted in the deaths of many millions. For Mr. Putin and most Russians, however, Stalin is fondly remembered for his leadership during World War II and expansion of Soviet territory to its greatest size ever. Under Stalin, as well, there was order.

While President Putin is not Stalin reincarnated, he has brought back strong-man, authoritarian rule to Russia, albeit with a veneer of democracy. Although he projects the image of a modern, Western-oriented leader, he governs more in the Soviet tradition, without, however, the utopian ideology and its baggage. In today's Russia, Vladimir Putin is its master.


Dr. Bohdan Klid is a research scholar and assistant director at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, based in Edmonton at the University of Alberta.


Copyright © The Ukrainian Weekly, March 14, 2004, No. 11, Vol. LXXII


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